Evaluating and analyzing firms investment decisions: A study of UK domestic and cross-border acquisitions by Adel, Nour
 i 
BRUNEL UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Evaluating and Analyzing Firms‟ Investment Decisions          
-A Study of UK Domestic and Cross-Border Acquisitions- 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of philosophy 
 
By : Nour Adel 
03/03/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to many individuals for their valuable 
assistance during this work. Firstly, I am grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Bryan Mase, for 
his constant encouragement, support and direction. His own guidance allows him to 
provide me first-class supervision. 
Secondly, I am appreciative to my father who teaches me that I should work to achieve 
my aims and never give up. I am thankful also to my mother who without her blessings 
and guidance, I could not complete this thesis. I owe my deepest gratitude to my 
husband Wail and my children, who supported me in many ways to finish my thesis.  
It is my pleasure to thank my brothers, Ammar and Bander and their families for their 
support.  Finally, many thanks to all my friends specially those who supported and 
advised me 
 
Nour Adel  
March 2011 
 
 
 
 iii 
Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of four essays or chapters that investigate acquisitions made by UK 
firms. The main focus of the research is the acquirers‟ abnormal returns that are 
associated with the announcement of domestic and cross-border acquisitions. The 
research provides empirical evidence on some of the significant issues that have been 
raised in the literature, particularly focusing on measuring operating performance for 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions over the long-term. 
 
The first essay investigates acquirers‟ announcement abnormal returns for acquisitions 
that have been conducted by UK firms, either domestically or internationally. The 
principal finding is that acquisitions of domestic firms appear to generate larger returns, 
whereas acquisitions classified as cross-border do not appear to add value to the 
acquiring firm. 
 
The second essay examines the characteristics of the deal, and how these impact the 
acquirers‟ returns for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions. The characteristics 
considered are the method of payment, the industrial relationship between the acquirer 
and the target, the relative size of the acquirer to the target, the type of the target firm 
and the Book-to-Market ratio of the acquiring firm.  
 
The third essay investigates the directors‟ overconfidence and its impact on the 
acquirers‟ returns. Directors‟ overconfidence is examined depending on the self-
attribution bias by distinguishing between the abnormal returns to frequent and 
infrequent acquirers.  
 
The fourth essay examines insider trading via studying the relationship between the 
private investment decisions of the directors and the firm‟s investment in respect of 
acquisitions it makes over the announcement date of the acquisition. Two different 
methods are proposed to classify directors into optimistic and neutral based on these 
personal portfolio trades. 
 
The fifth empirical chapter focuses on domestic and cross-border acquisitions with 
public targets, and studies their synergy gains and operating performance for a 3-year 
period after the announcement year. The aim is to try to understand what these firms 
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gain from such acquisitions, given the apparent absence of a gain in value at the 
announcement of the investment. 
It is essential to add that the importance of this thesis comes from shedding a light on 
the role of acquisition activity in UK market within last 10 years domestically and 
internationally. Furthermore, providing a significant advice to firms not to allocate their 
capital in acquisitions with public targets because there is not benefit from investing in 
these types of investment 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction - 
 
1.1 Motivations and Importance 
 
The thesis is motivated by several factors: first, the researcher examines the acquirers‟ 
returns for both UK domestic and cross-border acquisitions to investigate whether there 
are any abnormal returns for acquirers that have conducted such domestic investments. 
In addition, the researcher investigates the major variables which may have an impact 
on acquirers‟ returns, such as, the method of payment, the relative size, the industrial 
relationship, the Book-To-Market ratio, and the type of the target firm. The main reason 
for investigating the acquirers‟ returns is that there are many studies that have examined 
acquirers‟ returns in the UK economy recently, and that have undertaken a comparison 
between acquirers‟ returns when acquiring either domestically or internationally.  
Furthermore, the impact of directors‟ overconfidence on acquirers‟ returns is being 
tested and also the influence of self-attribution bias for those acquisitions is being 
investigated, and that is for domestic and cross-border acquisitions. The major reason 
which leads the researcher to investigate directors‟ overconfidence is to determine 
whether there are any significant influences of managerial behaviour on acquirers‟ 
returns of domestic and cross-border acquisitions in the UK economy, and whether 
these influences will differ between domestic and cross-border acquisitions.  
Finally, studying abnormal returns for acquirers according to the type of the target firms 
leads to the further investigation of the synergy gains for those investments in relation 
to deals with public targets. This is in order to determine whether there are any gains 
which are hidden within the acquirers‟ abnormal returns. Moreover, the results from 
investigating the synergy gains has guided the approach to an examination of the 
operating performance for acquirers of international and domestic public targets for 
three years after the effective date of each deal. This can be considered as a real 
contribution, and provides new evidence in this thesis because measuring operating 
performance for these two kinds of investments will help to give a clear picture about 
the real gains that can be captured from them. 
It will be useful for researchers to examine and investigate acquirers‟ returns in more 
detail, especially for those firms that have made deals in large and important economies 
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such as the UK and the USA, because studying those returns may give a good impact 
and clear picture about firms‟ recent and future activities. 
In the following sections, a thorough explanation of the contribution of the thesis and a 
general idea about the topic will be provided.   
1.2 Contribution 
 
This research is divided into five main essays.  The first is titled “UK Acquirers Returns 
in domestic and cross-border acquisitions” where an investigation of the acquirers‟ 
returns from the beginning of 2000 toward the end of 2009 is conducted. Furthermore, 
in order to calculate the acquirers‟ abnormal returns before and after the announcement 
date of the deal, the researcher depended mainly on the event study methodology, 
specifically the Market Model application. The results of the study strongly confirm 
that, after comparing the acquirers‟ returns for both domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions, those acquirers that have conducted domestic deals generate higher returns 
compared with acquirers of cross-border acquisitions, and that this is evident both 
before and after the announcement date of the deal.  
 The second essay is titled “The Determinants of Domestic and Cross-Border 
Acquisitions”. This chapter investigates the major determinants that may have impacted 
acquirers‟ returns, such as, the method of payment, the industrial sector, the relative 
size, the Book to Market ratio, and the type of the target firm, and that is for acquirers 
undertaking either domestic or cross-border acquisitions.  The researcher depends on the 
event study method to calculate the abnormal returns for acquirers around and over the 
period of the announcement date for each deal. The major results confirm that there are 
some influences from some variables on acquirers‟ returns, and that these appeared 
clearly after running the regression of acquirers‟ returns against the above variables.  
The third essay is titled “Studying Directors‟ Overconfidence and its Impact on 
Acquirers‟ Returns”. This essay investigates the managerial behaviour, in terms of 
directors‟ overconfidence, and its possible impact on the acquirers‟ returns. This chapter 
examines “self-attribution” and its effect on the acquirer‟s returns due to the fact that 
some studies have considered self-attribution as a basis for explaining the managerial 
behaviour regarding firms‟ investment decisions. Therefore, the researcher divides both 
the domestic and cross-border sample into two main sections; the first one includes 
frequent acquirers, which is when the acquirer makes at least two acquisitions within 
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one year before the announcement date of the main deal. The second section includes 
infrequent acquirers who have not carried out any acquisition during the year prior to 
the announcement day of the deal. The results confirm that infrequent acquirers have 
higher and better returns compared to frequent acquirers, and that is evident for both 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions. These results confirm other studies‟ results, 
suggesting that undertaking more than one deal within a short space of time will lower 
the acquirers‟ returns. This implies that the market recognizes the Hubris effect, which 
is clear in measuring the self-attribution.    
The fourth essay is titled “Insider Trading and Acquirer Returns in Domestic and Cross-
Border Acquisitions”. The researcher examines in this chapter the relationship between 
the private investment decisions of directors of each firm and the firm‟s investment in 
terms of the acquisitions it makes. The link is examined via two main measures that 
depend on the personal portfolio of managers, i.e. the number of transactions method 
and the amount of transactions method. The first method depends on the difference in 
the number of transactions between the buys and sales which have been carried out by 
the directors of each firm. The director can be considered as optimistic according to this 
method if the number of buys is larger than the number of sales by at least two 
transactions; otherwise the directors are regarded as being neutral. On the other hand, 
the amount method relies on the difference between the sizes of the transactions which 
have been conducted by the directors of the firm. The directors can be considered as 
optimistic if the difference is positive, otherwise the directors will be considered to be 
neutral. Moreover, the event study methodology is relied upon to calculate the 
acquirers‟ abnormal returns. The results verify according to both methods that domestic 
and cross-border acquisitions which are undertaken by the directors who are classified 
as being optimistic generate higher returns compared to those that are conducted by 
directors who are classified as being neutral, and that is for the windows studied. The 
researcher applied the overlapping observations for deals that are carried out by 
optimistic directors crossways using both of the earlier methods in order to check the 
robustness of the results. The results confirm that optimistic directors generate higher 
returns estimated over a 5-day event window. It is important to add that there are no 
clear differences in acquires‟ returns between domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
regarding measuring directors‟ optimism.  
 The fifth essay is titled “Synergy Gains and Operating Performance for Acquisitions 
with Public Targets”. The reason for investigating this topic comes from taking into 
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account the results from the earlier essays. Moreover, even though the study‟s results 
show that there are no significant returns from those investments, it has been observed 
that the number of acquisitions keeps increasing year after year in the UK, which leads 
to an investigation of whether there are any synergy gains emanating from those 
investments. This essay is divided into two main sections; the first part includes an 
examination of the synergy gains for both the acquirers and the targets. This part‟s 
results show that acquisitions with public targets have lower returns compared with 
deals with private targets, and also that they do not deliver any significant synergy 
gains.  
 The second part contains a test for operating performance for the same acquirers who 
acquire domestic, cross-border acquisitions with public targets. The researcher depends 
on the return on assets to calculate operating performance over the long-term. This 
operating performance is estimated for three years after the effective date of the deal, 
with the main results confirming the absence of a clear gain in operating performance, 
which is especially evident after the announcement year.  
Furthermore, a regression has been run to examine the impact on the operating 
performance from several independent variables such as the method of payment, the 
industrial sector, the relative size, the Book to Market ratio. The major motive behind 
using the regression is to determine whether the operating performance of the acquirers 
will be affected by any particular variable. The major results demonstrate that the 
method of payment has an impact on domestic operating performance, while the Book-
to-Market ratio has a significant impact on operating performance for the cross-border 
acquisitions.  
It is notable that the novelty of this thesis is the presentation of new evidence via 
examining operating performance for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, 
which is considered a real contribution.   
Several obstacles had to be overcome to continue and complete this research. The main 
one is the lack of some information which led the researcher to drop some firms and as 
a result reduced the number of firms in both samples, the domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. This was especially important in relation to the information that was 
required for the last essay on operating performance.  
Generally, the results make a good contribution in developing our knowledge of the 
determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions behaviour, and to the researcher‟s 
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understanding of the acquirers‟ returns and their determinants. Essay three presents 
evidence regarding the managerial behaviour which outlines a good reason for making 
acquisitions and deals, and how these can even reduce the value of the firm.  Essay four 
also introduces evidence that examines the effect of acquiring public targets, and the 
importance of calculating the synergy gains. In addition, the fourth essay introduces 
new evidence which concerns investigating the operating performance for cross-border 
and domestic acquisitions with public targets for a three-year period after the 
announcement year.  
 
1.3 Background information  
 
 A basic idea about foreign direct investments should be mentioned before adding or 
explaining more detail about mergers and acquisitions and their influence on firms‟ 
returns. Foreign direct investments have been at the centre of interest for many years, 
and this interest derives from many aspects. Firstly, these kinds of investments have 
witnessed a very fast and significant growth within a short period of time. Secondly, 
these investments have been common in large economies such as the USA and the UK 
and have had a beneficial impact on those economies. Finally, foreign direct 
investments play an important role in channeling resources between countries. (See, 
Lizondo; 1991) 
Furthermore, many studies and reports have mentioned that foreign investments include 
or divide into many different types of investments and there are major connections 
between foreign direct investments and those types of investments. For example, the 
report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Developments has mentioned 
that there is an important relationship between foreign direct investments and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions as a major type of those investments. 
“A firm can undertake FDI in a host country in either one of two ways: Greenfield 
investment in a new facility or merging with as existing local firm. The local firm may 
be privately or state owned: privatization involving foreign investors count as cross-
border M&As, which entails a change in the control of the merged or acquired firm. In 
a cross-border merger, the assets and operation of the two firms belonging to two 
different countries are combined to establish a new legal entity. In a cross border 
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acquisition, the control or assets and operations is transferred from a local to a foreign 
company, the former becoming an affiliate of the latter” (UNCTAD, 2000, page 99) 
 
 
 
Moreover, foreign direct investment can be divided into five types which will be 
explained in more detail in the following chapter. These types can be identified as the 
following: 
 Investing directly via licensing through a local firm. 
 Investing directly via Greenfield investments. 
 Investing by acquiring a local firm. 
 Investing by merging with a domestic firm. 
 Entering a strategic alliance with a domestic firm. 
Mergers and acquisitions are considered to be a major type of foreign direct investment, 
and the importance of those investments comes from the substantial growth of mergers 
and acquisitions over the world within the last three decades, especially in the USA and 
the UK. Furthermore, these investments occurred in waves within a short period of 
time, which will be explained in more detail in the next chapter. For example, within the 
last wave of mergers and acquisitions, many studies and reports have mentioned that 
UK firms have played an important role in making or achieving mergers and 
acquisitions all around the world.  
  
One can add that within the international movement and waves of mergers and 
acquisitions, the UK firms have played an important and vital role. In addition, one can 
note that the number of domestic acquisitions increased significantly between 1993 and 
1994 from 526 deals to more than 670 acquisitions, and also rose from 430 deals in 
2002 to 869 acquisitions in 2007. On the other hand, the number of cross-border 
acquisitions increased from 464 deals in 1997 to more than 590 in 1999. While the 
value of domestic acquisitions does not show any noticeable increase over time, the 
value of the cross-border acquisitions has increased considerably from £9.213 billion in 
1993 to £181.285 billion in 2000, which explains the idea that by 2000, the UK was the 
biggest acquiring country around the world. However, the situation differs in 2004, 
because the report of the National Statistics Office reviews in its fourth publication in 
2004 that the spending on acquisitions in the UK by UK firms increased to £31.2 billion 
compared with £18.7 billion in 2003. The report also states that spending on 
acquisitions abroad by UK firms decreased slightly from £20.8 billion in 2003 to £20.3 
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billion in 2004, while the number of these types of cross-border acquisitions increased 
from 243 deals in 2003 to 278 acquisitions in 2004.  
 
Recently, one can add that spending on cross-border acquisitions by UK firms 
decreased from £2.5 billion in the third quarter of 2009 to £0.9 billion in the fourth 
quarter, and also that the number of cross-border acquisitions declined slightly to 25 
deals compared with 26 acquisitions in the third quarter of the same year. In addition, 
the spending on domestic acquisitions by UK firms showed some signs of a decrease 
from £1.9 billion in the third quarter of 2009 to £1.3 in the fourth quarter of the same 
year. These changes remain small compared with the changes or decreases in spending 
on cross-border acquisitions. The number of domestic acquisitions showed some signs 
of a dramatic decrease, from almost 100 deals in the first quarter of 2009 to less than 60 
acquisitions at the end of 2009.  
After introducing some brief information about foreign direct investments and mergers 
and acquisitions, more detail about foreign direct investments and their types will be 
presented in the next chapter. Additionally, further information about mergers, 
acquisitions, their historical type and the major motives which lead many firms to 
acquire or purchase another firm domestically and internationally will be discussed. 
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Chapter 2: Foreign Direct Investments – Mergers and 
Acquisitions- 
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Foreign Direct Investments and Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
 2.1 Introduction  
 
Foreign direct investments have been the centre of interest for a long time. This interest 
is the result of a number of reasons, including, the fast growth of these kinds of 
investments within a very short period of time. For example, Penings and Sluwaegen 
(2004) mentioned that the world in the last two decades has witnessed a massive growth 
in foreign direct investment and a significant increase in the number of “multinational 
enterprises”. Furthermore, this increase in foreign direct investment has occurred 
predominantly in the USA and the UK, which raises some questions regarding the 
results of such investments in these big economies. For example, Hood and Taggart 
(1997) point out that during the 1980s the UK became the most attractive place for 
German FDI in Europe, which placed the UK into the second position after the USA in 
terms of its receipt of FDI around the world. More importantly, these investments are 
essential for transforming wealth, not only among firms but also countries. According to 
Asiedu (2001) foreign direct investments have grown from $24 billion in 1990 to $178 
billion in 2000 which was regarded as welcoming news among poor countries that do 
not have access to international capital markets.(Lizondo, 1991) 
According to many studies, the most common type of foreign direct investment is the 
merger and acquisition, (Limmack, 1991. Conn et al, 1995. Sudarsanam et al, 2001). 
Due to the reasons mentioned earlier, the researcher will compare between domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions within the UK as a big and important economy, trying to 
analyze and evaluate their investment decisions by observing their abnormal returns, 
which will help to recommend their experiences to similar firms in other countries. In 
order to fulfill this purpose a consideration will be made of the United Kingdom‟s 
experience in respect of both domestic and cross-border acquisitions.  
In this chapter, the main information about foreign direct investments generally and 
mergers and acquisitions in detail will be introduced. This information will include 
some essential detail about foreign direct investment and its importance. Moreover it 
will provide a further explanation about mergers and acquisitions and their role in the 
economy. Furthermore, the main motivations which lead firms to make and complete 
these types of investment will be explored. Thus this chapter will be organized as 
follows. The next section will contain a general literature review. The second section 
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will include the history of mergers and acquisitions. The third section will introduce in 
more detail the major motivations for making acquisitions. The fourth section will 
present the importance of acquisitions. Finally, the last section will outline briefly some 
information about the data which has been used in the whole thesis. 
2.2 Literature review: 
 
It is obvious and clear that foreign direct investment flows have increased significantly 
within the last three decades. This idea has been welcomed by governments around the 
world, and it is noticeable that both developing and developed countries are trying hard 
to attract multinational enterprises to invest in their economies, which they do by 
offering financial and economic facilities to encourage those investments.  
The past decade has witnessed a remarkable increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) 
to developing countries, increasing from $24 billion in 1990 to $178 billion in 2000. For 
example, in 1999, developing countries have obtained $208 billion in FDI, and that is an 
increase equal to 16% compared with 1998. On the other hand, the developed countries 
attracted around $636 billion in FDI in 1999, and the US and the UK had the biggest 
share as investors and targets. It is notable that the growth in these kinds of investments 
has increased mainly since the mid 1980s. Since then the world economy has witnessed 
a strong growth, and from that time foreign direct investments have become the most 
general financial resources in many markets. Furthermore, many studies have pointed 
out that foreign direct investments grow much faster than any other type of investments, 
which makes it reasonable when the UN mentions in its World Investment Report 
(1994) that the world of FDI has grown at very extraordinary rates to achieve around 
$225 billion in 1990. This sharp increase in rates of foreign direct investments may 
appear as a result of many major changes in the economy, such as the combination of 
the global economy or what is known as “globalization” or to the increase in the number 
of multinational enterprises. Furthermore, the growth in the foreign direct investments 
flows was stable and quick since the late 1980s, and then these flows increased around 
six times from $53 billion in 1985 to $315 billion in 1996. ( Asiedu, 2002; Chakrabarti, 
2001; Moshirian, 2001; Gregory, McCorriston, 2003; Li, Moshirian, 2004; Penings, 
Sluwaegen, 2004; Barrios et. al., 2005; Brakman et al., 2006) 
Furthermore, Agarwal (1980) refers to three main hypotheses on the tendencies of 
countries and firms to establish foreign direct investments and these hypotheses build 
on the imperfection of the market. The first one is the differential rate of return which 
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assumes that FDI can work as a function of international differences in rates of return 
on capital investment. Thus FDI moves from countries with low returns to those 
expected to achieve or give high returns per unit of capital.  The second is the portfolio 
hypothesis which supposes that investors are usually interested not only in the rate of 
returns but also in the risk when choosing their portfolios. Thus the investment is a 
positive function for the first one and a negative one for the second. The third 
hypothesis consists of two sub hypotheses; the first part is the output hypothesis which 
refers to a positive relationship between the foreign direct investment of the firm and its 
output (sales) in the host country. The second part is the market size hypothesis which 
assumes the same idea about the relationship between investments and output but on the 
macro or the market level of the host country. 
Although there are a number of theories that have been developed to explain the main 
determinants and effects of FDI, a specific theory that has become popular is called the 
eclectic theory. This theory states that FDI is determined by three sets of advantages or 
benefits. The first benefit is the ownership advantage in the host country, which means 
that the firm has this advantage compared with its competitors, usually regarding its 
product or its technological knowledge. The second advantage is the location advantage 
which indicates the reason why it is absolutely crucial for the firm to invest in the host 
country as an alternative to investing in its home country. This benefit draws from 
facilities or services which are introduced by the host country to those firms. The third 
advantage is the internalization advantage. In addition, we can find that foreign firms 
are interested sometimes in a specific location or a specific country in which to invest, 
but some obstacles may stand in the way of these investments such as, the high tariffs in 
the host country, the tax rates and the application of strict laws in the host country. 
(Gastanaga et al, 1998) 
 On the other hand, foreign direct investment can take many types.  There are mainly 
five ways in which transnational companies can serve the foreign market. The first way 
is in the form of an indirect investment, where firms serve the market by licensing a 
domestic firm. The second type includes investing directly via Greenfield investments. 
The third and the fourth type incorporate the acquisition of or merger with a local firm. 
While the last type of these investments includes entering into a strategic alliance with a 
local firm. However, many articles consider that the most common type of FDI is the 
cross-border acquisitions and mergers. For example, in the UK, cross-border 
acquisitions form the major type of foreign investment in recent years, and in 1995, the 
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value of acquisition purchases by the UK was almost US$30m but by 1999 this had 
increased to US$209m. Moreover, the report of the UK Statistics Office mentions 
recently that the total number of acquisitions which have been conducted by UK firms 
abroad has increased from 365 deals in 2005 to 441 acquisitions in 2007. (E.g. Lall, 
2002; Gregory and McCorriston, 2005) 
One should also mention that China has played an important role in attracting foreign 
direct investments within the last two decades. Gao (2005) points out that in the late 
1970s China started its own policy to attract foreign direct investments by setting up the 
open-door policy. Since then, the actual FDI inflow increased from $0.64 billion in 
1983 to $3.49 billion in 1990 and these net inflows reached $52.7 billion in 2002 
according to the official statistics. 
Furthermore, there are many factors which play an important role in attracting foreign 
direct investments, such as the exchange rate. Froot and Stein (1991) assume in their 
paper that the decrease of the dollar has coincided with a spectacular increase in FDI in 
the United States, due to the weakness of the dollar which makes certain US assets less 
expensive to foreigners who hold their wealth in other currencies.  
 Thus the researcher provides a further explanation and definitions to those types of 
investments which will help to simplify forward explanation. According to Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) mergers can be defined as business combinations in which the number of 
companies decreases after the transaction, moreover acquisitions could also be defined 
as less than 50% ownership of the target company's stock by the acquirer before the deal 
and more than 50% ownership after the deal. 
 Brakman et al (2006) have distinguished between international M&A and the 
Greenfield investments when they explain the main difference between them. They 
clarified that mergers and acquisitions investments are the controlling of assets and 
operations which are transferred from a domestic to a foreign company, while the 
Greenfield investments are becoming affiliates of the M&As. In addition, the World 
Investment Report 2000 mentions the important difference between cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions and Greenfield investments which states that mergers and 
acquisitions as investments include a „change of assets‟ from the domestic country to 
the foreign one, and also that mergers and acquisitions do not usually create new 
employment initially, whereas Greenfield investments do. Additionally, mergers and 
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acquisitions can relocate new technology, while Greenfield investment does not and that 
is especially clear at the point of entry to the foreign country. 
 
                                    FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
                                                        
 
   22% Greenfield investments                                                  78% mergers and acquisitions       
                                  
 
  
                       3% mergers                                                                                            97% acquisitions 
 
 
 
 
65% full acquisitions                                   15% more than                                               16% (10-49) 
                                                                      50% acquisitions       
     
Source: Brakman et al (2006), and the percentage associated with different forms of investment.  
2.3 The history of M&A     
According to Aw and Chatterjee (2004) mergers and acquisitions are widespread 
nowadays with companies acquiring targets all over the world. Moreover, they state that 
historically, most of these deals were concentrated in the USA and in the UK, but after 
the 1990s mergers and acquisitions deals have entered Europe, which became a major 
source and host location to these investments. After the golden age of M&A activity in 
the 1990s, that activity began to increase after an obvious deceleration from 2002-2003 
following the peak activity during the „dot-com‟ period with $766 billion worth of 
acquisitions in 2004. (Dube and Glascock, 2006)  
Many studies have mentioned that it is now a well recognized fact that mergers and 
acquisitions happen in cyclical waves. The second industrial revolution concluded in the 
first European merger wave (1880-1904) which aimed at creating cartels. While anti-
trust regulation limited monopoly control, it also started a second merger wave (1919-
29) that led to increased vertical integration.  
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The third European merger wave started in the 1950s, but reached its peak by the mid-
1960s. Diversification and the establishment of large multinational companies were the 
main forces behind the global markets during this wave. The great developments in the 
technology field, as well as the growth in the financial markets form the main reasons 
for the fourth merger wave (1983-89).  During the final period, a fifth wave took place 
between  1993 and the beginning of 2000 as the total dollar value paid for target firms 
in the USA and Europe increased by twice that compared with the previous years. This 
wave comes with an economic boom, and also it witnesses the growth of new European 
stock exchanges such as the European New Markets and the expansion in the Internet 
and telecommunications industries.  During this period, and after the beginning of the 
fifth wave in 1993, the M&A wave grew even more with a value of $1,574 million in 
1997, $2,634 million in 1998, and $3,451 million in 2000. Despite many economic 
circumstances such as the overcapacity in the traditional sectors of many industries, 
which caused an unexpected decrease in merger activity acquisitions, acquisitions 
continue to be extraordinarily popular. For example, 1999 was extraordinary for the 
M&A market in Europe, because this market increased as much as the USA market and 
around 12% of the total value of that market was made via deals in excess of $100 
million. (See, Hayward, 2002; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004) 
Furthermore, many studies have noticed that mergers and acquisitions are the most 
common type of FDI which have been made within the last decade compared with 
Greenfield investments. (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004) 
Within the international movement and waves of mergers and acquisitions, UK firms 
have played an important and vital role. It is essential to add that by 2000, the UK was 
the largest acquiring country around the world. However, the situation was different in 
2004 as stated in the report of the National Statistics Office. It reviews acquisitions in 
its fourth publication, and illustrates that in 2004 spending on acquisitions in the UK by 
UK firms increased to £31.2 billion compared with £18.7 billion in 2003. The report 
moreover states that the spending on acquisitions abroad by UK firms decreased slightly 
from £20.8 billion in 2003 to £20.3 billion in 2004. The total value of cross-border 
acquisitions increased from £18.709 billion in 2004 to £37.412 billion in 2006.  
Recently, it could be noted from figures (1) and (2) that spending on cross-border 
acquisitions by UK firms decreased from £2.5 billion in the third quarter of 2009 to £0.9 
billion in the fourth quarter. In addition, there was a slight decline in the number of 
cross-border acquisitions to 25 deals compared with 26 acquisitions in the third quarter 
 15 
from the same year. Moreover, spending on domestic acquisitions by UK firms showed 
some decrease from £1.9 billion in the third quarter of 2009 to £1.3 in the fourth quarter 
of the same year. These changes remain small compared to the change or decrease in 
spending on cross-border acquisitions. The number of domestic acquisitions decreased 
dramatically from almost 100 deals at the first quarter of 2009 to less than 60 
acquisitions at the end of 2009.  
According to the report that has been published by the National Statistics Office, the 
Untied States of America was the main destination for the UK firms‟ investment abroad 
in 2009. The report mentions that spending was around £4.9 billion compared with £7.6 
billion in 2008. On the other hand, Europe comes second as the destination for UK 
firms‟ acquisitions, with a total value of £1.9 billion in 2009 compared with £15.3 
billion in 2008. 
 
Figure 2. 1.The value and the number of domestic and cross-border acquisitions via UK firms (1993 – 
2009) 
Panel A: introduces the number of UK domestic and cross-border acquisitions. 
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Panel B: introduces the value of UK domestic and cross-border acquisitions  
 
Notes: 
Panel A introduces the total number of UK domestic and cross-border acquisitions within (1993-2009). 
Panel B includes the total value of UK domestic and cross-border acquisitions within (1993-2009). The 
value in expressed in sterling pound (billions) 
The source for this information is the National Statistics Office in the UK.  
 
As a result of the high importance of the mergers and acquisitions topic, a discussion of 
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following section. 
Mergers generally can be divided into the major two types as follows. i.e. The 
horizontal, and the vertical or conglomerate. Horizontal mergers include firms which 
are operating in the same business. Alternatively, vertical or conglomerate mergers 
involve firms which are not in the same business field, even though vertical mergers 
take place among related firms that operate at different stages of the production process. 
They can make use of each other‟s business in some way, possibly as a supplier or as a 
recipient for goods produced. The conglomerate merger aims to benefit from non-
specific synergies, whether financial or managerial. The offer itself can be a tender offer 
or aggressive one. The tender offer can be conditional or unconditional, and in 
processing this offer, an agreement of around 50 percent of shareholders of the target 
firm can be under the bidding firm‟s control. Also the shareholders of the target firm 
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another acquirer makes an alternative offer they have another 10-days to review the new 
offer. (Weston, Weaver, 2004)  
2.4 Motivations for making acquisitions 
Commonly, there are three main motives for takeovers, i.e. the synergy motive, the 
agency motive and hubris. The first motive supposes that the managers of both the 
target and the acquirer firm aim to develop the shareholders‟ wealth, and they will 
conduct the takeover only if it achieves benefits for both sides. The second motive 
proposes that takeovers generally take place because they improve the acquirer 
management‟s wealth at the expense of shareholders. Finally, the hubris motive 
suggests that takeovers occur as a result of managers‟ mistakes in evaluating the target 
firm, even if there is no gain from the acquisition. (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993) 
There are a number of major theories which may seek to explain some of the motives 
that lead any company to acquire another company. The first one, according to Firth 
(1980), is the neoclassical profit maximization theory. This theory assumes that 
competitive market forces lead firms to maximize shareholder wealth. Moreover firms 
will be involved in investing in case it facilitates an increase in the shareholder wealth 
of the acquiring company, which resembles the case of the increased profitability of the 
acquiring company by means of the creation of the monopoly power. The second theory 
is the maximizing management utility. This theory assumes that for achieving a certain 
level of profits, many managers will try to increase their own interests, which does not 
coexist with the increase in the shareholder wealth.  
In addition, Cassiman and Colombo (2006) mention that there are some classic motives 
which lead firms to combine into (or purchase) one firm. The first motive is financial 
economics which suggests that mergers and acquisitions sometimes happen to correct 
internal inefficiencies, agency problems, and capital market imperfections. The second 
one is the industrial organization motive, which proposes that doing mergers and 
acquisitions occurs as a result of a desire to strengthen the market power and the search 
for efficiency profits. Furthermore, Chapman (2003) points out that motivations for 
making mergers and acquisitions have been found in many articles and different studies, 
but they can be classified into four main motives. The first one supposes that mergers 
and acquisitions can be undertaken as a result of the managers‟ desires to increase their 
personal power. The second one suggests that shareholders‟ interest should be 
considered more than the managers‟ desire or interest. The third motive proposes that 
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mergers and acquisitions can be considered as a result of the supposed economic 
benefits to the acquiring firm drawing from a reduction of the costs or an increase in the 
size of the whole enterprise. Finally, the fourth motive supposes that the firm‟s long 
term strategic goals may be considered while making the deal, such as a desire for 
market control.  
Acquisitions and mergers can be the result of many different reasons according to 
Hayward (2003). He mentions that many firms acquire new resources which help them 
to enter new markets, such as AT&T‟s acquisitions at the beginning of the1990s. These 
acquisitions allowed the firm to obtain good access to the computing and wireless 
telephony markets.  
On the other hand, according to earlier discussions about M&A investments, the 
cultural issues cannot be ignored, which may be caused by this kind of deal and may 
form a great barrier to these investments.  
These cultural problems can be attributed to many aspects such as the decrease in 
performance, the loss of highly skilled employees, and a reduction in loyalty to that 
company. Furthermore, they can form a break factor if the company does not deal with 
them. For example, dealing with employees‟ reactions to mergers or acquisitions 
integration is an essential issue because this problem plays an important role in the 
success or failure of the integration (See e.g. Bourantas, Nicandrou, 1998; Pineda, 
Kummer, 2007). 
In addition, one needs to consider the major motives which lead some firms to make 
cross-border deals as part of their mergers and acquisitions strategy. Many studies 
assume that there are different theories, which are based on industrial organization, and 
propose an influential motive for these kinds of cross-border deals. For example, 
entering foreign markets for many firms may help them to get some benefits, such as 
the differential tax systems between nations which can have an impact on the marginal 
productivity of foreign direct investments through acquisitions. Furthermore, some 
studies apply this idea to cross-border acquisitions when they mention that there are 
many reasons for cross-border acquisitions such as, imperfections and costs in product 
or factor markets, biases in government and regulatory policies and imperfections and 
information asymmetries in capital markets. These imperfections and costs help 
multinational enterprises, which in turn may encourage foreign acquisitions to take 
advantage from monopoly rents or internalize actions that are expensive to perform 
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through their market. (See, for instance, Harris and Ravenscraft 1990; Goergen, 
Renneboog, 2004).  
In the following section of this chapter, more information about the role and the 
importance of both acquisitions and mergers will be introduced.  
 
2.5 The importance of acquisitions  
Mergers and acquisitions activity has been one of the most studied topics within the last 
two decades. Historically, a large number of these investments have been carried out by 
firms in the USA as well as in the UK. For example, over the late 1980s, the UK was 
the most important player as an acquiring nation in cross-border acquisitions with over 
30% of international corporate investments during that time. Moreover, recently the 
total number of domestic acquisitions by UK firms increased from 492 deals in 2004 to 
869 acquisitions in 2007. (Gregory, McCorriston, 2005) 
Cross-border investments can be considered as the most outstanding feature of recent 
economic trends and many countries are attracting these kinds of investments and 
consider them to be a crucial element in their development strategy due to regarding the 
importance of cross-border investments as a combination of capital, technology and 
marketing. Other studies mention that cross-border mergers and acquisitions take place 
as a result of many factors such as the global competition, privatization and the single 
European market (See e.g. Aw, Chatterjee, 2004; Cheng, Kwan, 2000). 
Furthermore, many studies document a sharp increase in cross border mergers and 
acquisitions. For example, Brakman et al (2006) point out that there were 2,154 cross-
borders M&As in 2005 with a total value of about $774 billion, and the US tops the list 
with the UK in second place as the largest acquiring country with 286 deals. The UK 
was also second with 262 deals as a target country. On the other hand, they also confirm 
in their paper that while local M&As in banking have witnessed a reasonable increase in 
the last two decades, international mergers and acquisitions have stayed relatively 
uncommon, and between 1980 and 2000 around one sixth of all bank mergers engaged 
partners with head quarters in two different countries or regions. (See for instance Buch, 
Delong, 2001). 
 
 20 
It is notable that the number and the value of acquisitions in the UK that have been 
carried out by UK firms are higher than the cross-border acquisitions which have also 
been made by UK firms from 2002 to 2004. By 2005, one can note that both the number 
and the value of cross-border acquisitions have become higher compared with domestic 
acquisitions for the same period, but within the last two years, domestic acquisitions 
have returned to their position as higher in value compared to international deals. These 
changes in the number and the value of both domestic and cross-border acquisitions are 
a result of international changes and improvements over the world. For example, by 
2008 and 2009, most firms try to make domestic acquisitions instead of cross-border 
deals; possibly because of the credit crisis which has limited the sources of funds for 
many firms around the world.    
 Investigating mergers and acquisitions and their impact on firms‟ returns has been 
studied and researched all across the world. Many studies have investigated the changes 
in shareholders‟ wealth for both acquiring and target firms.  For example, concentrating 
on the impact of acquisitions in the UK, Firth (1979) found that the acquiring firms 
experienced losses of 6% around the announcement date of the deal. On the other hand, 
Franks and Harris (1989) found after studying around 1800 UK acquisitions that the 
shareholders of the acquiring firms get some gains instead of losing or generating any 
abnormal losses. In addition, Limmack (1991) found also that the acquiring firms 
generate some abnormal returns and that is one month before the announcement date. 
Furthermore, a number of studies have analyzed and tested the abnormal returns for US 
acquiring firms. For example, according to Danbolt (1995), Tessema (1985) 
investigated US abnormal returns for both the target and acquiring firms following 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions. He observed that acquiring firms did not lose as 
a result of the acquisition, and there is not much difference in the abnormal returns 
between domestic and cross-border acquisitions.  
In the following chapter, the researcher is going to examine acquirers‟ returns to 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions. These returns have been investigated for a 5-
day window which begins two days before the announcement day and ends two days 
after the announcement day and also includes the announcement day. It is important to 
add that the Market Model has been applied to calculate the acquirers‟ returns. 
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UK Acquirers’ Returns in Domestic and Cross-Border Acquisitions 
3.1 Introduction 
This paper makes several contributions. First, an investigation of acquirers‟ returns 
around and over the announcement date of each deal has been conducted. Second, a 
comparison is made between acquirers‟ returns in relation to domestic deals and cross-
border acquisitions. Third, UK acquirers‟ returns are an interesting area to study, 
particularly in view of the sharp increase in the number of acquisitions conducted in the 
UK within the past two decades.  
 
The intention of this study is to explore the difference in acquirers‟ returns between 
those that carry out domestic deals and acquirers that conduct cross-border deals, and 
which are measured around and over the announcement date of each deal. Thus, due to 
the importance of this topic in relation to the UK market, the performance of the bidder 
firm after and around the announcement date is studied here. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
Studying mergers and acquisitions‟ activity is one of the most commonly studied topics 
in corporate finance; which is not only due to the importance of the topic itself, but also 
to its great impact on the economy of each country. Furthermore, over the past 10 years 
investments via mergers and acquisitions in the UK, US, and Europe have far 
outstripped any other kind of investment, such as Greenfield (see, for example, Baker, 
Limmack, 2001; Goergen, Renneboog, 2004). 
 
Within the last merger wave, the UK played a very significant role. For example, the 
value and the number of cross-border acquisitions made by UK firms increased 
significantly between the mid 1980s and 1990s. Thus by 2000, the UK became the 
largest acquiring country in the world. For example, the total number of domestic 
acquisitions in the UK in 2000 was 587 with a total value of £106916 million. (Conn et 
al, 2005). Moreover, the total number of cross-border acquisitions by UK firms 
increased from 365 deals with a total value of £11967 million in 1995 to 405 
acquisitions with a total value of £37412 million in 2006.  
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The most popular area of study in this field is whether mergers and acquisitions as an 
activity generate any returns (positive, negative or even zero). This topic has been 
researched not only from the point of view of the target firm but also from that of the 
bidder firm. Many researchers have considered studying the performance of the target 
firm after or over the announcement period, while others have examined the bidder‟s 
return and whether the bidder firm achieved any returns as a result of that investment. 
Here, the researcher investigates acquirers‟ returns for UK domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions from the beginning of 2000 until the end of 2009. The main motivation 
behind investigating acquirers‟ returns for these years is due to the fact that the UK has 
witnessed an incredible increase in acquisitions activity after 2000 which witnessed the 
end of the fifth merger wave. For example, the total number of domestic and cross-
border acquisitions in 1999 rose from 1083 with a total value of £137356 deals to 1144 
with a total value of £288201 in 2000. On the other hand, the researcher also wanted to 
compare acquirers‟ returns in order to ascertain whether any of these types of 
acquisitions achieved any abnormal returns for acquiring firms. The following figure 
will explain more about the dramatic increase in the total number of domestic and cross-
border acquisitions in UK from 2000-2009. 
 
Figure 3. 1. Panel A: the number of domestic and cross-border acquisitions by UK firms between 
2000 and 2009 
 
Notes:  
This panel reports the number of domestic and cross-border acquisitions by UK firms between 
2000 and 2009. The source is UK Office for National Statistics.  
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This chapter is organized as follows: the first section which is the literature review 
includes two parts. The first part introduces general information about the main motives 
for making acquisitions, while the second part reports details about the role of 
acquisitions in the UK and US markets. The second section introduces information 
about the data used in this chapter. The following section presents some details about 
the methodology required and used.  The later section includes the main results for both 
cross-border and domestic acquisitions.  The final section concludes the whole chapter 
with a summary of its results and main findings.  
 
3.2.1 Major motives for making acquisitions 
There are two major theories which may explain why many firms are involved in 
acquisitions or mergers according to Firth (1980). The first one is called „the 
neoclassical profit maximization theory‟.  The author adds that this theory depends on 
the idea that „competitive market forces encourage the firm to maximize shareholder 
wealth‟. This may motivate a firm to make acquisitions or mergers as a way of 
increasing its shareholders‟ wealth, because shareholders‟ wealth will increase as a 
result of increases in the acquiring firm‟s profitability which will rise because of the 
acquisition bid. The author mentions that it is important to appreciate that profitability 
may increase either as a result of monopoly power, synergy or by inserting better 
management into the target firm. 
  
The second theory is called „maximizing management utility‟. It supports the idea that 
managers will attempt to maximise their own wealth, which may not lead to increases in 
shareholders‟ wealth. Managers usually enter into acquisition or merger deals as a way 
of increasing their own interests such as, increasing their salaries or enhancing their 
position in the firm and these are referred to as “management self-interests”. In addition 
achieving any benefit from earlier goals sometimes requires a growth in the size of the 
firm, which may not be achievable as quickly without making these kinds of 
investments. The first theory which is the „shareholder wealth maximization‟ involves 
according to Firth (1980), the concept that the takeover may lead to an increase in the 
profitability of the acquiring firm, while the second theory which is - the management 
utility theory - states that the acquisition is designed to increase the size of the firm and 
in turn, the managers‟ benefits more than increasing the firm‟s profitability.  
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Mandelker (1974) introduces this idea when he mentions that because of the separation 
between control and ownership in the corporations, managers will try hard to achieve 
their own goals which can range from reducing the risk of losing their own positions to 
increasing their salaries, which differ from the firm‟s goals. This may lead to an 
increase only in the size of the corporation, because it does not necessarily increase or 
affect the profitability of the firm or shareholders‟ wealth. 
  
 Additionally, Mueller (1969) mentions that if firms exploit returns, mergers will take 
place only when they are likely to increase the firm‟s market power or when they are 
expected to generate technological or managerial economies of scale, which is more 
probable in cross-border deals. Measuring the profitability of acquisitions and mergers 
can be achieved using two main methods. The first method is to test financial data and 
this is based on considering some accounting numbers of the bidder and the target, 
while the second method is to test the returns that accrue to the shareholders of the firm. 
 
The first method shows that firms sometimes acquire weak companies to restructure 
them or to increase their size. The second method of testing “the profitability of 
acquisitions” has been used more extensively in the literature. It depends on the concept 
of efficient markets as a way of measuring shareholders‟ returns. Hence depending on 
this method will allow researchers to test the share price around a specific time or 
around specific days, such as the announcement day of any merger or acquisition (Firth, 
1980). 
 
 Mandelker (1974) states that there are two main hypotheses regarding acquisitions, the 
first one is the Perfectly Competitive Acquisition Market hypothesis (PCAM). This 
hypothesis supposes that in a perfectly competitive market, the competition will 
associate the expected rates of return on assets of similar risk. For example, if the 
market of acquisition introduces higher or larger expected returns of profits than equal 
activities, many resources will be directed to the acquiring firm to this activity until the 
expected rates come back to its competitive level. In addition, this hypothesis entails 
that there are no monopolistic sources of gains to acquiring firms if they consider 
merging or acquiring firms as a method of having or achieving “productive capacity”. 
The second hypothesis is based on “efficiency of capital markets” which suggests that 
stock prices will be influenced and changed as a reaction to the new information. 
Therefore these stock prices will act as an impartial indicator for efficient resources 
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allocation. As a result, if the market is efficient when the merger activity takes place, 
then stock prices will respond immediately to this activity and incorporate the new 
information. This hypothesis does not imply any monopolistic elements as compared to 
the earlier one, and mergers and acquisitions gains or profits can be involved for 
acquiring or acquired firms. 
   
Furthermore, the author mentions that there are several reasons for making acquisitions. 
Among these is “the growth maximization” hypothesis which proposes that if firms 
merge not for the sake of increasing their profits or gains, but in order to increase their 
sizes or obtain certain managerial goals, their rate of returns will be abnormally small 
because achieving managers‟ goals will result in increasing firm‟s physical, size not its 
profits. Alternatively, the “abnormal gains hypothesis” assumes that information in 
relation to forthcoming acquisitions is considered „good‟ news for stockholders in the 
bidder firm. There are many sources of gains from mergers including financial benefits, 
tax reductions, and improvements or developments in the marketability of the stocks.  
 
3.2.2 The role of acquisitions in the UK and the US markets 
Studying mergers and acquisitions in the UK has been one of the most interesting topics 
over the past two decades due to the sharp increase in the number of these investments 
within the UK and between the UK and the rest of the world. (See, for instance.  Lall, 
2002; Gregory and McCorriston, 2003) 
 
There are many significant studies in this area which are relevant to this paper. For 
example, Firth‟s (1980) study, which studies UK acquisitions depending on the effect of 
the acquisition on stock prices. Firth‟s paper used the Market Model to examine 
takeovers which occurred in the UK between 1969 and 1975. Firth (1980) was 
interested in the offeree and offeror which made successful and unsuccessful bids 
measured over 48 months (prior to the announcement month which is considered month 
0 and 36 months subsequent to the announcement month). 
  
Firth (1980) obtained a negative cumulative average residual of around -0.007 at  month  
-48, and positive CAR for the following months -2, -1, +1, +2 and +3 including the 
announcement month (0) for offerees that were taken over. On the other hand, Firth 
(1980) tested offerees that were not taken over. These had insignificant CAR for the 
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following months which are before the announcement month -48, -3, -2 and -1 of 0.006, 
0.003, 0.011, and 0.095. And obtaining these positive CARs continue from month (0) 
until month 36 after the announcement date.  In addition, the author also examined the 
returns for offerors that made successful takeovers compared to those that made 
unsuccessful ones. He found that they generate a negative CAR of -0.049 for the former 
comparing with -0.045 for the latter one at the announcement month.  Their CAR at -48 
month are both positive of around 0.001, and these positive CARs continue for both 
samples from month 48 prior to the announcement month until one month before the 
announcement month (0). This indicates that there is no difference between offeror‟s 
returns whether they are involved in a successful takeover or not. Furthermore, the 
author concluded that the acquired or the target firms‟ shareholders achieve or benefit 
from large gains as a result of the takeovers, while the acquiring firms‟ shareholders 
suffer or realise losses which cannot be counteracted or balanced by the gains to the 
shareholders of the target firms. 
 
Doukas and Travlos (1988) studied the effect of foreign acquisitions on stock prices of 
US firms over nine years from 1975 to 1983. Following Fama and using the Market 
Model applied to 301 acquisitions, they showed important results for 10 days before and 
10 days after the “zero day” which is the announcement day. The main result of their 
analysis is that most of the returns for these 21 days are insignificant at any 
conventional level. For example, the returns for days -10, -5  are -0.11%, -0.69%, and 
one can notice almost identical results for days after the announcement day +10, +5 that 
are -0.59% and 0.12%. This implies that there is no real difference in returns before and 
after the announcement day. 
 
 Franks and Harris (1989) examined the effects of UK acquisitions on shareholder 
wealth from 1955 to 1985. They depended mainly on three major models to test the 
acquisitions‟ impact to measure the effects of the mergers on the share price.  
 
They use the market model where αi and βi are  are estimated depending on the firm and 
market returns. In addition, they apply the market adjusted model where αi=0   and βi=1   
for all firms. Finally, they used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Their 
findings are based on the simplest market adjusted model where  αi=0   and βi=1  ,  and 
their results are reported on both an equally weighted and a value –weighted basis. In 
the month 0, the shareholders of the target firms have positive and significant returns of 
 28 
23.3%. They also examined the targets‟ returns over the six months from -4 month to +1 
month and they found that the targets‟ returns had increased to 29.7% while the bidders 
have positive abnormal returns of 1% at month 0, and they have positive abnormal 
returns for (-4, +1) of around 7.9% which are less than the targets‟ returns. Additionally, 
they find that shareholders of both the targets and the bidders have positive returns 
according to the value-weighted measure, which supports the hypothesis that there are 
positive gains for shareholders from takeovers. They conclude that mergers generally 
produce a value for shareholders around and over the announcement date, and the 
shareholders of both the target and acquiring firms achieve profits, but the shareholders 
of the target firms have higher and better returns compared with the bidders‟ 
shareholders.   
 
Limmack (1991) studied the returns of shareholders of UK companies that were 
involved in acquisitions between 1977 and 1986. The author used three models to 
identify the abnormal returns for the companies. The first model is the Market Model, 
and to estimate the parameters for each firm, the author used the share price for month -
67 through to month -7 (he considered that month 0 is the month where the 
announcement had been made). The second model is the Adjusted Betas Model. He 
used this model to test any possible bias that may appear because of the first model. The 
third model is the Index Model that assumes alpha is zero and beta is one for all shares, 
and is equivalent to the market adjusted model used by Franks and Harris (1989). 
 
The full set of data was divided into two main sections, those with completed 
acquisitions, and those with abandoned ones. Limmack calculated the abnormal returns 
for three periods. The first one was the pre-bid period which was between month -6 and 
month -1. The second one was the bid period and this period included the bid month. 
The third period was the post-outcome period, and this period was between +1 month 
and +24 months. 
 
Regarding the abnormal returns for the pre-bid period, the author found that the 
acquirers of the completed acquisitions achieved positive and significant returns for 
months -6 and -5 of 1.27% and 1.37%, significant at a 5% level, and they had returns 
that were different from zero for months -4 and -3 of 0.32% and 0.22%, and for month -
1 they had positive and not significant returns of 0.22%. For the abandoned bids, 
acquirers had positive and significant returns for month -6 of 2.11%, and positive but 
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not significant returns for month -5, -4, and -3 of 1.61%, 1.69% and 1.55% respectively. 
Also they obtained negative and insignificant returns for month -1 of -0.59%. Limmack 
(1991) noted that acquirers of completed acquisitions had experienced at the bid period 
negative and not significant returns of -0.20%, while the acquirers of abandoned 
acquisitions experienced negative and significant returns of -6.02%. Finally, the returns 
for the third period were not different from zero for acquirers of completed acquisitions 
of 0.15%, and negative but significant returns for acquirers of abandoned acquisitions of 
-1.28%. The author concluded that no obvious or large gains were made by acquirers‟ 
shareholders for completed acquisitions over and around the announcement date. 
 
 Parkingson and Dobbins (1993) investigated the abnormal returns for UK acquisitions 
between 1975 and 1984. They depended mainly on three models to calculate the 
abnormal returns for both acquirer and target firms. The first model was the Market 
Model, the second one was the Index Model and the third one was the CAPM. 
Additionally, they divided the study period into four periods, month -6, month 0, month 
+12 and month +24 month. They found that acquirers had positive and not significant 
returns for month -6 of 1.70%, 1.73% and 1.67% for the respective models. 
 
Regarding the announcement month, acquirers had positive significant returns 
according to the Market Model of 2.02%, and not significant returns according to the 
Index model and the CAPM of 1.83%, and 1.97%. Finally, for the third and fourth 
periods (month+12 and month +24), the acquirers experienced positive and insignificant 
returns, and that was the same for all the three models. For example, the acquirers 
generated abnormal returns of 1.7% at month +12 according to the Index Model. 
 
Comparing the results for Parkingson and Dobbins (1993) with Limmack (1991), it may 
be noted that both are similar in their results regarding the pre-bid period returns. Both 
articles show positive and not significant returns for the acquirers. For example, 
Parkingson and Dobbins found that acquirers experienced returns of 1.70% according to 
the Market Model for month -6, and Limmack also found that the acquirers for 
completed acquisitions had returns of 1.27% for the same period. 
 
On the other hand, it is noticeable that both articles differ in their results for the bid 
period. For example, Parkingson and Dobbins mentioned that acquirers had positive and 
significant returns for month 0 of 2.02%, while Limmack stated that acquirers for 
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completed acquisitions had negative and not significant returns of -0.20%. Moreover, 
concerning the post-bid period, both articles showed that acquirers had experienced 
positive and not significant returns. This difference may come from using different 
models to calculate the acquirers‟ returns. Also this difference in results at the 
announcement month may be due to them considering completed and incomplete 
acquisitions in both samples. 
 
Danbolt (1995) studied the gains and losses for shareholders of foreign companies that 
had made takeover bids for UK companies during the period 1986-1991. In Danbolt‟s 
study, the sample included 174 foreign firms that had acquired UK companies. The 
author applied two common models in the previous sample; the first model was the 
Market Model, the second one was the Index Model. He found that for the eight months 
period prior to the announcement month CAR was negative and not significant for 
foreign acquiring firms of -0.54% according to the Market Model, and an average 
abnormal return of -1.10% according to the Index Model. At the announcement month 
the abnormal returns are insignificant but they became positive for both the applied 
models. 
 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) studied domestic and cross-border US acquisitions that 
acquired Canadian targets. With a sample of 1846 successful acquisitions between 1964 
and 1982, they used the Market Model to calculate the CAR for (-12, +12) months 
around the announcement month. Instead of testing the total sample, the authors 
selected some firms and calculated their CAR and then divided them into two groups 
according to the market value of total equity in month -12. The first group includes 
firms that have an average of their market value of equity around CAD$69 million at -
12 month, while the second group includes firms that have an average of around 
CAD$450 million. Their results showed some interesting findings about the cross-
border acquisitions that this chapter focuses on. The CARs are positive for bidder firms 
in both groups at the announcement month and also the same for five months after the 
announcement date. Later, the CARs stay positive for the first group after the 
announcement month, but they become negative for the second group. This implies that 
there is a relationship between the acquisitions‟ returns and the average of the market 
equity of the firm. It is notable that the lower the average of the market equity of the 
firm, the more positive the returns of the acquirer around and over the announcement 
period.   
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Tse and Soufani (2001) studied the major effects of UK takeover acquisitions (friendly 
and hostile) between 1990 and 1996. The authors explained that they were interested in 
studying the relationship between the takeover activities and merger eras between 1990 
and 1996, and they divide the period into two main eras according to the merger 
activity. This is because they noticed that between 1990 and 1993 merger activity was 
low compared with the period between 1994 and 1996, during which merger activity 
was very high. As a result of the major influence of the general economic performance 
on all investment decisions of firms as well as on acquisitions performance, the authors 
argue that it is important to find out more about this relationship. The first period is 
between 1990 and 1993; which is called the low merger activity era (LMAE), while the 
second period is considered a high merger activity era (HMAE) and is located between 
1994 and 1996.  
 
Focusing on full transaction acquisitions which are not partial deals, and beginning at 
12 months before the announcement date and ending three months after that date, they 
found that friendly bidders have significant positive CAR of 4.85% for the month 
before the announcement date in LMAE, while they have CAR of 1.76% for the same 
month at HMAE. On the other hand, hostile bidders have high returns at the 
announcement month for both HMAE and LMAE of around 4.56% for the first period 
and 3.28% for the latter one. The authors mentioned that these results assume that the 
bidder‟s shareholders may prefer friendly transactions to hostile ones. This is because of 
the low premium which is associated with friendly acquisitions.  
 
 Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) investigated the shareholders‟ gains from the point of 
the relationship between the financial status value or glamour of acquirers against a set 
of given variables. They investigated this for successfully completed UK acquisitions 
between 1983 and 1995. They studied these gains according to their relationship with 
many factors, such as, the Share Price to Earnings Ratio (PER), and the Market to Book 
Value (MTBV). They defined PER as Brealey and Myers (1995) defined it as “a 
measure of the esteem in which the company is held by investors”. The authors assumed 
that “shareholders of low PER acquirers (value acquirers) experience larger post-
acquisition wealth gains compared to shareholders with high PER acquirers (glamour 
acquirers)”. Secondly, with regards to the MTBV ratio, they assumed that “shareholders 
of low MTBV acquirers (value acquirers) experience larger post-acquisitions wealth 
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gains compared to acquirers with high MTBV (glamour acquirers)”. To test these 
hypotheses they divided the event window into three sections. The first section is from 
day -1 to day +1 (including the announcement day), the second one is from day +2 to 
day +40, and finally, the last section includes days +41 until day+750.  Then the authors 
used the buy and hold method to calculate the abnormal returns, depending on four 
benchmark models, the mean-adjusted model, the market-adjusted model, the size-
adjusted model and the market to book value-adjusted model. The authors found that 
acquirers have negative and significant returns for the first period (from day -1 to day 
+1) of -1.39%, -1.47%, -1.43% and -1.39%, and these returns are significant at the 1% 
level for all models. 
 
For the second period, the size-adjusted model and the market-adjusted model give 
insignificant returns of 0.52% and 0.14%, but for the other two models the returns 
remain insignificant for the MTBV model of -0.53% and significant for the mean-
adjusted model -1.89%. This implies that acquirers have returns that are not different 
from zero and also these results are consistent with Gregory‟s (1997) result.  
 
Moeller and Schlingmann (2005) investigated whether there is any difference in the 
stock performance for domestic and cross-border US acquisitions. Using the Market-
Adjusted return model and for a period of over 10 years (1985-1995), they analyzed 
around 383 US cross-border acquisitions and 4046 domestic deals. They found that for 
the years 1985-1995, the cross-border deals have positive CARs that are not different 
from zero of 0.307 % for a three-day period (-1, 0, +1). For the domestic deals, they 
found that cumulative abnormal returns for these acquisitions are positive and 
significant of 1.173% for the same 3-day period. 
 
More recently, Gregory and McCorriston (2005) studied foreign acquisitions made by 
UK firms for the short and long-run between 1985 and 1994. Firstly, they focused on 
studying the abnormal returns for UK acquiring firms over the short-run. As a result 
they choose two event windows, and used the Market Model to calculate the abnormal 
returns. The first one is for five days, beginning at three days before the announcement 
date and ending at the first day after that date. The second window is longer than the 
earlier one; it begins at day 10 before the announcement date and ends at day ten after 
the announcement date. After applying cumulative abnormal returns to 343 acquisitions, 
their findings include for the short-run (for the first window) insignificant abnormal 
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returns for all UK acquiring firms; and this result includes UK acquiring firms which 
have invested in all countries. When they divided their sample according to the 
investment region, they found negative CARs for firms which invest in the EU, and 
positive CARs for those that invest in the US and the rest of the world. The authors also 
tested their sample according to the sector. They found that acquiring firms have 
negative CAR of around -0.134% when the bidder and the target are sharing the same 
sector, and they have positive CAR of 0.168% in conglomerate deals. They stated that 
there is not a big difference in earlier results for the second window, which means that 
the acquirers‟ returns are still the same, and the only difference that they found was for 
the returns of firms which invested in the US and for conglomerate deals. The authors 
also used the buy-and-hold method for testing the firms‟ long-run performance. They 
considered three windows (one, three and five years) for the period post acquisitions, 
their findings include insignificant returns for year one of 0.65% and also insignificant 
returns for year three and year five of -3.9% for the former and -9.2% for the latter. This 
implies that acquirers have insignificant returns, and if one considers acquisitions 
according to location it may give different results according to the region‟s impact 
which may differ from the US and Europe.  
 
Conn et al (2005) discussed this idea from a different perspective. In their paper, they 
studied the impact on UK acquirers of domestic, cross-border, public and private 
acquisitions. Following Brown and Warner‟s (1985) study, the authors used a three-day 
period around the announcement day to calculate the CAR. They used the Market-
Adjusted Model to estimate the abnormal returns. They found positive abnormal returns 
for deals with private targets but not for public ones. They find negative returns of -
0.99% for domestic mergers which acquired public targets, while the CAR was -0.09% 
for cross-border mergers which acquired public targets. According to those results, they 
obtained significant positive returns for the private firms in both cross-border 
acquisitions of 0.38% and domestic acquisitions of 1.05%, while for acquisitions that 
acquired public targets, the returns were significantly negative. 
 
The authors not only studied the impact of acquisitions, but also examined the major 
determinants of acquisition returns, such as, the method of payment, the relative size, 
the value and glamour status of acquisitions, and the high-tech status of the acquirer and 
the target. With regard to the method of payment, they note that non-cash deals are 
better than cash deals, because the non-cash deals produce better abnormal returns than 
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the cash deals do, except for domestic acquisitions, where cash deals give positive and 
not significant returns that are better than domestic noncash deals. They defined the 
relative size by the ratio of the value of the deal to the market value of the acquirer. The 
authors did not show clear results on this factor.  For the effect of the glamour or value 
status of the acquirers, first they defined glamour acquirers as firms with high Market-
to-Book ratios. The value acquirers are firms with low Market-to-Book ratios. 
Secondly, they considered the Market-to-Book ratio at the beginning of the year of the 
acquisitions and then after calculating these ratios, they divided them into five groups of 
equal size in terms of number. As a result, they considered acquirers in group one to 
have the lowest MTBV and those in group five to have the highest MTBV. Finally, their 
results show that returns for private targets are larger than those for public ones. For 
example, glamour acquirers of cross-border public targets give significant negative 
returns of -1.48%, while the result for private targets is an insignificant return of 0.29%. 
 
In respect of the impact of the high-tech status on announcement returns, the authors 
first of all define high-tech status using Butchart‟s (1987) definition - which identifies 
sectors with high-tech status as those which have higher than average expenditures on 
R&D relative to sales, or which employ more experienced engineers and scientists than 
other sectors (Storey and Tether, 1998).  The authors found that there is no major 
difference for the announcement returns of domestic acquisitions between high-tech and 
non high-tech deals, while for the cross-border acquisitions the announcement returns 
are positive and significant at the 1% level of 0.90% for the high-tech compared with 
not significant returns of 0.07% for the non high-tech ones. (Conn et al, 2005) 
 
 With regards to the acquirer‟s returns for US firms from 1990 to 2000, and depending 
on the Market Model for a five-day period (-2,+2) including the announcement day, 
Fuller et al (2002) found that multiple acquirer firms have positive returns of around 
1.77%. Dividing them into two sections on the basis of whether they acquire public or 
private targets, they obtained significant differences in their results. They explained that 
the acquirer of a public target obtains a significant negative return of -1.00% on 
average, while the acquirer of a private firm will get a significant positive return of 
2.08%. As to the method of payment, the authors declare that if the target is a public 
firm, then the acquirer‟s returns will be insignificantly positive if the bidder uses cash as 
a method of payment, and significantly negative around -1.86% if the firm uses equity. 
The situation is different when the target is a private firm. In that case, the firm‟s returns 
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will be significantly positive whatever the method of payment chosen. Further, the 
authors considered the target size and its impact on the bidder‟s returns, because the size 
of public firms is, on average, bigger than private firms. Thus they considered that the 
bidder‟s returns might be larger when the target is a public firm, but the results showed 
otherwise. First, when the target is a public firm, the larger the target is relative to the 
bidder, so the more negative the acquirer‟s returns. Second, when the target is a private 
firm, they found that the larger the target, the more positive the returns.  
 
It is noticeable that this study shares some important results with Conn et al (2005). 
Both studies found that domestic mergers and acquisitions that acquired public targets 
have negative returns and positive returns for firms that acquired private targets. The 
importance of these results appears because each study has been conducted in a 
different market, Fuller et al (2002) investigated the US market, while Conn et al (2005) 
studied the UK market. It implies also that the market‟s reaction to an acquisition 
announcement is influenced by the type of firm being acquired. One possible reason for 
these results is that the acquirer is less likely to pay too much for a private firm as 
opposed to a public firm.  
  
Recently, Petmezas (2009) investigated acquirer returns and their relation to market 
valuation. The author classified each calendar month as high, low or neutral valuation 
depending on the P/E ratio of the value-weighted market index (TOTMKUK). He 
studied UK acquisitions between 1984 and 2003 undertaken by UK public firms that 
acquire both public and private UK firms. The main methodology in his paper was the 
Market-adjusted Model to estimate short term abnormal returns. Using a five-day period 
around the announcement date (-2, +2) for acquirers, he found that acquirers with a high 
valuation have significant returns of 1.66% while acquirers with a low market valuation 
have insignificant returns of 0.41%. Firms that acquire public targets generate 
significant losses of -1.35%, while firms with private targets have significant positive 
returns of 1.42%. Additionally, Petmezas considered the payment method (pure cash, 
pure stock and others) and its impact on the acquirers‟ returns. He found that acquirers 
who finance their deals with a pure cash payment and other kinds of payments have 
significant returns of 0.93% for the first kind of payment and 1.67% for the latter kind 
significant at a 1% level. The situation is different for acquirers who use stock as a 
payment for their acquisitions; they have insignificant returns of 0.22%. Petmezas‟ 
(2009) results are similar to those of Conn et al (2005) regarding acquirers‟ returns. 
 36 
They found that acquirers who acquire public targets have negative returns, while 
acquirers with private targets have positive returns. 
 
It is possible to sum up some points after considering the above literature and its 
findings. 
 Many studies found that acquirers had returns that are not significantly different 
from zero. 
 There is a relationship between acquirers‟ returns and the method of payment 
and the relative size. 
 Acquirers‟ returns will differ when the target is a public or a private firm.    
 Acquirers‟ returns of cross-border acquisitions will differ according to region.  
 
Following the earlier discussion, this paper investigates whether UK acquirers who 
make domestic or cross-border acquisitions achieve any abnormal returns. Also, an 
examination is carried out to establish whether there are any differences in returns 
between acquirers who make domestic acquisitions and those who acquire international 
firms. The next sections will be arranged as follows: The first section will discuss the 
data and the sample that has been used. The second section will outline the 
methodology that has been applied in this paper. 
 
3.3 Data 
The researcher examines a sample of 1133 acquisitions in the UK from the 1 January 
2000 until the 31
st
 December 2009. The main reason which leads me to investigate 
acquirers‟ returns within these years is that the fifth merger wave ended by the 
beginning of 2000, and this wave witnessed very important economic improvements 
such as a significant growth of European Stock markets. Furthermore, by 2000 the UK 
became the largest acquiring country around the world. Thus the researcher wants to 
find the real situation of these investments and how they may be influenced after 2000, 
and also studying acquirers‟ returns will provide an overall image of the recent and 
future activities of those firms after that important period. This sample is collected from 
the Thomson Database. The selection criteria are as follows: 
 
1- the acquirer must be a publicly traded UK firm, and the acquirer should have at 
least five days of return data around the announcement date to be included in the 
sample. 
 37 
2- the firm must be listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).                                   
3-   3-the deal can be a domestic or cross-border one. 
4- deals with values less than £1 million have been excluded to avoid results which 
can be produced by deals with very small values. 
5- the method of payment of each deal must be available. 
6- the sector of the acquirer and the target firm must be available as well. Deals with 
financial and utility acquirers/targets have been excluded. 
7-  the target can be a public or a private firm. 
The total number of domestic acquisitions is 654, while the total number of cross-border 
deals is 479. Regarding the number of deals according to the type of the target firm, it is 
important to add that the total deals with private targets are 970 acquisitions (551 
domestic deals and 419 cross-border acquisitions) and that compared with just 163 deals 
with public targets. This confirms that the majority of targets in this sample consist of 
private firms. Furthermore, with respect to the method of payment, the sample is sub-
divided into three sections according to the method of payment. The first section is cash 
payment. This section includes firms that finance their acquisitions with cash, profit-
related payment and liabilities. The second section is equity payment. Firms in this 
section finance their deals with common shares, any other kind of share, or they make a 
stock swap transaction. The final section is the mixed section. Many firms belong in this 
section because they use cash and equity together to pay for their deals. For example, 
firm X pays for its acquisition of £A in cash and up to £B issuance of new shares and 
£C in liabilities. In addition, it is important to add that a combination between the 
second and the third sections has conducted under non-cash section and that is due to 
the small number of deals in each section. The total number of deals in the first section 
which uses cash as a method of payment is 806 (420 domestic deals and 386 cross-
border deals). The total number of acquisitions which used non-cash as a method of 
payment is 327 deals (234 domestic deals and 93 cross-border deals). Considering the 
industrial sector of acquirers and target firms, the sample is also separated into two main 
sections according to the industrial sector of the firm. The researcher compares the 
essential activity of the acquiring and the target firms, which is based on Standard 
Industrial Codes for 2007. This will enable the researcher to determine whether both the 
acquiring and target firms belong to the same sector, as determined by the fact that they 
share the same two digits SIC code. Otherwise they are regarded as being in different 
sectors. It is important to note that the total number of deals within which the acquirer 
and the target share the same industrial sector is 693 deals (393 domestic deals and 300 
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cross-border deals), while the total number of acquisitions within which the acquirer 
and the target firm do not share the same industrial sector is 440 acquisitions (261 
domestic deals and 179 cross-border deals). Furthermore, acquirers who carried out 
cross-border acquisitions acquire around 270 targets from the US and Canada, and the 
rest of the targets are from Europe and other countries around the world.  
 
The following table presents the mean, median, minimum and maximum of the deal for 
domestic acquisitions. For the whole sample, the mean value of the deal is £58.09 
million and the median value of the deal is £9.5 million, with a total value of deals of 
£39952.1 million. With respect to the above details, it is notable that the majority of 
deals are conducted with private target firms with a total value of deals around 
£27108.180 million compared with around 15% of acquisitions conducted with public 
targets with a total value of £12834.99 million. 
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Table 3. 1.The Mean, Median, Min, and Max for domestic acquisitions 
 
Domestic 
acquisitions  
Number of 
acquisitions  
Mean  
 
(£million) 
Median  
 
(£million) 
Max 
 
(£million)  
Min 
  
(£million) 
Total 
value of 
deal 
(£ 
million) 
All  654 58.09 9.5 1926 1.11 39952.17 
Cash Payment  420 53.85 9.4 1926 1.25 22351.13 
Non-cash payment  234 65.77 9.8 1724 1.11 17601.04 
Same industrial 
sector 
393 69.23 9.1 1724 1.11 27210.46 
Different industrial 
sector 
261 28.06 10 1926 1.25 12741.71 
Private target firms 551 49.64 8.0 1926 1.11 27108.18 
Public target firms  103 112.46 26 1069 1.12 12843.99 
High 
 B/M ratio  
319 
 
50.46 8.1 1724 1.11 16098.12 
Low B/M ratio 292 64.96 10.6 1926 1.12 23854.05 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the number of acquisitions, the mean, median, min, and max of the value of 
the deals for domestic deals which were conducted between 2000 and 2009. The first column 
includes the number of deals for the whole sample and accordingly the method of payment, the 
industrial sector and the type of the target firm. The last column presents the total value of the 
deals in £ million. It is necessary to add that the acquirers must be a public firm listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. 
 
 
The following table displays the mean, median, minimum and maximum of the deal for 
cross-border acquisitions. For the whole sample, the mean value of the deal is £232.29 
million and the median value of the deal is £22.9 million, with a total value of deals of 
£111267.2 million. With respect to the above details, it is notable that the majority of 
deals were conducted with private target firms with a total value of deals of £71450.52 
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million compared with around 10% of acquisitions with public targets with a total value 
of £39817.08 million. 
 
Table 3. 2. The Mean, Median, Min, and Max for cross-border acquisitions 
 
 
 
Number of 
acquisitions  
Mean  
 
(£million) 
Median  
 
(£million) 
Max 
 
(£million)  
Min 
  
(£million) 
Total value 
of deal 
(£ million) 
All  479 232.29 22.9 15500 1.02 111267.6 
Cash Payment  386 198.86 24 15500 1.02 76760.63 
Non-cash payment  93 365.34 16 15107 1.11 34506.97 
Same industrial 
sector 
300 331.75 26 15500 1.02 99193.67 
Different industrial 
sector 
179 65.92 16 15107 1.11 12073.93 
Private target firms 419 167.36 19 15107 1.02 71450.52 
Public target firms  60 845 142.88 15500 1.7 39817.08 
High B/M ratio 240 232.36 26.69 15107 1.11 80097.78 
Low B/M ratio 219 155.84 11.5 15500 1.02 31169.82 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the number of acquisitions, the mean, median, min, and max of the value of 
the deals for cross-border deals which were conducted between 2000 and 2009. The first 
column includes the number of deals for the whole sample and accordingly the method of 
payment, the industrial sector and the type of the target firm. The last column presents the total 
value of the deals in £ million. It is necessary to add that the acquirers must be a public firm 
listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
 
 
 
The following table introduces the distribution of the sample by year. The sample 
includes domestic and cross-border acquisitions between 2000 till 2009 that were 
conducted by UK acquirers.  
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Table 3. 3.The sample distribution by year 
 
Year Domestic acquisitions Cross-border acquisitions 
2000 70 80 
2001 85 60 
2002 86 50 
2003 75 47 
2004 65 35 
2005 55 40 
2006 45 41 
2007 70 55 
2008 60 38 
2009 43 33 
Total number  654 479 
Notes 
This table shows the sample distribution by year. The sample includes domestic and cross-
border acquisitions that were conducted by UK acquirers between 2000 and 2009. 
 
3.4 Methodology  
Many studies have been mentioned that have studied the effect of firm-specific events 
on the prices of those firms‟ securities. The interest in the event studies research is to 
determine the extent to which the price of the firm‟s securities has been abnormal over 
the event date. In addition, the value of event studies comes from the idea that the 
influence of important events in the history of the firm may be reflected directly on the 
price of the security of that firm. Thus the measure of event studies depends on 
monitoring the firm‟s stock price over a period of time. Event studies have been applied 
to many events that are important to firms and their investors, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, earnings‟ announcements, and issue of new debt and new equity. 
According to McKinlay (1997) event studies have a long history, and Dolley (1933) 
was the first who mentioned this kind of study in his paper. Dolley (1933) studied the 
price impacts of stock splits around the time of splits, depending on a sample of 95 
splits between 1921 and 1931. The author found that the price increased in 57 cases and 
declined in the rest of them. Later, many other studies have considered this subject such 
as Myers and Bakay (1948), Barker (1956, 1957, and 1958) and Ashley (1962), which 
are all good examples of such studies during that time. But the most important study 
was that of Brown and Warner (1980), which studied all the complications and 
adjustments required when conducting event studies.  
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The major goal of performing an event study is to determine the event and recognise the 
period during which the security price of the firm may be involved in the event, referred 
to as „the event window‟. The event study usually includes the period of interest which 
is expanded to include some days before and after the day of the event that allows 
obtaining the price effects of the event after the market closes on the day of the event. 
The additional days prior to the event ensure that any leakages of information into the 
market are also captured by the event study. Including days immediately after the event 
ensures that any delays or frictions in the price adjustment process are also captured by 
the study. After determining the event, it is important to recognise „the selection criteria 
for the inclusion of a given firm‟. These criteria may have some restrictions imposed by 
the availability of the data such as restrictions that may involve a certain type of 
classification, a certain market size or membership of an industry. In this case, it is 
important to sum up the sample characteristics. An event study requires the researcher 
to measure the abnormal returns which are defined as the actual ex post returns of the 
security over the event window relative to the returns that would be expected of that 
security. Moreover, a normal performance model should be chosen, from which can be 
estimated the expected returns of the security during the event window. After selecting 
the model the estimation window must be recognised which is usually a period before 
the event window. It is important that the event period is not included in the estimation 
window in order to avoid the event affecting the normal performance model parameter 
evaluates. After calculating the abnormal returns, the empirical results will help to 
provide an understanding of the reasons for the effects of the event. It is also worth 
noting that the empirical results with a limited number of event observations might be 
deeply affected by the results of one or two firms.  Understanding this fact according to 
MacKinlay (1997) is essential for estimating the significance of the results. For 
example, Brown and Warner (1985) calculated the returns for two samples, the first one 
consisting of five securities and the second one consisting of 20. They found that the 
average returns for the first sample is 0.05% while the average returns for the second 
one is 0.07%. 
 
There are many approaches to calculating the normal returns for a given security. These 
approaches can be divided into two major categories. The first category consists of 
statistical approaches which depend on statistical hypotheses and do not involve any 
economic arguments. The second category which includes the economic approaches 
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depends on the investor‟s behaviour without being concerned with any statistical 
assumptions. On the other hand, statistical approaches are sufficient for the market 
model, thus this hypothesis is strong and gives reasonable results and conclusions using 
normal return models which tend to be robust to variations from the assumption.  
 
It is important to add that choosing the model is critically important because results that 
may lead to market inefficiency could be credited via a bad model. Usually, two major 
groups of models are used; statistical models and economic models. The first group 
depends on statistical hypotheses regarding the asset‟s returns, while the economic 
models depend on economic hypotheses regarding the behaviour of the assets. 
(Mackinlay, 1997), Thus, in this research, the researcher used the Market Model to 
calculate the acquirers‟ abnormal returns. In the following section more detail about the 
Market Model will be introduced.  
 
3.4.1 The market model  
According to Mackinlay (1997), the market model is the statistical model „which relates 
the return of any security with the return of the market portfolio‟. For any given security 
the market model is 
 
  = + +  
 
Where  and  are the returns for the given security and the market portfolio, and 
 and  are the parameters of the market model.  The advantage of using the market 
model comes from  of the market model regression, this means that the higher  the 
greater the variance.  
 
To understand an event study well, it is necessary to know more about measuring and 
analysing the abnormal returns. Returns will be indexed in event time depending on , 
identifying =0 as an event date, = +1 and =  as the event window and = +1 to 
=  as the estimation window. One can consider that = -  and = -  the 
length of the estimation window and the event window. In addition, if the event is 
considered as an announcement on a given date, the event window length will be bigger 
than one. The post-event window will extend from = +1 to = . Thus the following 
time line will sum up the earlier idea.   
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             (Estimation window)                         (Event window)                           (Post- event window) 
                                                                    0                                                                      
 
 
Furthermore, after estimating the market model parameters, the abnormal returns will be 
calculated depending on the following equation.  
 
= - -   
 
The abnormal return is a disturbance term of the market model on an out of sample 
basis.  These returns must be combined to help finishing the assumption of the event 
study. Thus the concept of the cumulative abnormal returns is important to 
accommodate a multiple period event window. The cumulative abnormal returns 
( , ) can be defined as “the sample cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from  
to ” and these returns will be given as follows.  
 
( , )=   
 
The t-stat is calculated as following  
 
 
Finally, according to Brown and Warner (1985) one should add that there are issues 
which will have occurred while performing an event study. Those issues consist of 
inferences with event-date uncertainty, non-normality and other possible bias. First of 
all, regarding inferences with event-date uncertainty, this issue suggests that the event 
date can be classified with certainty but in some studies it is difficult to recognise the 
event date and that trend to appear especially when these dates can be collected from 
financial publications such as the “Wall Street Journal”. When the announcement date 
appears in the paper, sometimes it is not certain that the market has been updated before 
the close of day prior to the trading date. If this happens the prior date will be 
considered as the event date otherwise the present date will be the event date.  Ball and 
Torous (1988) studied this issue and they improved an estimation method which 
accommodates event date uncertainty and they examined the results of their particular 
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explicit method against an informal method of extending the event window. They found 
that the informal method works satisfactorily.  
 
Second, regarding non-normality, the daily stock return for a given security shows 
considerable departure from normality which is not experiential with the monthly data. 
The evidence proposes that the distribution of daily returns is „fat-tailed‟ compared with 
normal returns.  Here it is worth mentioning that there is a theory „the Central Limit 
Theorem‟ which tries to solve this issue when it suggests that if the excess returns in the 
cross section of securities are independent and identically distributed drawings from 
variance distributions, the distribution of the sample mean excess return converges to 
normality as the number of the sample increases. Thus providing the sample size is 
reasonable, normality can be assumed. 
 
Event study methodology has been applied and the Market Model to this research; the 
researcher supposes the announcement date of the acquisition as the event day, and  
considers the five-day window before and after the announcement day as the event 
window, while the estimation window extends from day -150 to day -20 prior to the 
announcement day. The researcher depends on the FTALL-Share as an Index Market 
which allows applying the Market Model to calculate acquirers‟ returns. 
   
The following section presents the main results regarding the acquirers‟ returns for both 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions and that depends on the event study and after 
applying the Market Model for a five-day window before, over and after the 
announcement date. 
 
3.5 Results  
3.5.1 Results for acquirers that have made cross-border acquisitions  
Abnormal returns for each acquirer have been calculated, depending on the Market 
Model for a five-day window. The following tables introduce the average of the 
acquirer‟s returns and t-stats for the cross-border sample. It is necessary to add that a 
three-day window has been included in the studied period to check the robustness of the 
results. 
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Table 3. 4.Abnormal returns for acquirers of cross-border acquisitions 
 
Window CAR t-stat 
-2 to +2  0.50 1.62 
-1 to +1 0.41 1.57 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the acquirers‟ returns for UK cross-border acquisitions from the beginning of 
2000 until the end of 2009. The number of cross-border deals is 479, and the researcher depends 
on the Market Model.  
 
 
 
It is notable from table 3.4 that includes the CAR for UK acquiring firms which have 
been involved in cross-border acquisitions that acquirers‟ returns are not different from 
zero for all the studied windows.  It is essential to compare these results with the results 
of some studies which test or examine international deals or acquisitions which have 
been conducted in the UK or by UK firms overseas in their samples.  Comparing these 
results with Gregory and McCorriston‟s (2005) results, it is notable that both results 
show that acquirers have insignificant returns for the same estimated windows around 
the announcement. Furthermore, the results in the table share with Conn et al. (2005)‟s 
results because they found that CARs for acquirers which conducted cross-border 
acquisitions were around 0.33% with a t-stat of 1.99 for a three-day window over the 
announcement date.  
 
3.5.2 Results for acquirers that have carried out domestic 
acquisitions  
The abnormal returns for acquirers of domestic deals have been calculated, and that is 
depending on the Market Model to estimate these abnormal returns for a five-day 
window.  It is necessary to add that a three-day window has been included in the studied 
period, and that is to check the robustness of the results.  
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Table 3. 5.Abnormal returns for acquirers of domestic acquisitions 
 
Window CAR t-stat 
-2 to +2 1.20 3.25 
-1 to +1 1.03 3.14 
 
Notes: 
This table presents the acquirers‟ returns for domestic deals from 2000 till the end of 2009. The 
number of domestic deals is 654 deals; the cumulative abnormal returns have been calculated 
depending on the Market Model for a five- day window before and after the announcement day 
 
 
Comparing these results with other articles‟ results will be divided into two main 
sections. The first section will include the articles which depend on the same 
methodology and on the same application as this chapter, because comparing these 
results with others‟ results that have been found depending on another model will affect 
the comparison negatively, and that also will provide an opportunity to avoid any effect 
which may be generated because of the other models used. The second section will 
contain a comparison between these results and those which depend on the same 
window in their analysis, which means that long-run studies will be ignored, because it 
would not be fair to compare these results on the short-run with those on the long-run. 
 
First of all, comparing the results in table 3.4 with Firth‟s (1980) who used the same 
model in his study, it is clear that the earlier results are shared with Firth‟s result, which 
is that both articles have insignificant CAR for UK acquisitions before and after the 
announcement date. Additionally, these results are consistent with those observed by 
Franks and Harris (1989) in one respect. They found that at the announcement date, the 
CARs were insignificant, and the acquirers according to these findings had insignificant 
returns. 
 
Comparing the results with Limmack (1991), it is noticeable that there is a common 
finding in that both results have insignificant CAR in all periods. However the situation 
differs in the comparison with Parkingson and Dobbins (1993), because they had a 
significant and positive CAR at the announcement date when depending on the Market 
Model, while here there are insignificant and positive CARs in all periods depending on 
the Market Model. 
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Comparing these results with articles that belong to the second section (they shared a 
short-run period), it is important to begin with Sudarsanam and Mahate‟s (2003) study. 
They calculated the abnormal returns for three periods. As a result of the interest in 
short-run studies, the researcher concentrates on the first two periods in their study. The 
earlier results are not consistent with theirs in any respect, because they find negative 
and significant returns, while here the returns are insignificant for the same period. 
Additionally, the returns for the second period (+2, +40) cannot be compared with 
earlier results and that is because they include a longer period than those in this paper. 
 
Following that study, Conn et al (2005) produced a very important study in this area. 
Depending on a different model Conn et al (2005), one can observe that both papers 
present insignificant returns for the same period for cross-border acquisitions. Finally, 
comparing these results with one of the most recent articles on this topic which is that of 
Petmezas (2009), it is clear that both papers obtain the same results in one respect. 
Petmezas found that acquirers that conducted domestic acquisitions had returns of 
1.17% and acquirers that made domestic acquisitions in this paper achieved CARs of 
around 1.20% for the same studied window. Following the above discussion, one can 
detect that these results share a number of similarities with articles that belong to the 
first section to a greater extent compared to articles in the second section. It is possible 
that this is because the articles in the first section use a similar model in calculating the 
abnormal returns.  
 
With respect to the above discussion, it is important to add that results in tables 3.4 and 
3.5 confirm the idea that gains from making international investment may be lost 
because of many types of “market failures”, such as transferring new knowledge and 
asymmetry information that may prevent the acquirer from evaluating the target firm. A 
cultural gap between the acquirer and the host country may play an important role in 
lower acquirers‟ returns. Conn et al (2005) 
 
3.6 Summary   
In this chapter, the researcher investigates in this chapter the acquirers‟ returns for 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions from the beginning of 2000 until the end of 
2009.  Many earlier studies have discussed this topic over the past three or four decades, 
due to the importance of these kinds of investments and their impact on the economy. 
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An examination of the acquirers‟ returns for a 5-day window around and over the 
announcement date of the deal has been conducted using an event study and the Market 
Model. Many studies found that acquirers have insignificant returns or even not 
different from zero. 
 
These results show that acquirers who carried out cross-border and domestic 
acquisitions do not generate abnormal returns, and acquirers who conducted cross-
border acquisitions gain lower returns compared with those who made domestic 
acquisitions, and that is the case for almost all the studied windows. 
   
The previous literature has highlighted the fact that there are some determinants that 
may affect these investments and have an impact on acquirers‟ returns, such as using the 
specific method of payment which may have its own effect on acquirers‟ returns. Also 
acquiring large or small target firms may produce abnormal returns or even acquiring a 
target firm that is not from the same industrial sector as the acquirer. As a result, the 
researcher considers in the next chapter some variables and their impact on the 
acquirers‟ returns, to determine whether acquirers‟ returns are affected by these 
variables.  
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Chapter 4: The Determinants of Domestic and Cross-Border 
Acquisitions- 
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The Determinants of Domestic and Cross-Border Acquisitions 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter makes a contribution for several reasons. First of all, this chapter 
investigates the main determinants of acquirers‟ returns of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. Second, the impact of some major variables has been considered, such as 
the method of payment, the relative size, the industrial relationship, the Book-To- 
Market ratio and the type of the target firm. Third, many studies suggested that these 
variables are the most important determinants that may have an impact on acquirers‟ 
returns. Finally, a regression of acquirers‟ returns against those determinants has been 
run for domestic acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions and the whole sample that 
includes all acquisitions.  The reason for studying those variables is results that have 
been estimated in the previous chapter. It is important to identify whether there are 
variables that may affect acquirers‟ returns and have an important impact on those 
returns.  
 
4.2 The determinants of acquirers’ returns  
There are many variables which may affect the bidder‟s returns such as the method of 
payment, the relative size of the bidder and the target, the industrial relationship 
between acquirer and target, Book-to-Market ratio and the type of the target firms. In 
this paper, the researcher summarized some of that literature concerning each variable 
which is believed to have an important effect on the bidder‟s returns. Thus this chapter 
is organized as follows; the current section includes more details about the major 
determinants of acquirers‟ returns, such as the method of payment, the industrial 
relationship, the relative size, the Book-to-Market ratio and the type of the target firm. 
After introducing some information about each variable, the main results for each 
determinant and that is for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions will be 
presented.  
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4.2.1 The method of payment  
Recently, a number of studies on mergers and acquisitions report that the method of 
payment plays a major role in explaining the stock returns of bidding firms (Chang, 
1998). Furthermore, Travlos (1987) mentioned that different methods of payment have 
various effects on the bidding firm‟s equity. Firstly, in a world of asymmetric 
information the method of payment may indicate important information to the market. If 
the acquirer‟s manager has valuable information about his/her firm, this manager will 
depend on the most profitable way for stockholders to finance his/her firm‟s acquisition. 
In addition, managers will prefer generally to finance acquisitions via cash if they think 
that their firms are undervalued, otherwise they will depend on stock. The author also 
explained that the market usually considers a cash offer as good news and an equity 
offer as bad news about the actual value of the bidding firm. Secondly, cash offers and 
equity offers have various tax implications. For example, cash offers usually have tax 
obligations for the target firm, while equity offers are tax-free deals. As a result, the 
author assumed that the bidding firm should pay a high acquisition price for a cash offer 
to balance the tax trouble or complication for the selling firm (the target firm).  
 
Moreover, Loughran and Vigh (1997) highlighted that the method of payment is usually 
endogenous to the type or the mode of the deal and that the acquirer who depends 
mainly on stock is likely to be a growth firm, which makes managers and the market 
quite optimistic about their future. The research summarized the major studies that have 
studied the method of payment as an important factor which may affect abnormal 
returns of acquirers. The first study is by Barnes (1984). The author studied in this paper 
all mergers which are listed in the London Stock Exchange for the period from June 
1974 until February 1976. Depending on the market model he divided the acquirers 
according to the method of payment. His major findings for 39 firms were that the 
abnormal returns for acquirers who used cash were -0.056% for the 60 months 
following the announcement date, and -0.054% for acquirers who depended on equity to 
finance their acquisitions. 
 
Travlos (1987) presented an important empirical study for 167 acquisitions between 
1972 and 1981. First of all, the author divided the sample into three major sections 
according to the method of payment. The first section included offers which were 
financed by stock, the second section consisted of offers that were financed by cash, and 
finally the third section contains offers which were financed by a combination of 
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common stock and cash. Depending on the Market Model, for ten days before the 
announcement day and ten days after the announcement day, he found that acquirers 
generated negative significant returns of -1.03% at the announcement date if they used 
stock as a method of payment, and positive returns which were not different from zero 
of 0.26% if they depend on cash as a method to finance their deal.  
 
Danbolt (1995) studied in his paper the returns to shareholders of foreign acquiring 
firms that conduct cross-border acquisitions into the UK between the beginning of 1986 
and the end of 1991. The author analysed as well the effect of the method of payment on 
the bidder‟s returns. The author found that the majority of firms tend to be financed by 
cash, and that bidders who financed their deals with equity had insignificant returns. 
 
Furthermore, Loughran and Vijh (1997) studied the relationship between the post 
acquisition returns and the mode of acquisition (merger and tender offer) and the 
method of payment for the period between 1970 and 1989. They considered in their 
findings comparing between acquirers‟ returns of their sample and returns of matching 
firms. Thus their results showed that the difference between acquirers‟ abnormal returns 
and the matching firms of those acquires for post acquisition over five years was -1.18% 
for tender offers which have been financed by stock, and -2.94% for mergers which 
depended on stock as the method to finance. Acquirers that are involved in mergers and 
paid by cash for their deals have insignificant and negative difference of their returns of 
-0.32%, while acquirers who financed their tender deals by cash had a significant and 
positive abnormal difference in their returns of 2.03%. Furthermore, the authors noted 
that acquirers who depended on cash and stock together as a method of payment had a 
negative and insignificant difference in their returns for both mergers and tender offers. 
 
Additionally, Chang (1998) studied the acquirers‟ returns according to the method of 
payment and the type of target firm for USA firms. The author depended mainly on the 
Market Model for a 2-day period (the day before the announcement day through to the 
announcement day) to calculate the abnormal returns. The findings presented  
insignificant average abnormal returns for acquirers who hold private targets and used 
cash as a method of payment of 0.09% (t=0.34) , while acquirers who also hold private 
targets but offered to pay by stock had significant and positive average abnormal returns 
of  2.64% (t=7.49). 
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On the other hand, the acquirers who hold public targets had insignificant average 
abnormal returns of -0.02% (t=-0.06) when they paid by cash, and significant, negative 
average abnormal returns of -2.46% (t=-9.85) when they offered to pay by stock. This 
implies that acquirers that depended on cash to finance their deals had small returns 
compared with those that used stock to pay for their acquisitions. 
  
Later, Fuller et al (2002) explained that Myers and Majluf (1984) stated in their study 
that the acquirer will depend on stock as a method of payment, if its board thinks that its 
shares are overvalued. But the authors mentioned that this earlier idea has been 
developed in more recent articles. Fishman (1989) and Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel 
(1990) stated that the higher-valued bidders will depend mainly on cash or they will use 
cash more than any other method to indicate their value in the market. On the other 
hand, the bidders usually will not offer cash as a payment for their acquisitions when 
there is a very high uncertainty in respect of the value of the target firm. 
 
 Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) stated in their paper that many investors in the perfect 
market will differ in choosing any method of payment to finance their deals. On the 
other hand, in the actual market, there are many limits which bound the partiality of 
each method of payment, such as the level of information asymmetry which may play 
an important role in determining the choice of the method of payment in any deal. For 
example, any confidential information that may be held by the target firm creates an 
incorrect estimation in the value of the target firm that may lead to uncertainty in that 
estimation. As a result the acquirer may offer equity instead of cash. 
 
Recently, Goergen and Renneboog (2003) stated that choosing between each method 
may be strictly related to the stock price of the bidding firm. For example, if the 
manager of the acquiring firm recognizes that the stock price of his/her company is 
worth more than its current market price, he/she will choose cash as a method to pay for 
the deal; otherwise he/she will depend on equity to pay for an acquisition.  
 
Following the above discussion, the authors studied European acquisitions and they 
found that over the short and long term, cash offers generated higher abnormal returns 
for the target firms compared with the total equity offers, of 9.89% and 6.65% 
respectively at the announcement month. On the other hand, the situation was 
completely different for acquiring firms. Their results showed that for the short term, 
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bidders that offered equity as a method of payment received 0.98% returns at the 
announcement month, while the bidders that financed their deal with cash, received 
returns of 0.37%. Moreover, bidders who used cash as a method of payment received 
losses of -1.18% up to month -40, while the bidder with an equity offer received 
positive returns over the long-term. 
 
Conn et al. (2005) distinguished in their paper between the public, private, domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions. They mentioned that the choice of the method of payment is 
likely to differ between the domestic and cross-border deals and also between the public 
and private ones. However, the cash offers are better and more preferable than equity 
offers for the acquirer‟s shareholders, because financing any deal with cash can be 
considered in the market as a good sign for bidder‟s expectations of future gains. 
However this idea according to the authors cannot be applied for cross-border 
acquisitions, because there are many variables that may limit the method of payment in 
cross-border deals. These included the difficulties which may appear by using foreign 
currency, and also the uncertainty that was related to information and investment 
abroad. The bidder will prefer to offer equity instead of cash in those kinds of deals. 
Conn et al. (2005) 
 
Conn et al.‟s (2005) results showed that almost in all deals for the three day period -1, 
+1, those acquirers who financed their deals via cash, had worse returns than acquirers 
who depended on noncash as a method to finance their deals. Moreover, the returns of 
the acquisitions of public targets (for the announcement period) which were financed by 
cash were an insignificant 0.07% and this turned into a negative and significant return 
of -1.12% for acquisitions that used noncash as a method to finance their deals. 
 
More recently, Petmezas (2009) studied the effect of the method of payment generally 
and with it the relationship with the market valuation. The author investigated the 
relationship between the merger activity and the market valuation because he assumed 
that testing the market reactions to mergers in high- low market valuation periods can 
assist in drawing attention to the importance of market-wide valuation on the acquiring 
firm‟s stock performance, and have a good idea about the incomplete debate of merger 
activity. Thus the author found that acquirers who used cash as a method of payment 
gained CAR of 0.93% for the 5-day study (-2, +2) and acquirers who financed their 
deals via stock had CARs that were not different from zero of 0.22%. Acquirers who 
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used both cash and stock had significant returns of 1.67%. Furthermore, the author 
considered the relationship between the method of payment and the market valuation, 
and presents an interesting finding. Acquirers who used cash or a mixed method had 
significant returns for high valuation periods of 1.29% and 2.32%, and insignificant 
returns for low valuation periods of 0.39% and 0.69% for a 5-day study. On the other 
hand, acquirers who paid for their acquisitions via stock had insignificant returns for the 
high valuation period of 1.00%, and negative returns for the low valuation period of -
1.71% also for the (-2, +2)  studied period. 
 
As regards the method of payment, the researcher is going to find out whether there are 
abnormal returns for domestic and cross-border UK acquisitions and that is for the 
period from the beginning of 2000 until the end of 2009. The effect of the method of 
payment on returns of these acquisitions has been tested. To achieve that, the sample 
has been divided (654 domestic acquisitions, 479 cross-border acquisitions) into three 
main parts according to the method of payment. The first part includes acquisitions that 
have been financed by cash, the profit-related payment, cash loans and liabilities. The 
second part includes acquisitions that depend on equity, common stock and preferred 
stock as the method of payment. The third part includes deals that depend on both cash 
and equity together as the method to be financed. The major problem that appears after 
the earlier separation is that there is an unbalanced number across the three previous 
parts. The first part that contains the cash as a method of payment is bigger than the 
second and the third parts, and that for both domestic and cross-border deals. Thus to 
solve this problem, a combination between the second and the third parts has been done, 
that includes acquisitions which have been financed by a non-cash method. 
 
 The following section presents the major results for acquirers according to the method 
of payment‟s impact for domestic and cross-border acquisitions for a 5-day window.  
 
4.2.1.1 Results  
Using an event study methodology, and for 5 days (-2, +2) including the announcement 
day, abnormal returns for domestic and cross-border deals according to their method of 
payment have been calculated.  The sample is sub-divided according to the method of 
payment into two main sections. The first section includes deals which are financed by 
pure cash, liabilities, loan notice, and relative-profit payment. The second section 
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includes acquisitions that are financed by non-cash such as common stock, equity and 
preferred stock. The following table introduces the average of abnormal returns for 
domestic deals after considering the method of payment for each one. The domestic 
deals have been divided according to the method of payment into 420 deals which are 
financed via cash and 234 acquisitions that are financed by non-cash. 
 
Table 4. 1. Acquires‟ returns for domestic deals in relation to the method of payment 
 
 Cash Deals  Non-cash Deals Differential 
between CAR 
t-stat of 
Differential  
Window CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
 
Cash- 
Noncash 
Cash- 
Noncash 
All bidders  
-2 to +2 1.26 3.74 1.05 1.30 0.21 0.23 
-1 to +1 1.17 3.88 0.83 1.16 0.34 0.43 
Bidders with private targets 
-2 to +2 1.31 3.62 1.23 1.62 0.08 0.10 
-1 to +1  1.19 3.66 0.72 1.65 0.47 0.65 
Bidders with public targets  
-2 to +2 0.85 0.95 0.48 0.19 0.37 0.08 
-1 to +1 1.04 1.26 1.20 0.52 -0.16 -0.04 
 
Notes: 
This table presents acquirers‟ returns for UK domestic deals from the beginning of 2000 until 
the end of 2009 according to the method of payment. The sample is sub-divided according to 
the method of payment into two sections. The first section includes deals which have been 
financed by pure cash, liabilities, loan notices, and relative-profit payment. The second section 
is a non-cash section which comprises acquisitions which have been financed depending on 
common stock, equity, and preferred stock; an event study methodology has been used to 
calculate the acquirer‟s abnormal returns for a 5-day window. Thus the number of domestic 
deals is 654 acquisitions; according to the method of payment the sample includes 420 cash 
deals and   234 non-cash deals. The total number of bidders with public target which used cash 
to finance their deals with cash is 45 one, while the total number of bidders with public target 
which depend on non-cash is 58 acquirers.  
 
One can notice that domestic deals that have been financed by cash have higher returns 
for the studied period compared to non-cash deals that have lower returns. These results 
are similar to those of Petemzas (2009). The author also found that acquirers who 
depend on stock as a method of payment have lower returns of 0.22% compared with 
those who use cash as a method of payment with returns of 0.93%. On the other hand, 
these results are not similar to these of Conn et al (2005) in one respect, which is that 
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cash deals do worse than noncash deals regarding their abnormal returns. It is notable 
from the fifth column that there are insignificant differences between the CAR of the 
previous two sections, but there are significant t-statistics which confirms that there is a 
significant impact on the bidder‟s returns according to the method of payment .  
 
Table 4.2 introduces the average and t-stat of abnormal returns for acquirers regarding 
the method of payment for cross-border deals. The cross-border sample has been 
divided into two sections according to the method of payment. The first section includes 
386 deals which have been financed by using cash which includes pure cash, liabilities, 
and loan notice and relative-profit payment. The second section consists of 93 deals 
which have been financed depending on a non-cash method which includes common 
stock, equity and preferred stock. One can observe that there is a big difference in the 
number of both sections, and this is because cross-border acquirers tend to finance their 
deals depending on cash more than non-cash, and that is because the targets are 
sometimes unwilling to accept foreign stock.   
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Table 4. 2.Acquirers‟ returns for cross-border acquisitions according to the method of payment 
 
 Cash Deals  Non-cash Deals  Differential 
between 
CAR 
t-stat of 
Differential 
between CAR 
Window CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
 
Cash-
Noncash  
Cash- Noncash 
All bidders  
-2 to +2 0.58 1.83 0.35 0.38 0.23 0.39 
-1 to +1 0.57 2.18 -0.17 -0.20 0.74 2.42 
Bidders with private targets  
-2 to +2 0.52 1.53 1.20 1.15 -0.68 -1.92 
-1 to +1 0.57 1.99 0.72 0.80 -0.15 -0.53 
Bidders with public targets 
-2 to +2  0.18 0.21 -3.31 -1.63 3.49 3.34 
-1 to +1 -0.06 -0.09 -4.09 -2.00 4.03 4.50 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the acquirers‟ returns for UK cross-border acquisitions from the beginning of 
2000 till the end of 2009 according to the method of payment. The sample has been divided 
according to the method of payment into two sections. The first section consists of deals which 
have been financed via cash, liabilities, loan notice, and relative-profit payment. The second 
section includes acquisitions which have been financed depending on common stock, equity, 
and preferred stock. The total number of the cross-border sample is 479 deals; this sample is 
divided into 386 cash deals and 93 non-cash acquisitions. Abnormal returns have been 
calculated depending on an event study methodology and the market model for a 5-day window. 
 
One can observe from the previous table that acquirers that are involved in cross-border 
deals which have been financed by cash, have higher returns for the studied period 
compared with acquirers who used non-cash as a method of payment. Acquirers who 
used a non-cash method to fund their deals have lower returns which are not different 
from zero. These results share with Conn et al‟ s (2005) study in one respect, which is 
that both studies have insignificant returns for non-cash cross-border deals for days       
(-1,+1), and that of -0.17% for these results and 0.24% for Conn et al‟ s (2005) results. 
It is notable from the earlier table that there are significant differences between both 
sections according to the t-stat; this confirms that there is a marked impact for the 
method of payment on acquirers‟ returns around the announcement date. Explaining 
these results, it is possible I can depend on Conn et al.‟s (2005) argument. The authors 
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mention that there are several reasons which can explain differences in the method of 
payment‟s influence between domestic and cross-border deals and particularly 
according to the type of the target firm. First of all, acquirers who used cash to finance 
their deals generate better returns because the market usually considers using cash as a 
good sign of “positive expectations” of potential returns. This idea may not be 
considered in financing cross-border acquisitions, because of many factors that play an 
important role in using the method of payment in these deals, such as the uncertainty 
problem regarding overseas information. Applying this idea on earlier results confirms 
that domestic deals that have been financed with cash do better compared with non-cash 
deals, while acquirers with private targets in cross-border deals produce better returns 
when they use non-cash.  It is notable that clearly for acquirers with cross-border deals, 
for those who depended on non-cash as a method to finance their deals, they have 
returns which are not different from zero for the whole studied period, while acquirers 
who depended on cash have higher returns over the announcement date. Also acquirers 
of domestic acquisitions that finance their deals via cash have higher returns compared 
with acquirers who depend on non-cash to finance their acquisitions over the 
announcement date.  
 
In the next section, more detail about the second determinant which is the relative size 
of the bidder to the target firm will be reviewed. 
 
4.2.2 The relative size of the target firm to the bidder 
The second variable is the relative size of the target firm to the bidder. There are many 
studies which have mentioned this variable as an important one, but one can notice that 
each article defines it in different way. Travlos (1987) pointed out that the relative size 
of the acquisition can be measured by two main ratios. The first one can be defined as 
the market value of the equity of the target firm divided by the market value of the 
bidding firm. The second ratio can be defined as the value of the transaction divided by 
the market value of equity of the acquiring firm. Furthermore, Travlos (1987) added that 
acquisitions which are financed by equity experience mostly lower returns compared 
with deals that are financed via cash. Secondly, the authors assumed that the Hubris 
Theory may have a role in the impact of a size effect on acquirers, and that is because 
large firms mainly make many acquisitions in a short period of time. This may affect 
their announcement returns badly or negatively, while the situation will differ for the 
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small firms which cannot achieve many acquisitions due to their more limited resources, 
and that significantly does affect their announcement returns.   
 
Danbolt (1995) stated that the relative size can be defined as the ratio of the pre-bid 
market value of the target firm to the pre-bid market value of the bidder firm. The 
author examined this variable depending on two factors, the first one was the market 
capitalization of the target firm in relation to the market value of the bidder firm, and 
the second one was the natural log of the market capitalization of the bidder firm. It is 
notable according to the author that this variable did not show any significant impact 
without considering the impact of the earlier two factors. Depending on this idea, and 
using two models for calculating the abnormal returns the Market Model, and the Index 
Model, he stated that over the pre-bid period (which is the period from month eight 
prior to the announcement month to the second month before the announcement month) 
the relative size has significant effects according to both models at a 5% significance 
level. Furthermore, over the announcement bid period which includes the first month 
prior to the announcement month and the announcement month, the author found that 
this variable had some effects on the cumulative abnormal returns of the bidders 
according to the Index model of 1.57%, while it had a significant effect for the same 
period according to the Market Model of 2.21%, and large bidders perform better than 
small bidders over this period. 
  
 Tuch and O‟Sullivan (2007) mentioned in their article that many researchers stated 
some reasons which may be related to this important variable, such as many acquiring 
firms prefer to acquire a large target because this will give them a strong impact on the 
post-bid performance of the combined firm. 
 
The authors also summed up some main studies which have considered these variables, 
such as the article written by Asquith et al (1983). They were the first researchers who 
mentioned the size effect in their study. They found the relative size had an essential 
impact on the bidder‟s gains during the announcement period. They also mentioned that 
Dong et al. (2005) assumed that there were negative gains in the short run but positive 
gains in the long term from acquiring large targets. 
 
More recently, Petmezas (2009) studied the effect of the relative size of the target. First, 
the author defined the relative size as the deal value divided by the market value of the 
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acquirer one month prior to the announcement date. The author considered the 
relationship between the relative size of the target and the market valuation (the author 
classified as high and low valuation depending on the P/E ratio of the value-weighted 
market index “TOTMKUK”).  One should add that the author examined the relationship 
between the merger activity and the market valuation because he believed that testing 
the market reaction to merger in high and low market valuation periods can assist into 
drawing attention to the importance of market-wide valuation on the acquiring firm‟s 
stock performance, and therefore provided a good idea about regarding the incomplete 
debate of merger activity.  The author found that acquirers with a small size relative to 
the target had positive and significant returns of 1.23% for high valuation periods, and 
returns that are not different from zero for the low valuation periods of 0.21%. In 
addition, bidders with a high size relative to the target had positive and significant 
returns of 2.07% for high valuation periods, and 0.61% for low valuation periods. This 
implies that the small size effect on acquirers‟ returns appears more in the high 
valuation periods compared with low valuation periods.  
 
Regarding this research, the researcher is going to investigate the impact of the relative 
size on acquirers‟ returns and that will be done for both domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. An event study method and the Market Model for a 5-day event window 
have been applied. The following section reports the major results regarding the effect 
of the relative size of the target to the bidder. 
 
4.2.2.2 Results  
Regarding this variable, the researcher divides the value of the deal on the market value 
of the acquirer one month prior the announcement date of the deal. The sample of 
domestic acquisitions has been divided into two sections according to that variable. The 
first section includes deals with a large relative size and the second section comprises of 
deals with a small relative size. The following table presents the average of abnormal 
returns and t-stat of domestic deals after considering the relative size of the target. 
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Table 4. 3.Acquirers‟ returns for domestic acquisitions according to the relative size 
 
 Large Relative 
Size  
Small Relative 
Size  
Differential  
between  
CAR 
t-stat of 
Differential 
between CAR 
Window CAR 
 
t-stat CAR 
 
t-stat Large –Small  Large- Small 
All bidders  
-2 to +2 1.88 2.95 0.61 1.62 1.27 2.00 
-1 to +1 1.53 2.69 0.60 1.81 0.93 1.63 
Bidders with private targets 
-2 to +2 2.19 3.69 0.52 1.30 1.67 2.82 
-1 to +1 1.56 3.13 0.55 1.56 1.01 2.03 
Bidders with public targets  
-2 to +2 0.44 0.19 1.15 1.05 -0.71 -0.30 
-1 to +1  1.36 0.61 0.92 0.95 0.44 0.19 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the impact of the relative size on acquirers‟ abnormal returns for UK domestic 
deals from the beginning of 2000 till the end of 2009. The abnormal returns have been 
calculated depending on the Market Model for a 5-day window.  The sample has been divided 
according the relative size into two sections. The first section includes the large relative size 
which consists of 330 acquisitions. The second section includes the small relative size which 
consists of 324 acquisitions. The researcher defined the relative size of the target to the bidder 
as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer one month prior the announcement 
date, and then the median has been calculated. Later, the sample has been divided according to 
the relative size impact depending on that median into two sections. 
 
One can notice from table 4.3 that deals with a large relative size have significant and 
higher returns compared with acquirers with a small relative size, and that is for the 
complete 5-day window. It is important to add that earlier results confirm that the larger 
the relative size of the target to the bidder the lower the bidder returns in acquisitions 
with public targets and the higher the bidder returns in deals with private targets.  
 
Moreover, these results are similar to Petmezas‟ (2009) results, the acquirers in both 
studies that are involved in bigger relative size deals have better returns of 2.07% for 
Petmezas‟s study and 1.88% for these study, and that is for the (-2, + 2) window. 
Secondly, acquirers in both studies that engage in smaller relative size deals have 
smaller returns of 1.23% for Petmezas‟ study and 0.61% for this study, also for the (-
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2,+2) studied period.  It is necessary to add that according to Travlos (1987) that Hubris 
Theory may also have its impact on small and large firms‟ returns. Moreover, Asquith 
et al. (1983) mentioned that acquirers‟ returns may be affected by the type of the target 
firms, and after considering this idea, the researcher finds that the large relative size the 
higher the bidder returns in acquisitions with private targets.  
  
Furthermore, the following table introduces the average of abnormal returns and               
t-statistics for cross-border acquisitions and again for a 5-day period after considering 
the impact of the relative size. The researcher calculates the value of the deal on the 
market value of the acquirer one month prior the announcement date, the sample of 
cross-border acquisitions has been divided into two sections regarding the median. The 
first section with a large relative size includes 240 deals, while the second section with a 
small relative size includes 239 deals. It is important to add that the total number of 
deals with large relative size of target to bidder with public targets is 35 acquisitions, 
and the number of deals with public targets and large relative size is 25.  
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Table 4. 4. Acquirers‟ returns for cross-border acquisitions in relation to the relative size 
 
 Large Relative 
Size  
Small Relative 
Size  
Differential 
between CAR 
t-stat of 
Differential 
between CAR   
Window CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
 
Large –Small  Large-Small 
All Bidders 
-2 to +2 0.90 1.70 0.21 0.31 0.69 1.76 
-1 to +1 0.82 1.76 0.11 0.39 0.71 1.99 
Bidders with private targets 
-2 to +2 1.04 1.95 -0.08 -0.22 1.12 2.14 
-1 to +1 0.97 2.09 -0.07 -0.24 1.04 2.29 
Bidders with public targets 
-2 to +2  -1.58 -0.55 0.57 0.26 -2.15 -0.77 
-1 to +1 -1.66 -0.65 -0.52 -0.24 -1.14 -0.45 
 
Notes: 
This table introduces acquirers‟ abnormal returns for UK cross-border acquisitions between the 
beginnings of 2000 till the end of 2009 after considering the impact of the relative size. 
Acquirers‟ returns have been calculated depending on the Market Model for a 5-day window. 
The researcher defined the relative size of the target to the bidder as the deal value divided by 
the market value of the acquirer one month prior the announcement date, and then the median 
has been calculated. Later, the sample has been divided according to the relative size impact 
depending on that median into two sections. Later, the cross-border sample has been divided 
into two sections depending on the median into two sections. The first section includes large 
relative size acquisitions which consist of 240 deals. The second section which includes deals 
with a smaller relative size comprises of 239 acquisitions.  
 
One can notice that both sections have insignificant returns, but the returns for the large 
relative size section are higher compared with a small relative size for the same 
windows. Additionally, one can note that the results from table 4.4 are consistent with 
Danbolt (1995), who found that for the pre-bid period foreign firms with large targets 
perform better when compared with firms with small targets. The author also added that 
after making the takeovers, firms with large targets also still experience higher returns. 
This means that both studies show almost the same results regarding the impact of the 
relative size on returns for acquirers which conducted cross-border acquisitions. It is 
important to add that there are no significant differences between the CAR as shown in 
the fifth column. Comparing the results of domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
according to their relationship with the relative size, one can note that acquirers of 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions with a large size have higher returns and that is 
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because of the strong relationship between the size and the method of payment, and 
applying that to both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, the researcher finds that 
the majority of acquirers that used non-cash as a method of payment acquire small 
targets which has its own effect on acquirers‟ returns and lowers them (Travlos, 1987). 
It is important to add that these results are affected by the type of the target firm, 
because the researcher finds that acquirers with large relative size acquire private 
targets, and this confirms what Asquith et al (1983) and Fuller et al (2002) found. 
 
The next section presents more details on the industrial relationship between the bidder 
and the target that explains and introduces the importance of this variable and its effect 
on acquirers‟ returns.  
 
4.2.3 The industrial relationship between the bidder and the target 
 Regarding the industrial relationship between the bidder and the target firm, Morck et 
al (1990) mentioned that there are many models which assume that managers will make 
unrelated diversification even when it affects shareholders negatively. This is for a 
number of reasons, such as, managers will diversify and enter new kinds of business to 
guarantee the survival and continuity of the firm in the case of a lack of liquidity. Also 
they may try to enter a new business area in the case of the poor performance of the 
firm, because that may strengthen their positions. 
   
Hubbard and Palia (1999) explained in their paper about the conglomerate merger wave 
that took place during the 1960s. According to Matsusaka (1993) who studied the 
announcement effects of mergers in his paper, the bidder who diversifies will derive 
positive abnormal returns. This idea clarifies and gives good reasons for firms to prefer 
conglomerate activity in their investments. The authors continued in their discussion by 
defining the diversifying acquisitions as those where the bidder firm and the target firm 
do not share any two-digit SIC code, while the related acquisitions are those which 
share a two-digit SIC code.  
 
The paper examined four major elements as measurements to the abnormal returns of 
the bidding firm. The first one was the CAR from five days before to five days after the 
event date. The second one was the CAR from five days before to five days after the 
date of the last revision, the third one was the dollar returns, and finally, the last one 
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was the investment return which can be defined as the change in the value of the bidder 
divided by the purchase price. The authors presented their results which can be 
summarized in two main parts. The first one was that related acquisitions had positive 
abnormal returns for all the earlier measurements. The second part was that diversifying 
acquisitions had positive abnormal returns in just two measurements. 
 
Depending on the dollar return measure, Matsusaka (1993) stated that the return to a 
diversifying acquisition was significantly positive. The author also explained that when 
any firm acquires an unrelated target, the shareholders of the bidder firm will enjoy an 
$11.0 million on average value increase in the value of the firm after correcting for 
market movements.  
 
Goergen and Renneboog (2003) divided in their article the data into five main industries 
(energy and utilities firms, production and manufacturing firms, services, retails and 
hotels and pubs, and finally banking and insurance firms ) that will help them to test 
whether their results have been affected by the industrial relationship. For the target 
firms, they found that on the announcement day the manufacturing and the retail and 
manufacturing firms had positive abnormal returns of 14.4% and 10.9%, but two 
months later they found that there was no difference between the five industries. On the 
other hand, bidders in the retail and manufacturing sectors had positive abnormal 
returns of 2.07% and 1.89%, while services and energy firms had negative abnormal 
returns of -2.35% and -1.91%, and the returns for the banking industry firms were not 
different from zero of 0.44% for the short-term, but this industry received significantly 
negative returns for the long-term. 
 
More recently, Petmezas (2009) studied the industrial relationship between the bidder 
and the target firm. First of all, the author assumed that both acquirer and target must 
share at least a two-digit SIC code to be considered as having an industrial relationship 
between them. Furthermore, the author studied the relationship between the industrial 
relationship and the market valuation. He found that acquirers who diversified their 
deals had positive and significant returns for high valuation periods of 2.22%, and also 
he mentioned that the same section of acquirers had less returns in the low valuation 
periods of 0.62%. In addition, acquirers who did not diversify had less positive returns 
of 1.19%, and that compared with those who diversified for the high valuation periods. 
Also, acquirers who did not diversify did not gain any significant returns during low 
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valuation periods. The earlier discussion implies that when the acquiring firms acquired 
targets which belong to different industrial sectors, they gain more than acquirers that 
acquired targets from the same industrial sector. 
 
The following section therefore includes the major results regarding the effect of the 
industrial relationship on acquirers‟ returns, and that is for domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions.  
4.2.3.1 Results  
The researcher considered the industrial relationship between the target and the acquirer 
firm as an important variable which may have its own impact on acquirers‟ returns. The 
domestic sample has been divided into two main sections depending on two-digit SIC 
code; the first section includes 393 deals which belong to the same industrial sector 
according to the two-digits SIC code. The second section includes 261 deals which do 
not share the same industrial sector. The following table presents the average of bidders‟ 
returns regarding the industrial relationship for domestic deals. The researcher examines 
acquirers‟ returns for a 3-day window as well to check the robustness.  
 
Table 4. 5.Acquirers‟ returns regarding the industrial relationship for domestic deals 
 
 Different 
Sectors 
Same  Sectors Differential  
between CAR 
t-stat of 
differential 
between CAR 
Window CAR t-stat  CAR  t-stat 
 
Different –
Same  
Different- 
Same 
-2 to +2 2.12 3.01  0.57 1.43 1.55 2.20 
-1 to +1 1.81 2.98 0.46 1.25 1.35 2.23 
 
Notes: 
This table shows returns for UK domestic acquirers from 2000 till 2009 after considering the 
impact of industrial relationship between the acquirers and the target firm.  Acquirers‟ returns 
have been calculated relying on the Market Model for a 5-day window. The domestic 
acquisitions have been divided into two sections according to the impact of the industrial 
relationship. In the first section, the acquirer and the target firms belong to the same industrial 
sector, which means they share the same two –digit SIC code, the total number of domestic 
deals in this section is 393 acquisitions. In the second section, the acquirers and the target firms 
belong to different industrial sectors, they do not share the two –digit SIC code. The total 
number of the deals in the second section is 261 acquisitions.   
 
It is notable from table 4.5 that acquirers that share with the target firm the same 
industrial sector have returns which are not different from zero for the studied window. 
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On the other hand, acquirers that do not share the same industrial sector with the target 
firm have positive and significant returns for -2, +2. These results share with Petmezas‟ 
(2009) study in some aspects including the announcement day which is that acquirers 
who diversify or acquire firms from a different industrial sector have significant returns 
of 2.22% for the same window. However, these results do also share with Petmezas‟ 
study in that acquirers who do not diversify in their deals have lower  returns of 1.19% 
in the period of (-2, +2), and in Petmezas‟ (2009) results 0.57% in the earlier results for 
the same window and that compared with acquirers who diversify have returns of 
2.12% . 
 
Additionally, table 4.6 introduces the average and t-stat of abnormal returns for 
acquirers according to the industrial relationship for cross-border deals. The cross-
border sample has been separated into two sections. The first one consists of 300 deals 
which belong to the same industrial sector and that depends on the two-digit SIC code. 
The second section includes 179 deals which belong to different industrial sectors. It is 
necessary to add that the researcher tested a 3-day window to check the robustness of 
the results.  
 
Table 4. 6.Acquirers‟ returns regarding the industrial relationship for cross-border deals 
 
 Different Sectors Same  Sectors Differential  
between  
CAR 
t-stat of 
differential 
between CAR 
 
Window CAR t-stat CAR  t-stat 
 
Different-
Same 
Different –
Same  
-2 to +2 0.50 0.94 0.56 0.09 -0.06 -0.10 
-1 to +1 0.46 1.03 0.51 0.08 -0.05 -0.02 
 
Notes: 
This table shows acquirers‟ returns for UK cross-border acquisitions during 2004, 2005 and 
20006 after considering the impact of the industrial relationship. Acquirers‟ returns have been 
calculated depending on the Market Model for a 5-day window. The cross-border sample has 
been divided into two sections according to industrial relationship. In the first section, the 
acquirer and the target firm belong to the same industrial sector and share the two-digit SIC 
code, the total number of deals in this section is 300 acquisitions. In the second section, the 
acquirer and the target belong to different industrial sectors and do not share the two –digit SIC 
code. The total number of acquisitions in this section is 179 deals.    
  
It is noticeable that acquirers that belong to the same industrial sector have higher 
abnormal returns for the studied window, while acquirers that belong to different 
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industrial sectors have returns that are not different from zero. This makes these results 
consistent with Morck et al.‟s (1990) results, in which the authors investigated 
acquirers‟ returns for US acquisitions. They found that the bidder had higher returns 
when the bidder and the target share the same four SIC -digits compared with acquirers 
that do not share. In addition, Hubbard and Palia (1999) examined in their paper the 
abnormal returns for acquirers who share with their targets two-digit SIC code around 
the announcement date. They found that related acquisitions had high average abnormal 
returns of 1.62% compared with diversifying acquisitions with average abnormal 
returns of 0.24%.  
 
In addition, it is notable that the results from table 4.6 are consistent with Gregory and 
McCorriston‟s (2005) results in one respect. They examined in their paper acquirers‟ 
returns for UK acquisitions which have been conducted according to their location and 
their industrial relationship for the long and short term. For the short term which is for a 
five day window (-3, 1), they found that acquisitions which share the same SIC code 
had low returns of -0.31% and that is compared with acquisitions that do not share the 
same SIC code which achieved returns of 0.36% and these results show that acquirers 
that do not share with the target the same industrial sector have positive returns which 
are not different from zero. As regards to the above discussion, it is important to 
mention that acquirers of domestic acquisitions who diversify have or gain significant 
returns, and acquirers of cross-border acquisitions who diversify have small returns 
which are not different from zero, which confirms that acquirers usually invest abroad 
and diversify but they do not have high returns from those investments, and that is 
because these investments are risky and cost firms a lot of effort compared with 
investing or acquiring international targets which share the same sector.  
 
4.2.4 Book-to-Market Ratio 
There are many studies which have considered the Book to Market Ratio as an 
important variable in their research, such as Fama and French (1992) who discussed that 
this financial variable is considered as a proxy for unobservable common risk factors. 
Also they found in their results that it had a significant relationship with realized 
returns. Fama and French (1993) found that low book-to-market equity firms achieve 
more profits compared with high book-to-market equity firms over a five year period. 
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 Most studies calculated the Book-to-Market Ratio as Barber and Lyon (1997) did in 
their paper. They calculated it as the ratio between the book common equity for a fiscal 
year ending in calendar year (t-1) and the firms‟ market equity at the end of Dec in year 
t-1. 
 
In addition, Sudarsanam et al. (2001) introduced in their paper Lakonishok et al‟ s 
(1994) view regarding the analytical power of the Book-to-Market ratio as an important 
variable. They mentioned that Lakonishok et al (1994) stated that those financial 
variables are good in forecasting share returns and that is because they can capture 
investors‟ mistakes regarding their expectations of any future returns or gains. 
Furthermore, the researcher notes that very few studies have examined this variable 
according to its impact on mergers and acquisitions. For example, Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) tested a sample of 987 of USA takeovers between 1981 and 1990. They found 
that acquirers with a high Market-to-Book ratio had returns between -5.6% and -5.4% 
within the first, second and third years after the completion, while acquirers with a low 
Market-To-Book ratio gained returns of 5.5%, -1.1% and 9.9% within the first, second 
and third years. 
 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) hypothesized later that most shareholders of low 
MTBV acquirers experienced large post-acquisition wealth gains compared with those 
with high MTBV acquirers. They also found in their results that at the announcement 
date (-1 to +1) acquirers with high MTBV experienced abnormal returns in the range -
2% to -1.8%. 
 
Petmezas (2009) found that bidders with a high Book-to-Market ratio had negative and  
insignificant returns at a high valuation market period of -0.15%, while bidders have 
negative and significant returns at a low valuation market period of -2.80%. On the 
other hand, bidders with a low Book-to-Market ratio have negative and significant 
returns for high valuation market periods of -2.00% and also insignificant returns for 
low valuation market periods of -1.21%. This means that acquirers with a low Book-to-
Market ratio gain better returns compared with those with high Book-to-Market ratio 
and that is because according to Rau and Vermaelen‟s (1998) argument of the 
extrapolation hypothesis which supposes that the market overreacts to the past 
performance of the acquirers at the time of announcement bid. Acquirers with high 
Book-to-Market ratio have a tendency to have a high share price imitating the high 
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growth in cash flow. Thus the market depends on the past performance of those 
acquirers and gives the managers of those firms the benefit of the doubt when they 
undertake the acquisitions. The opposite situation happens to acquirers with a low 
Book-to-Market ratio, which leads the managers of firms with a low Book-to-Market 
ratio to be careful when conducting any acquisitions. 
 
In this research, the Book-to-Market ratio has been considered as an important variable.  
Both domestic and cross-border deals have been divided into two main sections 
according to the median of the Book-to-Market of the whole sample. The first section 
includes deals with a high BTM ratio, and the second section consists of deals with a 
low BTM ratio. It is important to add that Book-to-Market ratio is defined as the net 
book value divided by the market value one month prior to the announcement date. 
 
In the following section, the researcher is going to include the major results regarding 
the impact of the Book-to Market ratio on acquirers‟ returns for domestic and cross-
border acquisitions. An event study methodology and the application of the Market 
Model have been used to calculate acquirers‟ returns for a 5-day window over the 
announcement date. 
 
4.2.4.1 Results  
The following table presents acquirers‟ abnormal returns in relation to the BTM ratio.  
The domestic sample has been divided into two main sections as mentioned before, the 
first section contains 319 deals with a high BTM ratio, and the second one includes 292 
deals with a low BTM ratio. Several deals have been excluded from the domestic 
sample because of the lack of information about their BTM ratio. 
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Table 4. 7. Acquirers‟ returns for domestic deals in relation to the Book-to-Market ratio 
 
 High B/M Ratio Low B/ M Ratio Differential 
between CAR  
t-stat of 
differential 
between CAR  
Window CAR t-stat CAR 
 
t-stat High –Low High-Low  
-2 to +2 1.46 3.01 0.28 0.58 1.18 2.40 
-1 to +1 1.03 2.47 0.41 0.98 0.62 1.47 
 
Notes: 
This table presents abnormal returns for UK domestic acquisitions between 2000 and 2009 in 
relation to the Book-to Market ratio. Acquirers‟ returns have been calculated relying on the 
Market Model for a 5-day window.  The domestic sample has been divided into two sections 
according to the Median of the whole BTM ratio. The first section includes deals with high 
Book-to-Market ratio; the total number of acquisitions in this section is 319 deals. The second 
section includes 292 deals that contain deals with the low Book-to-Market ratio. 
 
It is noticeable from these results in table 4.7 that deals with a high Book-to-Market 
ratio have high and significant abnormal returns for the period compared with acquirers 
with a low Book-to-Market ratio. These results share with previous literature that 
suggests that firms with a high Book-to-Market ratio have higher returns over the 
announcement period. For example, Lang et al (1989) mention that firms with high 
Book-to-Market ratio generate high announcement returns. On the other hand, it is 
important to add that deals with a low Book-to-Market ratio have insignificant returns 
and that for windows around the announcement date. 
 
It is clear that these results are consistent with Petmezas‟ (2009) results in returns 
during the low valuation market period, because in these results bidders with a high 
Book-to-Market ratio have insignificant returns of 1.46% for -2, +2 period, while 
according to Petmezas (2009)‟s results, bidders for the same studied period have also 
insignificant returns of 0.87% for the high valuation market period, and both studies 
find that bidders with a low Book-to-Market ratio gain less than bidders with high 
Book-to-Market ratio in low valuation period.  
 
Furthermore, table 4.8 shows the returns for acquirers undertaking cross-border deals in 
relation to the Book-to-Market ratio. The cross-border sample is sub-divided into two 
main sections according to the median of the whole Book-to-Market ratio of the 
complete sample. The first section includes 233 deals with a high Book-to-Market ratio, 
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while the second section contains 219 deals with a low Book-to-Market ratio. Several 
deals have been excluded from the cross-border sample because of the lack of 
information about their Book-to-Market ratio.  
 
Table 4. 8. Acquirers‟ returns for cross-border acquisitions in relation to the Book-to –Market 
ratio 
 
 High B/M Ratio Low B/M Ratio Differential  
Between 
CAR 
t-stat of 
differential 
between 
CAR 
Window CAR t-stat CAR 
 
t-stat High- Low High-Low  
-2 to +2 1.30 3.27 -0.31 -0.60 1.61 4.19 
-1 to +1 1.23 3.43 -0.20 -0.44 1.43 4.14 
 
Notes: 
This table presents acquirers‟ returns for UK cross-border deals between 2000 till 2009 in 
relation to the Book-to-Market ratio. Acquirers‟ returns have been calculated depending on the 
Market Model for a 5-day window. The sample has been divided into two sections according to 
the median of the whole Book-to-Market ratio for the whole sample. The first section consists 
of 240 deals which include deals with a high Book-to-Market ratio. The second section includes 
219 deals with a low Book-to-Market ratio. 
 
 
One can notice from table 4.8 that bidders with a high Book-to-Market ratio have 
significant returns for the studied window of 1.30% compared with bidders with a low 
Book-to-Market ratio that have lower returns of -0.31% for the same window. It is 
notable that there are differences between the t-statistics of both sections which 
confirms that there is a clear impact of B/M ratio on bidder‟s returns. In addition, these 
results are consistent with Megginson et al‟s (2004) in one aspect. They found that 
acquirers with a high Book-to-Market ratio have higher returns of -3.49% at the 
announcement period compared with acquirers with a low Book-to-Market ratio.  
 
4.2.5 The type of the target firm 
 
This section investigates the effect of the target firm being a public or private one. The 
literature confirms that acquiring private targets is considered important in both 
domestic and international acquisitions, and that is compared with acquiring public 
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targets. There are many reasons which lead to think that acquiring private targets may 
produce more returns for acquiring firms. The first reason is that the procedure of 
making the deal may be less showing to “public gaze”, which may happen in public 
bids. The second one is the private bids may lead to revelation of information between 
parts of the deal which cannot happen in public bids. Conn et al. (2005) 
 
Chang (1998) studied in his paper acquirers‟ returns for 281 firms which acquire private 
target firms between 1981 and 1992 and compare those returns with acquirers‟ returns 
for 255 firms which acquire public targets for the same studied period. The author found 
that there were significant returns for firms which acquired private targets and used 
stock to finance their deals.  
 
Conn et al (2005) examined the announcement returns of UK private, public, domestic 
and cross-border acquisitions between the beginning of 1984 and the end of 1998. They 
found that domestic acquirers with private targets achieve higher returns of 1.05% 
compared with those who conducted public firms. Furthermore, they found that the 
returns for cross-border acquirers do not differ from zero and that is for acquirers with 
both public and private targets. On the other hand, the authors pointed out that acquirers 
of domestic and cross-border acquisitions produce significant gains of 0.68% and 0.33% 
and these returns were driven by deals with private targets instead of public targets.  
  
In the following section, the researcher will introduce acquirers‟ returns for domestic 
and cross-border acquisitions after considering the type of the target firm.  
 
4.2.5.1 Results  
As regard to the type of the target, the researcher divides the sample into two sections 
according to the type of target firm. The first section includes firms which acquire 
private targets, while the second section consists of deals which acquire public firms.  
The following table introduces returns for acquirers of domestic acquisitions after 
dividing the sample according to the type of target firm. Domestic sample includes 551 
deals with a private target and 103 deals with a public firm. One can notice that the 
majority of the sample includes firms which acquire private targets which gives a good 
explanation to the empirical results. It is important to mention that the researcher 
includes a 3-day window, and that is to check the robustness of the results. 
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Table 4. 9. Acquirers‟ returns for domestic acquisitions in relation to the type of the target firm 
 
  
 
Private targets 
 
 
Public targets  
Differential  
between 
CAR 
t-stat of 
differential 
between CAR 
Window CAR t-stat CAR  t-stat 
 
Private –
Public  
Private- 
Public  
-2 to +2 1.22 3.21 0.90 0.69 0.32 0.82 
-1 to +1 0.90 2.89 1.41 1.13 -0.51 -1.54 
 
Notes: 
This table presents acquirers‟ returns for UK domestic deals from 2000 till 2009 in relation to 
the type of the target firm. Acquirers‟ returns have been calculated depending on the Market 
Model for a 5-day window. The sample has been divided into two sections according to the type 
of the target firm. The first section consists of 551 deals which include deals with private 
targets. The second section includes 103 deals with public targets. 
 
 
It is notable from table 4.9 that acquirers with private targets have higher returns 
compared with acquirers with public targets. These results share with Fuller et al (2002) 
in one respect, which is that acquirers with private targets have higher returns than 
acquirers with public targets. Furthermore, Fuller et al (2002) added that when a public 
acquirer acquires a public target the negative returns for the acquirer will equalize by 
the positive gains of the target firm, while when a public firm acquires a private target, 
the shareholders of the acquiring firm will get some returns from this bid considering 
that this deal is a way to increase the value. One can observe that results in the previous 
table share also with Conn et al.‟s (2005) study, they found that acquirers of domestic 
and public targets have lower returns than acquirers of domestic and private targets for 
the 3-day window. It is notable that the difference between returns is insignificant 
economically and statistically which is obvious when t-stat of the difference has been 
considered. 
 
The following table includes CARs for acquirers of cross-border targets after 
considering the type of the target firm. The cross-border sample is sub-divided into two 
sections. The first one includes 419 acquisitions with private targets; the second one 
consists of 60 deals with public targets.  
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Table 4. 10. Acquirers‟ returns for cross-border acquisitions in relation to the type of the target 
firm 
 
  
 
Private targets 
 
 
Public targets  
The 
difference 
between 
CAR 
t-stat of 
differential 
between 
CAR 
Window CAR t-stat CAR  t-stat 
 
Private-
Public  
Private-
Public 
-2 to +2 0.55 1.68 0.19 0.18 0.36 1.05 
-1 to +1 0.56 2.02 -0.71 -0.74 1.27 4.30 
 
Notes: 
This table presents acquirers‟ returns for UK cross-border deals from 2000 till 2009 in relation 
to the type of the target firm. Acquirers‟ returns have been calculated depending on the Market 
Model for a 5-day window. The sample has been divided into two sections according to the type 
of the target firm. The first section consists of 419 deals which include deals with private 
targets. The second section includes 60 deals with public targets. 
 
One can note from the previous table that acquirers with public targets have losses 
compared with acquirers of private targets for the same window -1, +1. This makes 
these results share with Conn et al.‟s (2005) results, because both results show that 
acquirers with public targets have losses over the announcement period while acquirers 
with cross-border and private targets have higher returns of 0.38% with a t-stat of 
2.17% for Conn et al.‟s study and 0.56% with a t-stat of 2.02% for my results. 
 
Following the above findings, it will be significant to sum up the results of this chapter 
and compare them with others before moving to the next section. First, regarding the 
method of payment as a first variable in this paper, the results indicated that acquirers of 
both domestic and cross-border acquisitions who used cash as a method of payment to 
finance their deals had higher and better returns compared with those who depended on 
non-cash. There are some reasons for having these results. Firstly, in cross-border 
acquisitions, the targets are often disinclined to accept foreign equity which leads the 
bidding firms to finance their deals with cash, which has its own impact on acquirers‟ 
returns and gives a good reason for having a big difference between the two sections. 
Furthermore, previous literature showed that cash offers achieved higher returns 
compared with non-cash or stock offers and this idea is consistent with the acquirers‟ 
results in this chapter.  
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Second, regarding the relative size of the acquirer to the target as a second variable in 
this research, it is notable that most studies mentioned that acquirers with small targets 
had higher returns compared with acquirers with large targets and that is for the short-
run, and acquirers with large targets have or gain significant returns when measured 
over the long-run. The results showed that acquirers with domestic and large relative 
size had higher returns compared with acquirers with small relative size and acquirers 
with small and cross-border targets did worse compared with acquirers with larger 
cross-border acquirers. There are several reasons for having those results. The first one 
is the method of payment, because using equity will lower acquirers‟ returns, and 
applying that on both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, it is notable that the 
majority of acquirers with large relative size finance their deals with cash. The second 
reason is that those results are driven by the type of the target firm. Applying that as 
well on prior results, it is important to mention that most firms with large relative size 
acquire private targets. The third reason is that because of the market reaction which is 
slightly less towards acquiring large and international firms compared with acquirers 
with small relative size (see, Asquith et al, 1983. and Travlos, 1987). 
  
Third, regarding the industrial relationship as a third variable in this paper, many studies 
stated that firms which acquire targets from the different sectors have higher abnormal 
returns compared with acquirers which acquire targets from the same sector. In addition, 
the results showed that acquirers which made cross-border acquisitions with a target 
from the same industrial sector have higher returns compared with acquirers with a 
target from different industrial sectors, while acquirers of domestic targets have higher 
returns when they acquire targets from a different industrial sector that is consistent 
with earlier idea.  
 
Forth, regarding the Book-to-Market ratio as a final variable in this research, many 
studies find that acquirers with a low Book-to-Market ratio have higher returns 
compared with acquirers with a high Book-to-Market ratio. The results indicate that 
acquirers with domestic firms and high Book-to-Market ratio have higher returns 
compared with acquirers with low Book-to-Market ratio. Additionally, acquirers with 
cross-border targets and low Book-to-Market ratio have higher and significant returns 
compared with acquirers with higher Book-to-Market ratio. The reason for having these 
results for domestic acquisitions is that the market overreacts to the past performance of 
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the bidder at the announcement time, and this situation will appear and be clear in the 
domestic market compared with other countries‟ market. 
  
Finally, in respect of considering the type of target firm as a significant variable, the 
results showed that acquirers who acquire private targets had higher returns, and that is 
for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions. It is important to mention that all the 
results in this chapter are driven and affected by this variable and generate higher and 
significant returns for acquirers in this sample. 
 
In the subsequent section, a regression has been run of acquirers‟ returns against the 
four earlier variables; the method of payment, the industrial relationship, the relative 
size, the type of the target firm and the Book-To-Market ratio. That is for both domestic 
and cross-border deals together and then each section of the sample has been applied 
separately for eight different windows over, before and after the announcement day. 
 
4.3 Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS) 
With a respect to above discussion, many articles have studied the effect of several 
variables on acquirers‟ returns. According to those articles, the best method to examine 
the impact of some variables is to run a regression of acquirers‟ returns against the 
studied variables. (Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Fuller et al, 2002; Conn et al, 2005; Croci 
et al. 2010) 
 
An investigation of the combined impact of the earlier variables on acquirers‟ returns, 
the method of payment, the relative size, the industrial relationship, the type of the firm 
and the Book-to-Market ratio has been conducted. The researcher considers the 
acquirers‟ abnormal returns as the dependent variable while the earlier determinants as 
independent variables. An examination of the determinants for the whole studied period 
has been done, and cumulative abnormal returns for UK acquirers for domestic and 
cross-border deals have been tested and estimated over two different windows (-2, +2),   
(-1, +1). It is necessary to mention that 5-day window is the most important window in 
this study but the researcher adds the 3-day window to check the robustness of the 
results over the announcement date. 
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The standard Ordinary Least Square regression has been used for the whole studied 
period. It is important to add that the Ordinary Least Squares has been considered in 
finance as a method to estimate the unknown parameters in liner regression model. Thus 
considering OLS regression, the researcher tests the relationship between acquirers‟ 
returns and five different variables. Table 4.11 introduces the regression‟s results for 
domestic and cross-border deals. Four main variables have been considered as follows: 
1. The method of payment. The dummy equals 1 when acquirers use cash payment 
and equals 0 when they depend on non-cash payment. 
2. The relative size of the acquirer to the target. This variable is considered as its 
real value which is the value of the deal divided by the market value of the 
acquirer one month prior to the announcement date of the deal. 
3. The industrial sector. The dummy is equal to 1 when both acquirer and target 
belong to the same industrial sector, otherwise the dummy equals 0. 
4. The Book-to-Market ratio.  The real value of the Book-to-Market ratio has been 
considered for each deal. 
5. The type of the target firm. The dummy is equal to 1 when the target is a private 
firm, otherwise the dummy equals 0.  
To examine the impact of the four variables on acquirers‟ return around and over the 
announcement day which is considered as day 0 and that is for the complete sample, I 
estimate a regression of the acquirers‟ returns against four different variables, the 
method of payment, the relative size, and the industrial relationship, the type of the 
target firm and the Book-to-Market. It is important to add that a regression analysis of 
the acquirers‟ abnormal returns has been conducted to examine whether differences in 
deal characteristics explain the difference in acquirers‟ abnormal returns for domestic 
and cross-border acquisitions. 
 
 The following equation will explain more about the regression:   
 
 
 
Where: 
Y: is the acquirer‟s return 
: is the method of payment                                   : is the relative size  
: is the industrial relationship                               : is the Book-to-Market ratio 
 81 
, , , , :  are coefficients                          : is the type of the target firm  
is the error term
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Table 4. 11. Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS) for the complete sample 
 
  (-2,+2)  (-1,+1) 
Con 
 
(intercept) 
0.005 
(0.639) 
0.002 
(0.359) 
 
MOP 
0.002 
(0.526) 
0.005 
(1.243) 
 
Size 
0.111 
(0.663) 
0.811 
(0.559) 
 
Sector 
-0.005 
(-1.036) 
-0.003 
(-0.907) 
 
BTM 
0.286 
(0.411) 
0.278 
(0.466) 
Type 0.005 
(0.722) 
0.003 
(0.543) 
Observation 1071 1071 
R-squared 0.0026 0.0031 
 
Notes: This table shows results of the OLS regression of cumulative abnormal returns (the dependent 
variable) for 1133 UK acquirers for 5-day window between 2000 and 2009 against five variables (the 
independent variables), the method of payment, the relative size, the industrial relationship, the type of the 
target and the Book-to-Market ratio.  This regression includes the whole studied sample which comprises 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions. The abnormal returns have been calculated depending on the Market 
Model across 5-day window. Thus MOP refers to the method of payment, it is a dummy equal to one when 
acquirers used cash as a payment to finance their deals, and equals zero when they used non-cash as a 
payment. Size refers to the relative size of the target to the acquirer, and is considered as the value of the deal 
divided by the market value of the acquirer one month prior the announcement date. Sector means the 
industrial sector which acquirer and target are belonging to, and it is a dummy that equals one when the 
acquirer and the target are sharing the same industrial sector, and the dummy equals zero when the acquirer 
and the target are from different industrial sector. Type is the type of the target firm, it is considered whether 
the target is private or a public firm, the dummy equals one when the target is a private firm otherwise it is 0. 
BTM means the Book-to-Market ratio which is considered as the net book value divided by the market value 
one month prior to the announcement date of the deal. The numbers located between brackets are the T-stat. 
It is important to add that a 3-day window has been examined also for the robustness check. The sample has 
reduced from 1133 deals to 1071, and that is due to the lack of information about the Book-to-Market ratio 
for several firms.
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It is notable from table 4.11 that the industrial relationship and the type of the target 
firm have a slightly good relation with the acquirers‟ abnormal returns and that is for a   
5-day window. This means that the market reacts positively in relation to the type of the 
target. For a 3-day window, the results show that the method of payment has a better 
relation with the acquirers‟ returns. There is also evidence that the method of payment 
has a relationship with the acquirers‟ returns over the announcement date. 
 
The domestic and cross-border deals have been tested separately, in order to determine 
whether there are some differences in the results between the two samples in terms of 
the affect of these variables on acquirers‟ abnormal returns. Table 4.12 shows the 
regression results of acquirers undertaking domestic deals against the same five 
variables. It is important to add that several firms have been excluded because of the 
lack of information about their BTM ratio. 
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Table 4. 12. Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS) for domestic deals 
 
  (-2,+2) 
 
 (-1,+1) 
Con 0.002 
 
(0.260) 
0.004 
 
(0.551) 
 
Mop 
0.004 
(0.545) 
0.005 
(0.913) 
 
Size 
0.103 
(0.557) 
0.743 
(0.472) 
 
Sector 
-0.011 
(-1.589) 
-0.009 
(-1.648) 
 
BTM 
0.219 
(0.174) 
0.618 
(0.581) 
Type 0.014 
(1.612) 
0.006 
(0.887) 
Observation 612 612 
R-squared 0.0103 0.0086 
 
Notes: This table shows results of OLS regression of cumulative abnormal returns (the dependent variable) 
for a 5-day window for 612 domestic UK acquirers between 2000 and 2009 against five variables 
(independent variables), the method of payment, the relative size, the industrial relationship, the type of the 
target firm and the Book-to-Market ratio. Thus MOP means the method of payment and is a dummy that 
equals one when acquirers used cash as the method of payment to finance their deals, and equals zero when 
they used non-cash as a payment. Size means the relative size of the acquirer to the target, and it is 
considered as the value of the deal divided by the market value of the acquirer. Sector means the industrial 
sector to which the acquirer and target belong, and it is a dummy that equals one when the acquirer and the 
target share the same industrial sector, and the dummy equals zero when the acquirer and the target are from 
the a different industrial sector. BTM means Book-to-Market ratio which is considered as its real value for 
each deal (which is the net book value divided by the market value one month prior the announcement date 
of the deal).  The type means whether the target is a private or a public firm, and it is a dummy that equals 
one when the target is a private firm otherwise it equals zero. The numbers located between brackets are the 
T-stat. It is important to mention that several firms have been excluded due to a lack of information about the 
Book-to-Market ratio for those firms. 
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It is notable from table 4.12 that the type of the target firm has a quite good relation 
with the acquirers‟ returns for domestic acquisitions, and that is found for both studied 
windows. The relative size and Book-To-Market ratio have no significant relation with 
acquirers‟ returns for domestic deals. In table 4.13, a regression of acquirers‟ returns for 
cross-border acquisitions against the same five variables has been run. Moreover, 
several firms have been excluded and that is due to the lack of information about their 
BTM ratio. 
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Table 4. 13.Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS) of cross-border acquisitions 
 
  (-2,+2)  (-1,+1) 
 
Con 
0.019 
 
(1.416) 
-0.064 
 
(-0.516) 
 
Mop 
0.004 
(0.571) 
0.009 
(1.369) 
 
Size 
0.893 
(0.150) 
0.646 
(1.222) 
 
Sector 
0.004 
(0.725) 
0.005 
(0.961) 
 
BTM 
0.351 
(0.479) 
0.890 
(0.136) 
Type  -0.022 
(-1.791) 
-0.006 
(-0.545) 
Observation 459 459 
R-squared 0.009 0.0098 
 
Notes: This table shows results of the OLS regression of cumulative abnormal returns (the dependent 
variable) for 430 UK cross-border acquisitions between 2000 and 2009 against five variables (independent 
variables), the method of payment, the relative size, the industrial relationship, the type of the target firm and 
the Book-to-Market ratio. The acquirers‟ returns have been calculated depending on the Market Model for a 
5-day event window. Thus MOP means the method of payment and it is a dummy that equals one when 
acquirers use cash to finance their deals, and equals zero when they used non-cash as a payment. Size means 
the relative size of the acquirer to the target, and it is considered as its real value which is (the value of the 
deal divided by the market value of the acquirer one month prior the announcement date). Sector means the 
industrial sector to which acquirer and target belong and it is a dummy equal to one when the acquirer and 
the target share the same industrial sector, and the dummy equals zero when the acquirer and the target are 
from different industrial sector. BTM means Book-to-Market ratio which is considered as its real value for 
each deal (the net book value divided by the market value one month prior the announcement date of the 
deal). Type is considered the type of the target firm whether the target is a private firm or a public firm, it is a 
dummy that equals 1 when the target is a private firm otherwise it is 0. The numbers located between 
brackets are the T-stat.
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It is notable from table 4.13 that there is some evidence of a relation between the type of 
the target firm and the acquirers‟ abnormal returns for cross-border acquisitions over the 
announcement. In addition, the deal characteristics have no significant impact on the 
acquirers‟ returns for cross-border acquisitions.  
 
To sum up from the above three regressions the following results, the variables‟ impact 
differs when the sample distinguishes between domestic and cross- border acquisitions. 
That is because when a regression has been run for the complete sample, the results 
show the industrial sector has a slight relationship with the acquirers‟ returns for a 5-day 
window and the method of payment has a better impact for a 3-day window. 
Considering the domestic acquisitions, it is notable that the industrial sector and the 
type of the target firm have a slight impact on acquirers‟ returns.  This is almost the 
same when the cross-border sample has only been considered in the regression and that 
for a 5-day window. 
 
 The following section introduces a robustness check for a 3-day window that has been 
included in the previous results with a 5-day window. 
 
4.4 Robustness Check  
It is notable that a 3-day window has been included in all earlier results with a 5-day 
window, thus in this section the researcher will revise acquirers‟ returns within a 3-day 
window and analyze their impact. The following tables present acquirers‟ returns for 
both domestic and cross-border acquisitions within a 3-day window.  
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Table 4. 14. Acquirers‟ returns for domestic and cross-border acquisitions within a 3-day 
window 
 
 Domestic deals  Cross-border deals 
All Bidders  1.03 
(3.14) 
0.41 
(1.57) 
Cash Payment  1.15 
(3.78) 
0.57 
(2.18) 
Non-cash Payment  0.69 
(0.93) 
-0.17 
(-0.20) 
Small Relative Size 0.60 
(1.81) 
0.11 
(0.39) 
Large Relative Size 1.53 
(2.69) 
0.82 
(1.76) 
Same Sector  0.46 
(1.25) 
0.51 
(0.08) 
Different Sector 1.81 
(2.98) 
0.49 
(1.03) 
High Book-to-Market ratio 1.03 
(2.47) 
1.20 
(3.49) 
Low Book-to-Market Ratio 0.41 
(0.98) 
-0.20 
(-0.45) 
Private Target Firm 0.90 
(2.89) 
0.56 
(2.02) 
Public Target Firm 1.44 
(1.13) 
-0.71 
(-0.74) 
 
Notes 
This table introduces acquirers‟ returns for UK domestic and cross-border acquisitions between 
2000 and 2009 within a 3-day window over the announcement date. The sample includes 
successful and unsuccessful deals. The acquirer must be a public firm, while the target can be a 
public or a private firm; the firms must be listed in LSE. The impact of five variables has been 
analysed against acquirers‟ returns, the method of payment, the industrial relationship, the 
relative size, the Book-to-Market ratio and the type of the target firm. The sample has been 
separated into sections according to the method of payment; the first section includes acquirers 
which used cash to finance their deals, while the second section consists of deals that have been 
financed via non-cash. The sample is sub-divided according to the industrial relationship into 
two sections depending on two SIC digits. The first one consists of acquirers that share with 
their target firms the same industrial sector. The second section includes acquirers that do not 
share with their targets the same industrial sector. The sample also has been divided according 
to the relative size into acquirers with large relative size and acquirers with small relative size, it 
is important to mention that the relative size defined as “the value of the deal divided by the 
market value of the acquirer one month prior to the announcement date of the deal”. With a 
respect to the type of the target firm, the sample divided into two parts. The first one includes 
firms that acquire private targets. The second comprises from firms with public targets, it is 
notable to mention that the first part form the majority of both domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. The sample has been divided according to the Book-to-Market ratio into two 
sections; the first one includes firms with high Book-to-Market ratio, the second one consists of 
firms with low Book-to-Market ratio. Abnormal returns have been calculated depending on the 
Market Model. Numbers between brackets are t-stat.   
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Table 4. 15. OLS regression of acquirers‟ returns against five variables for a 3-day window 
 
 The complete sample  The domestic sample The cross-border sample  
 
Con 
0.002 
(0.359) 
0.004 
(0.551) 
-0.064 
(-0.516) 
 
Mop 
0.005 
(1.243) 
0.005 
(0.913) 
0.009 
(1.369) 
 
Size 
0.811 
(0.559) 
0.743 
(0.472) 
0.646 
(1.222) 
 
Sector 
-0.003 
(-0.907) 
-0.009 
(-1.648) 
0.005 
(0.961) 
 
BTM 
0.278 
(0.466) 
0.618 
(0.581) 
0.890 
(0.136) 
 
Type  
0.003 
(0.543) 
0.006 
(0.887) 
-0.006 
(-0.545) 
Observation 1071 612 459 
R-squared 0.0031 0.0086 0.0098 
 
Notes:  
This table shows results of the OLS regression of cumulative abnormal returns (the dependent 
variable) for UK cross-border and domestic acquisitions between 2000 and 2009 against five 
variables (independent variables), the method of payment, the relative size, the industrial 
relationship, the type of the target firm and the Book-to-Market ratio. The acquirers‟ returns 
have been calculated depending on the Market Model for a 3-day event window. Thus MOP 
means the method of payment and it is a dummy that equals one when acquirers use cash to 
finance their deals, and equals zero when they used non-cash as a payment. Size means the 
relative size of the acquirer to the target, and it is considered as its real value which is (the value 
of the deal divided by the market value of the acquirer one month prior the announcement date). 
Sector means the industrial sector to which acquirer and target belong and it is a dummy equal 
to one when the acquirer and the target share the same industrial sector, and the dummy equals 
zero when the acquirer and the target are from different industrial sector. BTM means Book-to-
Market ratio which is considered as its real value for each deal (the net book value divided by 
the market value one month prior the announcement date of the deal). Type is considered the 
type of the target firm whether the target is a private firm or a public firm, it is a dummy that 
equals 1 when the target is a private firm otherwise it is 0. The numbers located between 
brackets are the T-stat. 
 
 
Tables 4.14 and 4.15 illustrate that examining acquirers‟ returns over a 3-day window does not 
differ from acquirers‟ returns over a 5-day window. These returns are almost the same for both 
cross-border and domestic acquisitions.  It is significant to add that analysing acquirers‟ returns 
against five different variables does not show clear differences for a 3-day window compared 
with acquirers‟ returns for a 5-day window.    
 
4.5 Summary  
This chapter studies the acquirers‟ returns for acquisitions made by the UK firms from 
2000 until the end of 2009.  The sample of both domestic and cross-border deals has 
been included, and the total number of the sample is 1133 deals. The acquirers‟ 
abnormal returns have been calculated depending on the event study methodology and 
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the application of the Market Model for each deal for a 5- day event window before and 
after the announcement day. The impact of the major determinants has been 
investigated that have been proposed as affecting acquirers‟ returns for the same studied 
period of 5 days around the announcement day. The variables are the method of 
payment, the relative size of the acquirer to the target, the industrial sector, and the 
Book-to-Market ratio. Regarding the method of payment‟s impact, the results indicate 
that for domestic deals acquirers that depend on noncash as a method of payment 
achieve slightly more returns compared with those who use just cash to finance their 
payment for long windows, and for cross-border deals, acquirers that finance their 
acquisitions depending on cash have better returns comparing with those who did not 
use cash. The situation is the same for the relative size and the industrial relationship, 
because acquirers of both domestic and cross-border acquisitions also differ in their 
returns. Finally, regarding the Book-to-Market ratio, domestic acquirers with a high 
BTM ratio have higher abnormal returns compared with acquirers of cross-border 
acquisitions with a high BTM ratio that have lower abnormal returns. A regression has 
been conducted between all the earlier variables and the acquirers‟ abnormal returns for 
the same studied period, and for both the domestic and the cross-border deals. The 
results show that there is no clear difference between the results of domestic and cross-
border acquisitions. 
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Chapter 5: Directors’ Overconfidence and its Impact on 
Acquirers’ Abnormal Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92 
Directors’ Overconfidence and its Impact on Acquirers’ Abnormal 
Returns 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the effect of directors‟ overconfidence on acquirers‟ returns. The 
researcher investigates the „self-attribution bias‟ of acquirers by dividing the complete 
sample into acquirers classified as frequent and infrequent acquirers, and that is done for 
both domestic and cross-border acquisitions. Event study methodology has been used to 
calculate acquirers‟ abnormal returns for a 5-day event window. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: The first section includes the literature review that 
introduces more information about the topic. The second section reviews the major 
studies concerned with managerial behavior. The third section reports and investigates 
„self-attribution bias‟ in more detail. The next two sections include the data and the 
major results of self-attribution and its impact on acquirers‟ abnormal returns for 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions. The final section is the summary which 
concludes the chapter and its results. 
5.2 Literature review   
Studies that analyse mergers and acquisitions activities suggest that there are three 
major reasons for firms to conduct takeovers. The first reason is the desire to generate 
synergies; the second reason comes from the agency conflict between managers or 
directors and shareholders, while the third reason is associated with the concept of 
managerial hubris. Investigating the third reason leads to Roll‟s (1986) study, which 
proposed that managers of acquiring firms overvalue the target when making mergers 
and acquisitions, because they are overoptimistic about the possible benefits of the 
merger. This leads them to -overbid for the target firm- and results in a loss for their 
shareholders. (Brown and Sarma, 2007)   
 
Many articles have recently stated that managerial behaviour has a major role in the 
performance of the acquirer in mergers and acquisitions (Croci et al., 2010). The 
literature relating to the concept of managerial behaviour departs from economics 
models to integrate psychological evidence on some attitudes such as overconfidence. 
The analysis of overconfidence belongs mainly to psychology, which points out that 
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many individuals have a tendency to consider themselves as above average regarding 
their skills and abilities. Furthermore, individuals tend to over-estimate the gains from 
things which relate to themselves, especially those who are in the senior positions. This 
is because the CEO usually has the final decision regarding a firm‟s big investments, 
and as a result, the CEOs can believe that they have ultimate control over outcomes, 
which leads them to underestimate the probability of failure generally. This discussion 
leads us to Roll‟s (1986) „hubris theory‟ (Malmendier and Tate, 2005b).  
 
Roll (1986) was the first to present the idea of overconfidence to corporate finance in 
his „Hubris‟ theory of acquisitions. He introduced the idea of a rational investor-
irrational manager which explains why managers keep making mergers and acquisitions 
because of their very optimistic view of their skills in order to generate value and profit 
in future takeovers. Moreover, overconfidence in finance has a psychological basis 
which confirms that such individuals are often overconfident, and also that managers 
tend to be more confident than normal individuals because of selection bias. (Brown 
and Sarma, 2007) 
 
In addition, Barros and Silveira (2007) stated that individuals who are overconfident 
about their skills and abilities are more likely to apply for, and therefore obtain higher 
managerial positions. According to Croci et al. (2010), Langer (1975) defined 
managerial overconfidence as “overestimation of CEO‟s own abilities and outcomes 
relating to actions which are under their control”. In addition, the authors added that 
when the manager overvalues the synergy in returns that are likely to result from any 
merger or acquisition, this is due to the manager‟s belief in his/her leadership skills and 
abilities. On the other hand, this idea may stem from the psychology of many people, 
because some individuals have a tendency to overvalue their capabilities compared with 
others, with the consequence that they can misjudge any potential danger which comes 
with an opportunity (Croci et al., 2010). Additionally, managers play a major role in 
predicting unidentified issues in a firm such as cash flow and demand, and they tend to 
depend on these predictions as the basis for designing future corporate policies. Thus 
achieving their predictions requires the presence of self-confidence, which indicates that 
individuals often show overconfidence in predicting their future plans. (David et al., 
2007)  
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On the other hand, Barry (2005) mentioned that the level of optimism common in 
society generally also has its impact on the mood of financial decision-makers, and 
where there is a high level of optimism or overconfidence, managers may consider 
making more investment decisions and therefore making many acquisitions. 
 
5.3 The main studies about managerial behaviour 
 Sudarsanam et al. (2006) discussed the idea of managerial behaviour from a different 
viewpoint. They assume that managerial compensation usually encourages managers to 
take risky investment decisions which are in shareholders‟ interests, and for that they 
study managers‟ compensation. They considered two measures to test managerial 
incentives; the first one was the sensitivity of the CEO‟s wealth to the stock price 
(Delta), and the second one was the sensitivity of the CEO‟s wealth to the stock return 
volatility (Vega). Also they studied how these two measures affect the consideration of 
risky investment decisions. They set up some hypotheses related to these measures and 
managerial overconfidence and acquirers‟ performance. The first hypothesis they 
examined was that a “high level of Vega is associated with an increase in firm risk due 
to corporate acquisition”. The second hypothesis was that a “high level of Delta is 
associated with a decrease in firm risk due to corporate acquisition”. Thus the authors 
depended on a sample of US mergers and acquisitions between 1993 and 2004.  In the 
short term, they use a traditional event study for a 3-day (-1, +1) event period to 
calculate the cumulative abnormal returns, and for the long term, they depended on one-
year and three-year buy and hold abnormal returns. They found that the impact of the 
stock return (Vega) on wealth differs between the long and the short term. In the short 
term high Vega is related to bad performance compared with Vega in the long term. In 
addition, with regard to the impact of the stock price (Delta) on wealth, they found that 
high Delta performs better in the short term compared with the long term. In addition, 
the authors create a regression which relates managerial motivations and CEO 
confidence and its relationship with different variables including the ownership, the 
relative size and the type of deal. They found that the Delta has a negative and 
significant impact on the acquirer‟s return for a 3-day period of -0.38%, while Vega has 
a positive and insignificant impact on the acquirer‟s return of 0.10%. This does not 
confirm the authors‟ assumption which related Vega to managerial behaviour, and 
especially that Vega should be positively related to the announcement returns when the 
executive is overconfident. 
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More recently, Malmendier and Tate (2008) have studied managerial overconfidence 
from another perspective. They examined the impact of executive overconfidence on 
merger decisions, and they wondered whether this overconfidence may explain 
acquirers‟ acquisition losses. They considered two predictions. The first one supposes 
that in firms with surplus internal capital, overconfident CEOs and executives will 
execute more acquisitions than non-confident managers. The second one is that when 
overconfident executives and CEOs carry out more acquisitions compared with non-
confident CEOs, the average value of return for the overconfident CEOs and executives 
will be lower than that for rational ones. They included in the sample 477 large US 
firms for the period between 1980 and 1994. To test the earlier predictions, they studied 
executives‟ personal portfolios of executive options. Also they examined additional 
variables such as the size, cash flow, stock ownership, and some personal characteristics 
of the individual (such as age and tenure). They sorted the executives into two main 
sections according to how long they hold their options. The first section includes the 
Longholder who can be identified as those CEOs who hold an option until the 
expiration date, and the second section includes the remaining executives who are 
considered as Holder67, holding their options until the fifth year prior to expiration. The 
authors formed a regression which included all the earlier variables to test their two 
predictions. They found that the impact of cash flow depends on whether the firm is 
cash-rich or cash-poor, because cash flow increases acquisitiveness between cash-poor 
firms. The stock ownership has an insignificant impact in all specifications. 
 
Ismail (2008) also considered executive overconfidence as an indirect reason for 
explaining abnormal returns for single and multiple acquirers. The author studied 
acquirers‟ returns for 16,221 US takeovers between 1985 and 2004. He included several 
variables such as the method of payment, the geographic scope, the type of the target 
and the industry scope in his study as well, in order to find out the effect of those 
variables on the returns for both single and multiple acquirers. The author reported that 
for the five days (-2, +2) around the announcement day, the returns for single acquirers 
are higher and better compared with multiple acquirers‟ returns. For example, generally 
single acquirers have 2.63% as abnormal returns compared with 0.97% as CAR for 
multiple acquirers. In addition, the author found that CARs are higher for single 
acquirers when he considered variables such as the method of payment, the geographic 
scope, the industry scope and the type target. For example, single acquirers who depend 
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on cash have a CAR of 1.83% compared with 1.01% for multiple acquirers who depend 
on cash as well. In order to determine whether the number of deals may affect the 
earlier results, the author compared acquirers‟ returns according to the number of deals, 
and considers in his comparison Malmendier and Tate‟s (2004) theory of 
overconfidence, and in particular that an overconfident executive usually makes many 
acquisitions compared with a not or less confident one. He found that abnormal returns 
are lower when the acquirer makes many deals, which means that the acquirer‟s return 
reduces from 2.63% after the first deal and becomes 1.25% after the second deal and the 
return continues to decrease to the tenth deal when it becomes 0.07%. Thus the author 
concluded that acquirers who made many deals (overconfident executives) had lower 
returns compared with those that are undertaken by firms with less confident executives 
who only undertake a single acquisition. This implies that managerial behaviour can be 
one of the most important variables in explaining acquirers‟ returns.  
 
More recently, Croci et al. (2010) studied the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and market valuation regarding returns to acquisitions, using a sample 
of UK acquisitions between 1990 and 2005 for the five-day period over the 
announcement day. They followed Bouwman et al. (2009) in their classification of each 
month into “high, neutral and low valuation", because they wanted to find out whether 
there was any difference in managerial behaviour according to the market situation.  For 
their estimate of the market‟s valuation, they depended on the market price to earnings 
ratio to sort the market into these three situations. In addition, they followed 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) by sorting managers into two main sections as 
overconfident and non-confident. This is based on their decisions regarding their 
executive options.  Managers are considered to be overconfident when they keep their 
options until the expiration date, and that is because they are confident that the stock 
price of their company will keep performing well as a result of their leadership skills. 
Depending on the Market Model, and trying to examine the relationship between  
market valuation and managerial overconfidence, they found that overconfident 
managers had positive and not different from zero returns for high and neutral market 
periods of 0.83% and 0.62%, and they had negative and significant returns for low 
market periods of -1.69%. Non-overconfident managers had positive and significant 
returns for all market periods (high, neutral and low) of 1.36%, 1.26% and 1.13%, 
which means that non-overconfident managers‟ returns show no difference between 
market valuation periods. Finally, it is possible to conclude that many studies find that 
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overconfidence among managers results in acquisition returns that are not different from 
zero, or are lower compared to those achieved by non-confident managers who have 
higher and significant returns.   
 
In view of the literature above, this paper will investigate the effect of managers‟ 
overconfidence on acquirers‟ returns, in order to find whether they have a significant 
impact on firms‟ decisions and this has been done by using UK data. The researcher 
will sort both domestic and cross-border acquisitions depending on two measures into 
acquisitions which have overconfident managers and acquisitions that have less 
confident managers. 
 
 In the following section, the self-attribution bias has been investigated which is 
considered as a fundamental of managerial behaviour. To achieve this, the sample has 
been sorted into frequent and infrequent acquirers, and that is for acquirers undertaking 
both domestic and cross-border acquisitions. 
 
5.4 Studying the self-attribution bias  
 Billett and Qian (2005) mentioned that according to the psychological literature, the 
most familiar resource of overconfidence generally is „self-attribution bias‟. According 
to self-attribution bias many people tend to excessively credit their own skills for good 
results and overly credit external factors for bad outcomes.  They stated that Hirshleifer 
(2001) summed up the relationship between overconfidence and self-attribution bias as 
follows “self-attribution can cause individuals to learn to be overconfident”. The authors 
tried to examine managerial self-attribution bias in US mergers and acquisitions by 
studying a series of deals made by acquirers. Depending on US data, the authors 
selected domestic US mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2002. To be included 
in their data, both acquirer and the target must be public firms and the deal must be also 
completed with a value more than one million dollars. Given these pre-conditions, they 
tested and studied around 4501 US mergers and acquisitions over the studied period, the 
authors sorted acquirers into frequent and infrequent acquirers. They defined a frequent 
acquirer as one that announces at least two public deals within any five-year period‟.  In 
addition, the authors used the Market Model to estimate abnormal returns for a 3-day 
event window (-1, +1).  They found that acquirers that conducted many deals have 
negative and significant returns at the 1% level. For example, acquirers that made 15 to 
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16 deals have returns of -2.01% and -2.88%. On the other hand, acquirers who have not 
achieved as many acquisitions also have negative but smaller returns. For example, 
acquirers that have carried out two deals have returns of -1.54%. Moreover, to examine 
self-attribution, the authors studied whether there is a difference in returns in first deals 
between frequent and infrequent acquirers. Thus they tested acquirers‟ abnormal returns 
of first deal for both frequent and infrequent acquirers. They found that both infrequent 
and frequent acquirers have returns that are not different from zero of -0.01% and -
0.031%. Thus they concluded that frequent acquirers only have significant and negative 
returns once they have made a number of deals.  
 
To determine whether these differences are driven by the method of payment, the 
authors examined the impact of the method of payment on acquirers‟ returns, after 
separating the method of payment into three sections (cash, stock and mixed). They 
found that acquirers that have achieved a number of deals (higher-order deals) have 
more negative returns in all kinds of payment. Additionally, the authors examined 
whether deal characteristics (such as, the relative size of target to acquirer, the type of 
the deal, the industrial relationship and the method of payment) change between 
acquirers that have made their first deal and those that have conducted a number of 
deals. They measured the mean and the median for each section of acquirers. They 
found that acquirers who made a first deal have a larger mean compared with acquirers 
who have achieved many deals, and that is in respect of many variables such as the 
relative size of the target to the acquirer, the conglomerate deal, tender offer and the 
cash deal. As a result, the authors suggest that past success in mergers and acquisitions 
can lead to hubris in managers‟ investment decisions in the future. 
 
More recently, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) examined whether acquisitions with 
overconfident managers can create higher returns compared with acquisitions by non-
confident managers in the short and the long term. Also they shed light on self-
attribution and its role in wealth effects. The authors explained that overconfident 
managers believe that they have great leadership skills which may motivate them to 
make multiple acquisitions, because overconfident managers usually underestimate the 
possible dangers and overvalue the potential benefits related to each deal. As a result, 
the authors sorted managers into overconfident and non-overconfident managers 
according to their merger decisions in the short term, and they considered managers 
who perform five or more than five acquisitions within a 3-year time period as 
 99 
overconfident managers, and managers who achieve less than five acquisitions are 
considered as non-overconfident managers. The authors studied around 5334 successful 
acquisitions by UK public companies that acquired domestic and cross-border 
companies and that, is between the beginning of 1980 and the end of 2004. In order to 
study the impact of overconfidence over the short-term, the authors calculated abnormal 
returns for the 5-day period (-2, +2) including the announcement day and they used the 
Market-Adjusted model. In addition, the authors estimated abnormal returns for the 
long-term (first, second and third years after the announcement date) using calendar 
time portfolio regressions.  
 
For the short term, they found that single acquirers gain positive and significant returns 
at 1% level of 1.34%, while multiple acquirers also have positive returns of 0.79%, 
which confirms that acquisitions by overconfident managers gain less than acquisitions 
with non-overconfident managers, and they fail to achieve better returns. Furthermore, 
to find out whether self-attribution plays an important role in acquirers‟ returns, the 
authors tried to compare between multiple acquirers‟ returns, and whether there is any 
difference between acquirers‟ returns after the first, second, third, fourth and fifth deal, 
because the self-attribution approach considers that acquisitions with a high-order (fifth 
deal or more) will be related to low returns compared with acquisitions with a low-order 
(first deal).  They found that multiple acquirers have positive and significant returns of 
1.72% after their first deal, and their returns decline after achieving their second, third, 
fourth, and fifth deal, the gain being 0.79%, 0.69%, 0.63%, and 0.49%, and this result 
confirms the self-attribution impact on acquirers‟ returns.  The authors also examined 
acquirers‟ returns (overconfident and non-overconfident acquirers) regarding 
diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions. They noticed that single acquirers (non-
overconfident acquirers) have positive returns when they make diversifying deals of 
1.37%, while multiple acquirers (overconfident acquirers) have positive and small 
returns of 0.73% when they diversify in their deals. In addition, the authors mentioned 
that both sections of acquirers (overconfident and non-overconfident acquirers) have 
positive and significant returns at a 1% level of 0.89% and 1.28% when they enter non-
diversifying deals. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) also studied acquirers‟ returns 
according to the impact of many variables such as the relative size of the target, target 
origin, and Tobin‟s Q. They found that single acquirers (non-overconfident acquirers) 
have positive returns of 1.91% when the target size is large and smaller returns of 
0.65% when the target size is small. On the other hand, multiple acquirers 
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(overconfident acquirers) have positive returns of 1.49% when they acquire a large 
target, and small but not different from zero returns of 0.37% when they acquire a small 
target. In addition, the authors studied acquirers‟ returns according to the target origin 
(domestic or foreign). They noticed that returns for single acquirers are higher than 
returns for multiple acquirers whatever the situation of the target firm and acquirers‟ 
returns are in the same position regarding the impact of Tobin‟s Q.  Single acquirers 
have positive and significant returns of 2.16% with low Q, and 1.31% with high Q 
while multiple acquirers have small returns in both cases of 0.89% in low Q and 0.81% 
in high Q for a five-day period. This implies that single acquirers have significant 
returns compared with multi-acquirers which have lower returns after their first deal.  
The authors examined the impact of different variables on the returns of the single and 
multi-acquirers. They found that acquirers have significant returns when they acquire a 
large target compared with acquirers of small targets, and the returns of single acquirers 
are better with domestic and cross-border acquisitions compared with multi-acquirers.  
 
5.5 Data  
The researcher examines a sample of 1133 acquisitions in the UK from the 1 January 
2000 until the 31 December of 2009. This sample is collected from the Thomson 
Database. The selection criteria are as follows: 
1- the acquirer must be a publicly traded UK firm. 
2-  the firm must be listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
3- the deal can be a domestic or cross-border one. 
4- deals with a value less than £1 million have been excluded to avoid results 
which can be produced by deals with small value. 
5- the method of payment of each deal must be available. 
6- the sector of the acquirer and the target firm must be available as well. Deals 
with financial and utility acquirers/targets have been excluded. 
7- the target can be a public or a private firm. 
The total number of domestic deals is 654 acquisitions, while the total number of cross-
border deals is 479 acquisitions.  
The researcher relies on the classic event study methodology with estimation windows 
(-150 day, -20 day) with a Market Model application to investigate acquirers‟ abnormal 
returns for a 5-day window.  First of all the impact of self-attribution bias for domestic 
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and cross-border acquirers have been investigated. Later, the directors‟ overconfidence 
has been tested via two measures and also for acquirers who conducted domestic and 
cross-border deals. The total number of firms in the sample has been reduced after 
examining the directors‟ overconfidence according to the two measures, and that is 
because of the lack of some information for some firms. (See section 3.3 for more 
information). 
 
5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Investigating the self-attribution bias  
First of all, the researcher investigates the abnormal returns for frequent and infrequent 
acquirers. The number of deals which have been made by the firm itself has been 
counted to determine whether the acquirer is frequent or infrequent. The main reason for 
considering the number of deals in this research is because there is a significant 
relationship between overconfidence in managerial behaviour and doing a number of 
deals. Thus an acquirer is considered as a frequent acquirer when the firm conducted at 
least two acquisitions during the year before the announcement date of the deal; 
otherwise the acquirer will be considered as an infrequent acquirer. The number of 
acquirers which have been considered as frequent acquirers in the domestic sample is 
262 firms and the number of the infrequent acquirers is 392 acquirers. In the cross-
border sample 200 acquirers are regarded as frequent, while the number of infrequent 
acquirers in the cross-border sample is 261 firms. 
  
After separating both samples into frequent and infrequent acquirers, the classic event 
study methodology has been applied to calculate the abnormal returns depending on the 
Market Model, and that is for a 5-day window over the announcement date of the deal. 
It is necessary to mention that the researcher investigates returns for a 3-day window 
over the announcement date in order to check the robustness of the results. 
  
Regarding the results for domestic frequent and infrequent acquirers, the following table 
will present the abnormal returns for both sections. 
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Table 5. 1Abnormal returns for domestic acquisitions according to self-attribution bias 
 
 Infrequent 
acquirers 
Frequent 
acquirers  
Differential 
between 
CAR  
t-stat of 
difference  
Window CAR t-stat CAR t-stat Infrequent- 
frequent  
Infrequent- 
frequent 
-2 to +2  1.30 2.53 0.96 1.86 0.34 0.65 
-1 to +1  1.13 2.43 0.92 2.02 0.21 0.45 
 
Notes:  
This table introduces abnormal returns for UK domestic acquisitions between 2000 and 2009 in 
relation to self attribution bias.  The domestic sample has been divided into two sections 
depending on the number of deals which have been done one year before the announcement day 
of the deal. The first section includes the frequent acquirers which conducted two deals in year 
before the announcement day of the deal. The total number of frequent acquirers is 262. The 
second section includes infrequent acquirers which have not done any deal during the year 
before the announcement day of the deal. The total number of infrequent acquirers is 392 
acquirers. The abnormal returns are calculated for a 5-day event window depending on the 
market model. 
 
 
One can note that frequent acquirers have lower returns compared with infrequent 
acquirers who have higher returns for the studied window. Over the announcement date, 
the frequent acquirers yield CAR of 0.96%, which is significant, while the infrequent 
acquirers have CAR of 1.30% for the 5-day window. These results are consistent with 
Billett and Qian‟s (2005) results in a few points, because Billett and Qian (2005) studied 
the managerial self-attribution of USA acquisitions depending on the number of deals. 
According to their study, they found that frequent acquirers that have carried out a 
number of deals have lower abnormal returns compared with acquirers that have done 
just one or two acquisitions. Moreover, these results are consistent with Doukas and 
Petmezas (2007) in several respects. They considered in their study overconfident 
acquirers who made more than five deals within a three years period, and not 
overconfident acquirers who have done less deals than that. They investigated abnormal 
returns over the short term of a 5-day window (-2, +2) around the announcement day. 
They found that overconfident or multiple acquirers have positive but small returns of 
0.79%, while the single or not overconfident acquirers have higher returns of 1.34%, 
significant at a 1% level. 
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Additionally, the abnormal returns for cross-border frequent and infrequent acquirers 
have been calculated. It is significant to mention that some firms have been excluded 
because some of them made more than one deal. Thus to avoid counting the firm twice 
or more they have been excluded. Here the results show that there is a difference 
between the returns for both sections of the cross-border sample (although not 
significant), as outlined in the following table. 
 
Table 5. 2.Acquirers‟ returns for cross-border acquisitions in relation to self-attribution bias 
 
 Infrequent 
acquirers 
Frequent 
acquirers 
Differential 
between 
CAR 
t-stat of 
Difference  
Window CAR t-stat  CAR t-stat  
 
Infrequent- 
frequent  
Infrequent-
frequent  
-2 to +2  0.68 1.55 0.23 0.52 0.42 1.01 
-1 to +1  0.67 1.79 0.08 0.21 0.59 1.57 
 
Notes: 
This table presents abnormal returns for UK cross-border acquisitions between 2000 and 2009 
according to the self-attribution bias. The cross-border sample has been divided into two 
sections. The first section includes frequent acquirers which conducted at least one acquisition 
within one year before the announcement day of the deal. The total number of the frequent 
acquirers is 213 acquirers. The second section consists of infrequent acquirers which have not 
done any deal prior to the announcement day of the main deal. The total number of infrequent   
acquirers is 266 firms.  The abnormal returns have been calculated for a 5-day event window 
depending on the event study and the Market Model.  
 
One can find that infrequent acquirers have higher returns compared with frequent 
acquirers which have returns that are not different from zero, and that is for both the 
studied windows. This confirms the idea that multiple or frequent acquirers have lower 
returns over the short term around the announcement date. See Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007).  
 
Earlier results in tables 5.1 and 5.2 confirm the idea that self-attribution is considered as 
a basis for managerial behavior. There is a significant explanation for having lower 
returns for frequent acquirers that conduct many acquisitions within a short period of 
time, as this gives a sign to the market that those managers are very optimistic about the 
future success of their mergers and acquisitions. As a result, they have a tendency to 
overpay for their targets. (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007)  
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5.7 Summary  
This chapter investigates managerial behavior by examining the „self-attribution bias‟ of 
acquirers. The researcher divides the domestic and cross-border samples into frequent 
and infrequent acquirers. An acquirer is classified as frequent when the firm conducted 
at least two acquisitions during the year before the announcement date of the deal, 
otherwise the acquirer will be considered as infrequent. Event study methodology has 
been applied to calculate the acquirers‟ returns. The results show that infrequent 
acquirers which conduct domestic acquisitions have significant returns compared with 
frequent acquirers. On the other hand, infrequent acquirers which make cross-border 
deals have higher returns compared with frequent returns, although the difference is not 
significant. Earlier results confirm that „self-attribution bias‟ leads managers to be 
overconfident, which in turn is related to the idea of „hubris theory‟; that indicates that 
overconfident or frequent acquirers have lower returns because of their high confidence 
in their managerial skill in generating or predicting future returns, and leads or 
encourages them to make many deals.  
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Chapter 6: Insider trading and acquirers’ returns of domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions 
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Insider trading and acquirers’ returns of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the link between the private investment decisions of the 
directors of the firm, and the firm‟s investment in respect of the acquisitions it makes. 
Thus the insiders‟ trades could simply be indicative of the director's private information.  
To examine this relationship, the researcher depends on two different methods to sort 
both the domestic and cross-border acquisitions into deals where directors are classified 
as being either optimistic or neutral. The motive on which the use of these two different 
measurements is used to sort the sample into optimistic and neutral directors is to 
determine whether the acquirer‟s returns will differ according to the different methods 
used in sorting the sample. 
 
This chapter is organized as following. The first section includes a literature review that 
introduces basic details about insider trading. The next section presents the major 
methods that have been used to measure the relationship between private investment 
decisions and the firm‟s investment in respect of the number and the amount of 
acquisitions it conducts.  The last section introduces the main results according to the 
earlier methods. 
 
6.2 Literature review  
Understanding whether and when to invest the firm‟s resources is a very significant 
decision, and it is considered as the most important decision that can be considered by 
the firm‟s directors (Boehmer and Netter, 1997). Furthermore, according to Roll (1986) 
it is important to recognize managerial behavior around corporate actions and try to 
explain their motivations.  
 
Elliot et al. (1984) point out that purchasing usually increases before the announcement 
of „good earnings‟ and selling also increases prior to the announcement of „bad 
earnings‟. The authors conclude that the main explanation for insider transactions is the 
availability of information to the insider. Seyhun (1990) examines the trading of the 
bidder‟s managers around the announcement date. He finds that managers increase their 
net purchases before the announcement date of the acquisition.  
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6.3 Examining the insider trading decisions  
The researcher investigates in the following section the link between the private 
investment decisions of directors and the firm‟s investment regarding the acquisitions it 
makes, depending on two methods to sort the sample into those that are optimistic and 
those that are neutral directors. The reason which leads to relying on two different 
methods in sorting the sample is to determine whether the acquirers‟ returns will differ, 
if different methods have been used in sorting the sample into optimistic and neutral 
directors. The researcher also considers in calculating acquirers‟ returns transactions 
which have been done within one year before the announcement date of the deal.  
  
6.3.1 The number of transactions method 
The first method which the researcher considers in sorting the sample into optimistic 
and neutral directors depends on the number of personal transactions undertaken by the 
directors, which means the number of buys of stocks and the number of sales of stocks 
which have been carried out by directors. This method considers counting the number 
of transactions within one year before the announcement of the deal.  The directors of 
the firm can be regarded as being optimistic when the number of buys is larger than the 
number of sales by more than two transactions, otherwise the directors will be 
considered as neutral. For example, the director of Trinity Mirror makes 13 buys and 
zero sales, and according to this method the director of this firm can be considered as 
being optimistic about the firm‟s prospects during these three years.  
 
6.3.2 The amount of transactions method 
The second method which the researcher considers in sorting the sample into optimistic  
and neutral directors depends on the amount of shares bought or sold within the 
personal transactions undertaken by directors, which means the amount of stock bought 
and the amount of stock sold by the directors. This method considers counting the 
amount bought or sold within one year before the announcement of the deal. The 
directors of the firm can be regarded as being optimistic when the difference between 
the two amounts is positive because an optimistic director keeps buying stocks and 
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reduces his selling, and that is due to his optimism about being able to achieve future 
profits, otherwise the directors will be considered as neutral. 
 
The following section introduces the main results according to these earlier two 
methods. The Market Model has again been applied to calculate the acquirers‟ returns 
after dividing the respective samples according to the measures used.  
 
6.4 Results  
The main results have been divided into two parts according to two previous methods 
outlined above to sort the sample into deals that include neutral and optimistic directors 
for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions. 
 
6.4.1 Results for domestic acquisitions 
First of all, regarding domestic acquisitions which are included in the sample, the total 
number of those acquisitions is 654, but when these acquisitions are sorted according to 
their managerial behaviour, the researcher has to drop some firms, because there were 
no directors‟ transactions for these firms. 
 
The following table 6.1 shows the total number of firms after sorting them according to 
the managerial behaviour within the firms, into firms with neutral directors and firms 
with optimistic directors, and that is estimated for the one year period before the 
announcement date of the deal. It is important to add that the difference between the 
number of optimistic and neutral acquirers according to earlier methods comes from the 
difference between two methods in sorting the sample. For example, depending on the 
amount method acquirer may be considered as optimistic one while he/she may be 
considered as neutral one according to the number of transaction method because he/she 
did not do many transactions.  
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Table 6. 1. The number of domestic acquisitions after sorting the sample depending on two 
methods for one year before the announcement date of the acquisition 
 
The type of directors 
for domestic deals  
The number of deals 
according to the number of 
transactions method 
The number of deals 
according to the amount 
of transactions method 
Neutral  215 150 
Optimistic  185 230 
 
Notes: 
This table includes the number of UK domestic acquisitions after sorting the sample relying on 
two methods into deals which include optimistic directors and acquisitions which consist of 
neutral directors. The first method is the number of transactions method which considers the 
number of buys and the number of sales which has been carried out by directors of the firm. The 
second method is the amount of transactions method; this method considers the amount of 
transactions that have been made by directors of each firm. The total number of domestic 
sample is 654 deals, but it is reduced because of the lack of information. This table considers 
transactions which have been done by directors within one year before the announcement day of 
the acquisition.  
 
6.4.1.1 Results according to the number of transactions method 
This section will introduce the abnormal returns for domestic acquirers after sorting the 
sample according to the number of transactions method based on the one year prior to 
the announcement date of the deal. 
 
According to the number of transactions method the total number of the domestic 
sample has been reduced to 400 deals, because of the lack of information availability for 
some firms. The number of sales and buys which directors of the firm make during the 
one year before the announcement date of the deal for each acquisition have been 
considered. The following table introduces acquirers‟ returns for the domestic sample 
after sorting them according to the first method one year before the announcement date. 
It is important to mention that a 3-day window has been considered in the following 
results, and that is for a robustness check. 
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Table 6. 2. Acquirers‟ returns for domestic acquisitions in relation to the number of transactions 
made by directors within one year of the announcement date of the acquisition 
 
 Optimistic 
director  
Neutral director Differential 
between CAR 
t-stat of 
differential  
Window CAR t-stat  CAR t-stat  
 
Optimistic-
Neutral 
Optimistic-
Neutral 
-2 to +2  1.60 2.80 0.16 0.28 1.44 2.67 
-1 to +1  1.53 3.38 -0.004 -0.01 1.54 3.59 
 
Notes: 
This table includes results for UK domestic acquisitions after sorting the sample into optimistic 
and neutral directors, and that is based on the number of transactions method. This method 
relies on the number of buys and the number of sales which have been done by directors of the 
firm, and sorting the sample into deals with include optimistic and neutral directors.  Thus the 
director can be considered as optimistic if the number of buys is larger than the number of sales 
by at least two transactions, otherwise they will be regarded as neutral. These results are for 
transactions which have been achieved within one year before the announcement date. The total 
number of domestic sample has been reduced to 185 deals which have optimistic directors and 
to 215 neutral directors, and that is because of the lack of trading information. Acquirers‟ 
returns have been calculated depending on the Market Model for a 5-day event window.  
 
 
It is clear from table 5.4 that firms with optimistic directors generate significant returns 
at and after the announcement date compared with firms with neutral directors. For 
example, for the window -2, +2 the CARs for optimistic directors is 1.60% (with t-
statistic of 2.80) and the CARs for neutral directors are 0.16% (with t-statistic of 0.28).   
 
6.4.1.2 Results according to the amount method 
This part will present the abnormal returns for acquirers that have made UK domestic 
deals after sorting the sample depending on the amount of transactions method. This 
method sorts the acquisitions by those that have optimistic directors and acquisitions 
which have neutral directors depending on the difference between the amount of 
purchases and the amount of sales. The directors are considered as optimistic if the 
difference is positive, because optimistic directors continue buying stocks and reduce 
their sales, and that is due to their optimism in achieving future profits. Alternatively, 
directors can be regarded as being neutral. The sample has been sorted according to this 
difference and included all related transactions that have been carried out by directors 
for just one year before the announcement date. The following table 6.3 presents the 
abnormal returns for acquirers that have directors classified as optimistic and neutral 
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based on their transactions carried out during the one year period before the 
announcement date of the acquisition. 
 
Table 6. 3. Acquirers‟ returns for domestic acquisitions after sorting by the amount method for 
transactions made within one year of the announcement date of the acquisition 
 
 Optimistic 
director   
Neutral director   Differential 
between CAR  
t-stat of 
differential  
Window CAR 
 
t-stat  CAR t-stat  Optimistic-
Neutral  
Optimistic-
Neutral 
-2 to +2  1.55 2.94 -0.16 -0.28 1.71 3.32 
-1 to +1  1.26 2.96 0.01 0.02 1.27 2.99 
 
Notes: 
This table includes results for UK domestic acquisitions after sorting the sample into optimistic 
and neutral directors based on the amount method.  This method relies on the difference 
between the amount of purchases and the amount of sales in sorting deals which have optimistic 
directors and deals which have neutral directors.  Directors are considered as optimistic if the 
difference is between positive, otherwise they will be considered as neutral. These results are for 
transactions within one year before the announcement date of the acquisition. The sample has 
been reduced to 230 deals which have optimistic directors and 150 deals which have neutral 
directors and that is because the lack of information. Acquirers‟ returns have been calculated 
depending on the Market Model for a 5-day event window.  
 
It is clear from table 6.3 that firms with optimistic directors have significant returns for -
2, +2 window compared with firms with neutral directors. These results are the same 
when the researcher depends on sorting the sample by the number of transactions 
method. It is significant to add that earlier results of domestic acquisitions confirm the 
idea which suggests that optimistic managers increase their purchases or ownership 
around the announcement date because they turn out to be optimistic about their 
acquisition plans. This means that the abnormal returns for acquirers with optimistic 
directors will be higher when personal transactions have been considered as a measure 
of managerial behavior. (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007)  
 
6.4.2 Results for cross-border acquisitions  
 The researcher investigates the abnormal returns to acquirers that conducted cross-
border deals.  Acquisitions have been sorted according to the two different methods. 
The essential number of the cross-border sample is 479 deals, but this number is 
reduced after sorting the sample according to the two different methods. As before, the 
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first method is the number of transactions method, the difference between the numbers 
of buys and sells undertaken by the directors. The second method is the amount of 
transactions method; this method considers the difference between the amount of 
purchases and the amount of sales. The directors are considered as optimistic if the 
difference is positive, otherwise the directors will be considered as neutral. The 
following table 6.4 introduces the number of cross-border deals and that after sorting 
the deals according to the two methods, but now based on directors‟ personal 
transactions undertaken within one year of the announcement date of the acquisition. 
 
Table 6. 4.The number of cross-border acquisitions after sorting the sample depending on two 
different methods for transactions which have been done within one year of the announcement 
date of the deal 
 
The type of 
directors for cross-
border deals  
The number of deals 
according to the number of 
transactions method  
The number of deals 
according to the amount of 
transactions method 
Neutral  150 
 
159 
Optimistic  190 
 
205 
 
Notes:  
This table includes the number of cross-border acquisitions after sorting the sample depending 
on two methods into deals that include optimistic directors and acquisitions which consist of 
neutral directors. The first method is the number of transactions based on the difference in the 
number of buys of and the number of sales conducted by directors of the firm. The second 
method is the amount of transactions method; which considers the difference between the 
amount of purchases and the amount of sales that conducted by directors. The total number of 
the cross-border sample is 479 deals, but this is reduced after sorting the sample due to the lack 
of information. This table considers all transactions carried out within one year of the 
announcement date of the acquisition.  
 
6.4.2.1 Results according to the number of transactions method 
After sorting the cross-border sample depending on the number of transactions method, 
the total number of firms in the cross-border sample was reduced to 340 acquisitions, 
and that includes 190 acquisitions with optimistic directors and 150 acquisitions with 
neutral directors. The following results in table 6.5 represent the transactions carried out 
within one year of the announcement date of the deal. 
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Table 6. 5. Acquirers‟ returns for cross-border acquisitions depending on the number of 
transactions method for transactions within one year of the announcement date of the deal 
 
 Optimistic 
director  
 Neutral 
director  
Differential 
Between 
CAR  
t-stat of 
differential  
Window CAR t-stat  CAR t-stat  
 
Optimistic 
-Neutral 
Optimistic 
-Neutral 
-2 to +2  1.29 2.64 0.11 0.19 1.18 2.32 
-1 to +1  0.85 2.11 0.04 0.10 0.81 1.92 
 
Notes: 
This table includes results for UK cross-border acquisitions after sorting the sample into 
optimistic and neutral directors, and that depend on the number of transactions method.  This 
method relies on the number of buys and the number of sales which have been done by directors 
of the firm in sorting the sample into deals which have optimistic directors and deals which 
have less optimistic or neutral directors. Directors can be considered as optimistic if the number 
of buys is larger than the number of sales by more than two transactions, otherwise they will be 
considered as neutral. These results are for transactions which have been achieved within one 
year before the announcement date of main deal, the total number of sample has been reduced to 
190 deals with optimistic directors and 150 deals with neutral directors because the lack of 
information. Acquirers‟ returns have been calculated depending on the Market Model for a 5-
day event window.  
 
 
It is clear from the table 6.5 that deals with neutral directors have returns that are not 
different from zero. For example, CARs for neutral directors in the window -2, +2 are 
0.11% while CARs for optimistic directors generate significant returns of 1.29% for the 
same window. It is important to mention that a 3-day window has been examined and 
that is to allow a robustness check.  
 
6.4.2.2 Results according to the amount of transactions method 
After sorting the cross-border sample according to the amount measure, the total 
number of cross-border acquisitions is reduced to 364 deals (205 acquisitions with 
optimistic directors and 159 acquisitions with neutral directors). The following table 6.6 
reports the results. 
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Table 6. 6. Acquirers‟ returns for cross-border acquisitions based on the amount of transactions 
method including transactions within one year of the announcement date of the acquisition 
 
 Optimistic 
director   
Neutral director Differential 
between 
CAR 
t-stat of 
Differential  
Window CAR t-stat  CAR t-stat  
 
Optimistic- 
Neutral 
Optimistic- 
Neutral 
-2 to +2  1.42 3.29 -0.23 -0.35 1.65 3.63 
-1 to +1  1.06 2.78 -0.24 -0.47 1.30 3.32 
 
Notes: 
This table includes results for UK cross-border acquisitions after sorting the sample into 
optimistic and neutral directors, and that depends on the amount of transactions method.  This 
method relies on the difference between of the amount of purchases and the amount of sales in 
sorting the sample into deals with optimistic directors and deals with neutral directors. Directors 
can be considered as optimistic if the difference is b, positive otherwise they will be considered 
neutral. These results are for transactions which have carried out within one year before the 
announcement date of the deal, the total number of cross-border sample has been reduced to 205 
deals which have optimistic directors and 159 deals which have neutral directors  because the 
lack of information. Acquirers‟ returns have been calculated depending on the Market Model for 
a 5-day event window.  
 
It is evident from table 6.6 that deals with neutral directors again have lower returns 
compared with deals made by firms with optimistic directors and that is for the studied 
window. For example, one can note that optimistic directors have significant returns of 
1.42% which are considerably larger than that achieved by firms with neutral directors. 
This makes those results consistent with the results presented in table 6.5, which leads 
to the conclusion that the abnormal returns for acquirers that conduct cross-border deals 
with neutral directors have lower announcement returns compared with deals conducted 
by firms with optimistic directors in the same sample. 
 
It is notable from the previous results that depending on both methods in sorting the 
cross-border sample, neutral directors have low returns compared with the returns of 
optimistic directors. 
 
The following section investigates robustness check for two major issues. The first one 
is considering abnormal returns for a 3-day window. The second issue considers testing 
the sensitivity across earlier methods that have been used to examine directors‟ 
behaviour.  
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6.5 Robustness check  
Measuring the link between the private investment decisions of directors of each firm 
and firm‟s investment according to acquisitions it makes over 5-day window throughout 
this chapter considers also examining managerial behavior for a 3-day window. Thus 
this section sums up abnormal returns after examining the earlier idea for a 3-day 
window, and that is to find out whether there is any difference in acquirers‟ returns 
between the studied window and a 3-day window. The following table presents 
acquirers‟ returns for domestic and cross-border acquisitions after considering the 
earlier idea for a 3-day window.   
 
Table 6. 7. Checking the robustness for abnormal returns for a 3-day window 
 
Insider trading decisions Domestic acquisitions Cross-border acquisitions 
  
 
 
 
The number of transactions method 
Optimistic  Directors 
 
Neutral  Directors   
 
1.53 
(3.38) 
-0.004 
(-0.01) 
 
0.85 
(2.11) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
The amount of transactions method 
Optimistic Directors 
 
Neutral Directors  
 
1.26 
(2.96) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
1.06 
(2.78) 
-0.24 
(-0.47) 
 
Notes: 
This table presents acquirers‟ returns for a 3-day window for domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions.  The sample includes 1133 UK acquisitions that have been conducted between 
2000 and 2009. The total number of domestic sample is 654 acquisitions, while the total number 
of cross-border acquisitions is 479 deals. The target can be a private or a public firm. The 
acquiring firms must be public firms that are listed on LSE. It is significant to add that the total 
number of both domestic and cross-border acquisitions has been reduced after considering two 
measures to examine insider trading. The first method is the number of transactions method. 
This method considers the number of personal transactions that have been conducted by 
directors. The director can be regarded as optimistic if the number of buys is larger than the 
number of sales by two transactions. The second method considers the amount of transactions. 
This method relies on the difference between the amount of the buys and the amount of sales. 
The director is considered as optimistic if the difference is positive otherwise he is considered as 
neutral. Numbers between brackets are t-stat for acquirers‟ returns.   
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It is notable from table 6.7 that examining acquirers‟ returns for a 3-day window does 
not show any big difference from the acquirers‟ returns that have been examined for a 
5-day window. Furthermore, measuring the relationship between private investment 
decisions and the firm‟s investment according to the acquisitions it makes depending on 
directors‟ personal transactions produces for a 3-day window almost similar results 
compared to the 5-day window. The following table presents overlapping observations 
across all measures which investigate the link between the private investment decisions 
and the firm‟s investment regarding acquisitions it makes.  
 
Table  6.8. Overlapping observations 
 
Insider Trading Decisions Domestic Acquisitions Cross-border Acquisitions 
Optimistic Directors 
 
2.06 
(3.03) 
1.77 
(3.31) 
Neutral Directors 
 
-0.82 
(-1.21) 
-0.42 
(-0.46) 
  
Notes 
This table presents results for overlapping observations across two methods which have been 
used. The first method considers the number of transactions that have been carried out by 
directors. The second method depends on the difference in amounts of transactions in sorting 
the sample into optimistic and neutral directors. These results are for a 5-day window. The 
number of optimistic directors in domestic sample is175 and in cross-border sample is 166, 
while the number of neutral directors in domestic sample is 110 and in cross-border sample is 
123. Numbers between brackets are t-stat. 
 
Earlier results in table 6.8 show that optimistic directors produce higher returns for both 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions compared with neutral directors. This leads us to 
summarize the major findings in this chapter. 
 
Optimistic directors of both domestic and cross-border acquisitions produce significant 
returns compared with neutral directors. These results confirm that optimistic directors 
increase their transactions around corporate events such as acquisitions. Measuring the 
relationship between private investment decisions of directors and firm‟s investment 
regarding the acquisitions it makes has its own influence on returns of directors who 
make many transactions around the announcement date of acquisition.  
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter investigates the relationship between private investment decisions of 
directors and firm‟s investment regarding the acquisitions it makes. For these terms, 
both domestic and cross-border samples have been sorted depending on two different 
methods. The first method is called the number of transactions method. This method 
depends on the number of buys and the number of sales which have been done by 
directors of the firm. The directors of the firm will be considered as optimistic if the 
number of buys is larger than the number of sales by at least two transactions, otherwise 
they will be considered as neutral. The second method is called the amount of 
transactions method. This method relies on the difference between the amount of 
purchases and the amount of sales. Directors will be considered as optimistic if the 
difference is positive otherwise they will be neutral. The researcher includes all such 
personal transactions that have been achieved within one year prior to the 
announcement date of each acquisition. The results indicate that optimistic directors of 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions produce significant returns compared to neutral 
directors and that according to previous used methods.  
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Chapter 7:  Synergy Gains and Operating Performance for 
Acquirers with Public Targets 
 
 119 
Synergy Gains and Operating Performance for Acquirers with Public 
Targets 
 
7.1 Introduction 
While many studies have investigated acquirers‟ abnormal returns around the 
announcement of an acquisition, others have tried to examine the synergy gains that 
accrue to an acquisition. The major motive for that is to determine whether these 
investments can create real economic gains or not. 
 
 In this chapter, synergy gains have been investigated for 94 UK successful acquisitions. 
The researcher includes in this chapter domestic and cross-border acquisitions from 
2000 until 2006. Further, the operating performance has been measured over a three-
year period, and that includes the years after the announcement year. Later, the 
researcher runs a regression for the operating performance against four different 
variables to find whether there is any change in the operating performance according to 
these variables. For a detailed review of the synergy gains, see (Bradley et al, 1988; 
Hayn, 1989; Kim, Singal, 1993) and for operating performance, see (Healy et al. 1992; 
Linn, Switzer, 2001; Powell, Stark, 2005). 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: The first section is the literature review that 
includes more detail about the synergy gains. The second section consists of the data 
and methodology that has been used in this chapter. The third section introduces the 
main results after investigating the synergy gains for acquiring firms with public and 
domestic targets. The next two sections include a study of the operating performance 
and the major results for acquirers. The final section sums up the whole chapter.  
 
7.2 Literature review 
Many studies in corporate finance have revealed that acquisitions usually result in 
significant gains for shareholders of target firms, and smaller gains in returns for 
shareholders of acquiring firms (Hayn, 1989). Considering and understanding the 
source of the gains is very significant for the merging firm, and also it may reduce the 
resistance towards acquisitions which can come sometimes from target firms or even 
from antitrust authorities. 
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In addition, the combined firm sometimes creates a cash flow with a net present value in 
excess of the market value of the bidder and the target firms. Investigating the sources 
of these gains will help to determine which components have changed as a result of the 
acquisition. On the other hand, studying abnormal returns does not give a clear picture 
of whether these returns are real economic gains, thus one should consider investigating 
synergy gains (Jensen, Ruback, 1983). Different explanations have been given 
regarding the source of these gains, but the main studies consider that tax and market 
power are the major sources of acquisition gains (See Hayn, 1989). 
 
There is empirical evidence that corporate acquisitions achieved via tender offers 
increase shareholders‟ wealth for both the target firm and the acquiring firm. These 
gains may be caused by the combination of the target and the acquiring firms‟ 
resources, which lead to the synergies theory (Bradley, Desai, Kim, 1988). In addition, 
the increase in the stock market value of the merging firms may come as a result of „the 
value creation‟, and the value creation in turn may occur as a result of improved 
managerial effectiveness, improved production methods or other synergy gains (Kim 
and Singal, 1993). Previous research stated that mergers raise the joint equity value of 
both the target and the acquiring firms, which increases the importance of searching for 
sources of merger gains that may have occurred because of market power, taxes, or 
efficiency developments. (Devos, Kadapakkam, Krishnamurthy, 2009) 
 
 Jensen and Ruback (1983) mentioned that synergy gains may come from different 
sources. They explained that these gains usually happen during the adoption of some 
new production or organisational technology, or through reducing agency costs. Also 
these synergy gains may come from tax savings or tax advantages by reducing the tax 
paid previously by the acquirer and the target firms separately. Furthermore, they added 
these ideas confirm that combined firms produce cash flows with a net present value 
which extends the market value of the bidding and the target firms. 
  
Bradley et al (1988) studied the importance of synergistic gains that are created via 
tender offers, which were defined according to Dodd and Ruback (1977) as a cash or 
stock bid by one firm „the bidder‟ for a block of another firm‟s outstanding common 
stock, and the stockholders accept the offer by tendering their stocks or not tendering 
their stocks to retain ownership of the target firm. Thus Bradley et al. (1988) depended 
on the re-estimation of the joint wealth of shareholders of both the target and the 
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acquiring firms. Their sample includes 236 pairs of successful tender offers made 
during 1962-1984. They defined the total synergistic gains to a tender offer as „the sum 
of the change in the wealth of the target stockholders and the change in the wealth of the 
stockholders of the acquiring firm‟. They divided the studied period into three sub-
periods. The first one begins from 1962 and ends in 1968 and this period is totally free 
from any government regulation. The second period begins in 1969 and ends in 1980, 
and by this period takeovers have been regulated via the government. The last period 
begins in 1981 and ends in 1984. Within this period the corporate market has witnessed 
many changes such as the beginning of „investment banking firms‟ whose interest is 
mainly in funding corporate takeovers. Thus the authors are interested to discover 
whether these changes within this period have any impact on the synergistic gains 
created by tender offers. They relied on the Market Model to estimate total synergistic 
gains, from five days before the announcement of the bid through also to five days after 
that announcement. Depending on the cumulative abnormal returns, the authors 
calculate the synergistic gains that are created via a tender offer.  They found that the 
total sample of tender offers produced an average synergistic gain of $67 million for the 
total studied period (1962-1984), and total gains for the first period on average was $21 
million. They noted that gains grew over the years. For example, the total gains 
increased from $38 million for the second period (1969-1980) to $187 million by the 
end of the third period in 1984. The authors also noted that the value of both the target 
and the acquiring firms increased as well, and that was the result of many factors such 
as inflation and the general growth of the economy which have their own impact on the 
value of firms. Also the beginning of investment banking firms during the third studied 
period enhanced the ability of firms to increase their funds and capital quickly when 
required, which affected firms‟ value positively and increased their capital. To 
summarise, they found that successful tender offers generated significant synergistic 
gains, and these gains increased over the years. The main reason for these increases was 
the rise in the value of firms involved in acquisitions, but when they control for the 
change in the value of the firm, they noticed that the synergistic gains remained stable 
for the whole studied period. Thus they concluded that changes in the environment of 
the economy have no effect on gains which are created via tender offers. 
 
 Hayn (1989) considered the magnitude of target firms‟ tax roles in attracting 
acquisitions. The author mentioned that acquisitions commonly can be categorised 
according to the tax situation, into taxable, partly taxable and tax-free acquisitions for 
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the target firm‟s shareholders. This categorisation will have its own impact on any 
benefit or loss that may be achieved via the acquisition. For example, for totally taxed 
acquisitions, gains or losses will be announced to the target firm‟s shareholders in the 
year of sale, while in part-tax acquisitions some benefits or losses will be known and the 
rest will be postponed because of tax. The situation will differ for the shareholders of 
acquiring firms, because the author considered just the taxable and the tax-free 
acquisitions, while part-tax acquisitions will be considered as taxable or tax-free 
acquisitions depending on the structure of the deal. Hayn studied a sample of 640 
acquisitions made between 1970 and 1985.  The author calculated firms‟ returns using 
an event study, and that for the announcement period according to the tax situation and 
the type of the deal (tender offer or merger).  She determined the announcement period 
as a 15-day period which begins from day -9 and ends at day +5 with day 0 as the 
announcement day of the deal which is the first day when the acquiring firm appears in 
the Wall Street Journal as a possible acquirer. The main results showed that abnormal 
returns are better for tender offers compared with mergers over the announcement 
period and it is important to add that tender offers are usually made via public offers, 
while mergers are made via private negotiations (See Berkovitch and Khanna, 1991). 
On the other hand, all tender offers are taxable deals, while mergers are divided between 
taxable and tax-free deals. The relationship between target and acquiring firms‟ returns 
and the role of tax has been studied by means of a cross sectional regression where 
returns are considered as the dependent variable and the tax and other variables such as 
net operating loss carryforwards and unused tax credits, capital gains tax, relative size, 
the step up, and the type of the deal are independent variables. The author added that net 
operating loss carryforwards and unused tax credits may explain part of firms‟ abnormal 
returns. 
 
 In addition, the author found that tax-attributes in tax-free acquisitions for target firms 
are better compared with acquiring firms‟ results, and that is because target firms have 
higher t-statistics compared with acquiring firms. Also target firms have high 
coefficients of net operating loss carryforwards and unused tax credit of 0.25 and 0.43 
compared with 0.14 and 0.21 for acquiring firms. For taxable acquisitions, the situation 
differs for acquiring firms, because they have higher results for major variables 
compared with the target firm. This indicates that some benefits may come from net 
operating loss carryforwards and unused tax credits for tax-free acquisitions, while 
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capital gain and step up may have their own impact on firms‟ returns of taxable 
acquisitions.  
 
 Healy et al. (1992) studied the post merger cash flow performance of both the target 
and the acquiring firms. The authors also tried to determine whether takeovers can 
generate actual gains, and they investigated the sources of these gains. They mentioned 
that gains from mergers may come from different sources such as operating synergies, 
tax savings, and transfers from employees. To determine these gains and their sources, 
they studied the largest 50 US acquisitions which happened between January 1979 and 
June 1984. They chose these for several reasons, such as, if there are any economic 
gains from acquisitions, their impact will be clearer in the largest acquisitions. Also the 
manual collection of data is easier with this small sample. 
 
They depended on the pre-tax operating cash flows for the target and the acquiring firms 
in order to determine the cash flows for the combined firm from year five before the 
merger until year five after the merger. They defined the operating cash flow returns as 
„the ratio of operating cash flows during a given year to the market value of assets at the 
beginning of that year‟. They found that the median of cash flow increases are 14% at 
year-1 to 1, 17% at year -1 to 2, and 16% at year-1 to 3 and 4, and 9% at year-1 to 5. 
This indicates that these changes in cash flows and assets cannot be recognized by the 
merger at post-bid period.  
 
Kim and Singal (1993) tested whether mergers increase market power, and they did that 
by studying the airline industry. They depended on the product price instead of the stock 
price; because any changes in the product price of merging firms may have its impact 
on efficiency and market power. The major reason that led them to choose airline 
industry data to examine market power was because each route can be measured and 
studied as a separate market. The routes that are not affected by mergers can be 
considered as the „control group‟, which help to capture any change in industry 
variables such as fuel costs, seasonal changes, or even airfare changes. The sample 
comprises 14 airline mergers made between 1985 and 1988. The essential data consists 
of 27 airline mergers but they drop 13 mergers because of insufficient information. 
They collect information about the acquirer, the number of passengers, the target and 
the number of air routes that are affected by those mergers. They compared the change 
of fare in the sample route with the average fare change in its control group. Later, they 
 124 
considered some hypotheses to be tested. First of all, they studied whether or not 
mergers raise airfares of combined firms compared with their control group. If the 
merger produces an efficiency gain, then this will have an impact on the marginal cost 
which will lower the price in the absence of market power. Thus they wanted to find out 
what the situation would be in order to examine the existence of both the market power 
and the efficiency gains. Secondly, they examined the relationship between the price 
changes of merging firms and the concentration of the market. Finally, they test whether 
the fare changes over the announcement period are because of the market power effect 
and the changes during the completion period are because of the balance impact of 
market power and efficiency gains. The authors studied earlier hypotheses for normal 
firms‟ mergers which does not include any firm in financial difficulty and for failing-
firm mergers which include firms in financial difficulties. They found that during the 
announcement period the merging firm and its rival firms (which are defined as airlines 
that serve sample routes) increase their fares by 11 and 13 percent, and that is between 
firms which did not suffer from any financial difficulties, while firms with financial 
difficulties drop their prices by 19 percent. In the authors‟ opinion that is to attract more 
consumers who may have a negative mindset after the announcement of the merger, or 
to increase the firm‟s cash which will help them to improve their financial situation. At 
the completion period both combined firms and their rivals cut their prices by a relative 
average of 9 percent and 5 percent, and that is for normal-firm mergers, while failing-
firm mergers increase their price by an average of 40 percent. Both authors concluded 
that this introduces evidence that the changes in fare price are due to the increase in 
market power, and also these changes in prices are due to market concentration and are 
not affected by any other variables. 
 
Hanson and Song (1997) investigated synergy gains for the acquirer and the target, and 
also the total gains which may be produced by divestitures. Also they expanded this 
idea to study the role of the ownership and board structure in allocating these gains. 
They stated that divestitures usually create gains in each firm for two main reasons. 
First of all, asset sales produce value and that for the divesting firm because it helps to 
eliminate negative synergies. In addition, sales will help to correct previous mistakes by 
the firm, such as the effects of failed deals. On the other hand, the buyer of the firm 
usually gains positive synergies via economies of scale. The authors think that there are 
major roles to the stock ownership and to the board structure in the division of these 
gains, and that is for several reasons. Firstly, when managers have a large share of 
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stock, this will force them to be good bargainers when making the deal. Also this will 
motivate them to sell assets which reduce the firm‟s value. Secondly, a small share of 
stock may lead the managers sometimes to acquire or make deals which are more 
valuable to their shareholders. Additionally, the board structure of the firm has a key 
role in advising and monitoring managers when doing their job and that role differs 
from one firm to another. 
  
According to the authors‟ earlier discussion, they studied 96 divestitures announced 
between April 1987 and July 1991.  In addition, they calculated total synergies for the 
seller and the buyer following Bradley el al.‟s (1988) method, and that for an 11-day 
window. They found that the average value of the transaction is $233.32 million, and 
the average of the market value of the buyer is higher than the average of the market 
value of the seller, and that is before the divestiture. Further, the authors mentioned that 
sellers have positive dollar synergy gains of $6 million, while buyers have synergy 
gains of minus $59 million, and the total synergies for the divestiture is still minus $53 
million. This indicates that divestures do not create any synergy gains. Finally, 
regarding the ownership role in synergy gains, they find that officers and directors own 
around 10.2% and CEOs on average 4.1% of the firm‟s shares. Regarding the board 
structure role, they found that outside directors make up around 47% of the average 
board. This also allowed them to conclude that both managerial ownership and board 
structure have a significant role in making these divestitures. 
   
 Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) investigated in their study the sources of merger 
gains in the banking sector. They focused in their research on large acquisitions made in 
the banking sector over 12 years (1985-1996). They chose large acquisitions in the 
banking sector because studying large acquisitions allows them to capture any 
improvements in performance, and also helps them to explain the bank consolidation 
process which took place between the 1980s and 1990s. They examine whether 
management valuations of deal gains will have an impact on the stock market‟s 
valuation of the merger benefits, and for that they calculate the present value of the 
after-tax cost saving and revenue gains from mergers. They divide the study period into 
two main parts. The first is between 1985 and 1990, and that is to help them to explain 
the bank consolidation process which happened at that time. The second part includes 
the years between 1991 and 1996. They calculate abnormal returns for the combined 
firms and for the acquirer and the target as well, and that is from four days before the 
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acquirer and the target become involved in the merger until one day after the 
announcement date. They found that the combined firms have returns of 1.86% over the 
whole study period, while deals made between 1985 and 1990 have lower returns of 
0.14% compared with transactions made after 1991 with returns of 3.11%. While 
acquirers have negative returns for both periods of -4.64% and -2.61% compared with 
target firms which have positive and very high returns of 15.58% and 24.60% for both 
periods. Furthermore, they calculate the combined returns for the acquirer and the 
target, and they found that there is an increase in the value of the acquirer and the target 
of an average of $165 million, and that mainly comes from transactions which occurred 
between 1991 and 1996. To find out the sources of the merger gains, they estimate the 
present value of merger gains via calculating the after-tax cash flows. They found that 
the mean of total gains is $765.05 million, with a median of $369.06 million. They 
mention that most of these earnings come from expected net cost savings which are 
estimated by calculating the present value of net cost savings with an average of 
$711.36 million and with a median of $367.09 million.  
 
 Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) investigated abnormal returns and gains from 
mergers between 1973 and 1998, both for the acquirer and the target as well as for the 
combined firm. They presented in this research the type of industry shock deregulation 
which was very important in the earlier years, and became a major factor leading to 
merger activity at and after the late 1980s.  They suggest that this kind of industry shock 
can create new investment chances for industry and can also remove many of main 
difficulties to merging and consolidating. The authors also divide the studied period into 
three main parts, in order to find out the difference in returns before and after late 
1980s. The first part includes the years from 1973 until 1979. The second part covers 
the years from 1980 until 1989, and the third part contains the years from 1990 until 
1998. They investigate abnormal returns for the acquirer and the target and the 
combined firms for each part of the studied period.  They consider two main windows, 
three days around the announcement date (-1, +1), and a longer window which begins a 
few days before the announcement date and ends by the closing date of the merger (-20, 
close). They found that combined firms have the higher returns at the second part of the 
studied period of 2.6% and that is for the short window, and the same situation for the 
longer window where combined firms have positive and significant returns of 3.2%. 
The target has almost the same average of positive and significant returns for all parts of 
the studied period of 16.0% for the short window, and for the longer window the target 
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has higher returns only for the first part of the studied period of 24.8%. The acquirer has 
negative returns which are not different from zero for the first and the second parts of 
the studied period of-0.3% and -0.4%, and higher returns for the third part of the studied 
period of -1.0% and for the short window. Even though the acquirers‟ returns become 
higher for all parts of the studied period for the longer window, they are still negative 
returns.  They also found that the acquirer has the lowest negative returns for the second 
part of the studied period of -3.1%.  
 
 Heron and Lie (2002) studied firms‟ operating performance and its relation with the 
method of payment. They examined acquisitions announced and completed between the 
beginning of 1985 and the end of 1997. With a sample consisting of 859 acquisitions 
divided into three main sectors according to the method of payment (cash payment, 
stock payment and mixed payment), the authors calculate announcement returns for 
both the acquirer and the target and for the combined firm. They use the equity market 
for five days before the announcement date, and find that target firms have positive 
returns for all three methods of payments, especially when the target has cash as 
payment for the deal. They found that the average of the target‟s returns is higher than 
when stock is used as a method of payment. On the other hand, they found that the 
acquirer has returns which are not different from zero when cash or a mix of methods is 
used to finance the deal. They found that combined firms have positive returns at the 
announcement period and the average of their returns is 5.3% for cash acquisitions, 
which is considerably higher than the returns for combined firms financed by stock and 
a mix of cash and stock of 0.9% and 5.00% respectively. 
 
 They measure operating performance by comparing the operating performance with 
two benchmarks which allows them to control some of the factors that may have an 
impact on the results. To control for economy-wide variables and industry 
improvements, they calculate an industry-adjusted operating performance by comparing 
the performance of the sample firms with the median of the operating performance of 
firms that share the same three-digit SIC code which they designate as a control group. 
Additionally, they compare the operating performance of the sample with a sample of 
firms in the same industry and share „pre-event performance‟, measured from three 
years prior to the fiscal year relative to completion until three years after the year of 
completion. They found that the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquiring 
firms relative to the control group remains almost the same for cash acquisitions for 
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three years after the completion of +0.016%.  The situation is different for acquisitions 
that depend on a mixed method of payment, with performance decreasing year on year. 
For example the operating performance at year +1 is 0.032% and at year +2 is 0.018%. 
This allowed them to conclude that acquirers performed well compared with firms in a 
similar industry. 
 
 Moeller et al. (2003) studied acquisitions‟ gains and considered mainly the target 
situation (public, private or subsidiary) which may have an effect on these gains. They 
examined a sample of 12,023 acquisitions announced between 1980 and 2001. The 
authors divide the sample into three main sections; acquisitions by public firms, 
acquisitions by private firms, and acquisitions by a subsidiary. Firstly, they estimate 
abnormal returns for each transaction around the announcement day for a 3-day 
window.  Then they calculate shareholders‟ gains also for a 3-day window. They call 
the measure of these gains „the net present value‟ of the acquiring firm. They found that 
the average of the net present value for the whole sample is $-218.59 million, and gains 
for public acquisitions lose more compared with private and subsidiary acquisitions of 
$-256.86 million. In addition, they divide the sample according to many variables, such 
as, the size of the acquirer, the method of payment, and the organisational form of the 
assets acquired. They found that subsidiary acquisitions have higher returns according 
to the method of payment compared with acquisitions of public and private targets. 
 
Recently, Devos et al. (2008) calculated synergy gains for 264 large mergers between 
1980 and 2004. They compared between the present value of Value Line cash flow 
forecasts for both target and acquiring firms before merger, with the forecast of joint 
firms after the merger. Before studying the sample they test three possible reasons for 
synergy gains from mergers. The first one is that mergers may produce useful 
efficiencies which in turn generate high operating earnings or reduced capital 
expenditure. The second reason is that firms sometimes become involved in mergers in 
order to benefit from tax savings. Finally, the third reason is that possible 
„anticompetitive mergers‟ between firms within the same industry may allow the joint 
firm to exercise enhanced market power.  
 
 The authors consider that the total synergy consists of two major parts; the first is the 
operating synergies which come from „changes in cash flow which are correlated to 
operations‟ while the second type is financial synergies which are „produced by 
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increased interest tax shields‟. In addition, they depend on Value Line forecasts to 
calculate the total gains for acquirer, target and the joint firm. The forecast contains 
variables such as, revenues, operating margin, depreciation, tax rates, debts, working 
capital and capital expenditures. They calculate the annual capital cash flows and the 
present value of cash flows for the acquirer and the target before the merger and for the 
combined firm after the merger. 
 
According to their results, the average of synergies for the total sample is around 10.3% 
which is significant, and also the median is 5.11% which is significant at 1%. This 
allowed them to conclude that all mergers create value through synergic gains. 
Furthermore, they found that the average for financial synergies is 1.64% which is 
significant at a 1% level, and the average for operating synergies is 8.38% which is 
better and higher than the average of financial synergies. This gives a clear indication 
that operating synergies can be considered as a major source of the gains in mergers.  
 
In the following section; the researcher introduces the data studying synergy gains in 
more detail, because synergy gains have been investigated for combined firms with 
domestic and public targets. In addition, more information has been added about the 
major methodology that has been required for investigating synergy gains for both 
acquirers and target firms.  
 
7.3 Data and methodology  
The total number of UK successful acquisitions which is included in the sample is 834 
deals which were carried out between 2000 until 2006. The acquirer must be a public 
firm, and the target in the sample differs between public and private firms, but the 
majority of these acquisitions were carried out with private targets, which lead to 
considering deals which include both public acquirer and public target firms in order to 
calculate total synergy gains. This reduced the number of acquisitions that are included 
in this chapter. The new total number of domestic acquisitions is 54 deals while the total 
sample of cross-border acquisitions with public targets is 40 deals. It is important to add 
that the researcher wants later in this research to calculate the change in operating 
performance for a 3-year period after the announcement year. Thus this leads to the 
need to exclude deals that were conducted during 2007-2009. The reason which leads to 
investigate acquisitions with public targets is that to find whether these investments can 
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produce any gains despite the fact that firms with public targets form only around 10% 
of the total number of these kinds of investment.    
 
The following table shows acquirers returns for domestic acquisitions that were 
conducted between 2000 to the end of 2006. 
 
Table 7. 1. Acquirers‟ returns for UK domestic acquisitions 
 
Window CAR t-stat 
-2 to +2 0.61 1.61 
-1 to +1 0.57 1.73 
 
Notes: 
This table presents acquirers‟ returns for UK domestic deals between 2000 and 2006. The total 
number of domestic deals is 484 deals. The cumulative abnormal returns have been calculated 
depending on the Market Model and the classic event study methodology for 5-day window 
over the announcement day. 
 
 
After reducing the domestic sample, the researcher makes a comparison in acquirer 
returns between the two divided samples. The first sample includes public acquirer and 
target firms; the second sample includes public acquirer and private target firm.  
 
The following table introduces acquirer returns for domestic acquisitions in both 
sections. The first section includes acquisitions with public targets; the total number of 
acquisitions in this section is 54 deals. The second section includes acquisitions with 
private targets; the total number of deals in this section is 430 deals. One can note that 
acquirers‟ returns for acquisitions with private targets are better than acquirers „returns 
with public targets for some estimated windows (See table 6.1).  
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Table 7. 2.Acquirers‟ returns for domestic acquisitions with public and private targets 
 
 Acquirers with Private Targets Acquirers with Public Targets 
Window CAR t-stat CAR 
 
t-stat 
-2 to +2 0.75 1.54 -0.80 -0.99 
-1 to +1 0.67 1.67 -0.46 -0.57 
 
Notes: 
This table introduces acquirers‟ returns for domestic deals in both parts and that from 2000 to 
2006. The first section includes acquisitions with private targets. The total number of deals in 
the first section is 400 deals.  The second section includes acquisitions with public target firms. 
The total number of the second section is 54 acquisitions. The acquirers‟ abnormal returns have 
been calculated depending on the Market Model and the event study methodology for a 5-day 
event window. 
 
 
Comparing between acquirers‟ returns of the two parts of the domestic sample, one can 
note that the part that includes acquirers with public targets have insignificant losses 
over the announcement date, which motivates a study of the synergy gains, in order to 
find out whether there are any gains which encourage acquirers to do these investments. 
In addition, studying the second part of the divided domestic sample will be impractical 
regarding calculating synergy gains, because it includes private target firms, and it will 
not be possible to calculate the abnormal returns for these private firms. 
 
The following table includes the returns to acquirers which conducted cross-border 
successful acquisitions between 2000 and 2006. The total sample comprises 300 
acquisitions. The cross-border sample is sub-divided into two sections according to the 
type of the target firm. The first section includes 40 acquisitions with public targets 
while the second section includes 310 acquisitions with private targets. It is necessary to 
add that abnormal returns have been calculated for a 5-day window but a 3-day window 
has been included to check the robustness of the results. 
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Table 7. 3. Acquirers‟ returns for UK cross-border acquisitions 
 
Window CAR t-stat 
-2 to +2 0.67 1.88 
-1 to +1 0.45 1.45 
 
Notes: 
This table presents acquirers‟ returns for UK cross-border successful deals between 2000 and 
2006. The total number of cross-border deals is 350 deals. The cumulative abnormal returns 
have been calculated depending on the Market Model and the classic event study methodology 
for 5-day window over the announcement day. 
 
 
The following table presents acquirers‟ returns after dividing the sample according to 
the type of the target firm.  
 
 
Table 7. 4. Acquirers‟ returns for UK cross-border acquisitions according to the type of the target 
firm 
 
 Acquirers with Private Targets Acquirers with Public Targets 
Window CAR t-stat CAR 
 
t-stat 
-2 to +2 0.93 2.26 -1.17 -1.02 
-1 to +1 0.74 2.17 -1.99 -1.91 
 
Notes: 
This table introduces acquirers‟ returns for successful cross-border deals in both parts and that 
from 2000 to 2006. The first section includes acquisitions with private targets. The total number 
of deals in the first section is 310 deals.  The second section includes acquisitions with public 
target firms. The total number of the second section is 40 acquisitions. The acquirers‟ abnormal 
returns have been calculated depending on the Market Model and the event study methodology 
for a 5-day event window. 
 
 
It is notable from tables 7.2 and 7.4 that acquirers with private targets have higher 
returns compared with acquirers with public targets that have losses for both the 5-day 
and 3-day windows.  
 
The total synergy gains have been calculated for the first part of the divided domestic 
and cross-border sample, which includes public acquirers and public targets. The 
researcher depends on the market value for both the acquirer and target firms and 
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cumulative abnormal returns for both firms as well. First of all, the acquirers‟ returns 
have been estimated depending on the Market Model and on the classic Event Study. 
The parameters for the Market Model are estimated between (-20 and -150 days) and 
the event window is the 5-day window both before and after the announcement date of 
the deal.  
 
Following Bradley et al. (1987), the researcher calculates total synergy gains for 
acquiring firms and target firms for domestic acquisitions. In addition, the total 
synergies have been defined as „the sum of the change in the wealth in the target 
stockholders and the change in the wealth in the acquirer stockholders‟. 
 
 
Where       the total synergistic gain  
         the change in the wealth of target stockholders  
        the change in the wealth of acquirer stockholders  
 
Moreover, the researcher calculates the change in the wealth for both acquirer and target 
stockholders depending on the cumulative returns and the market value of the acquiring 
and target firms. 
 
 
Where         
         
        The market value of the target equity at the end of one month prior to the 
announcement date 
     The cumulative abnormal returns to the target firm, and that is from two days 
prior to the announcement day until two days after the announcement day 
         The market value of the acquirer‟s equity at the end of one month prior to the 
announcement date. 
     The cumulative abnormal returns to the acquiring firm, and that is from two 
days prior to the announcement day till two days after the announcement day 
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In the next section; the major results have been introduced after applying the earlier 
methodology to the previous data. 
7.4 Results  
 
The researcher calculates total synergies for UK domestic and cross-border successful 
acquisitions between 2000 and 2006. The total number of the domestic sample is 54 
deals, and the total number of cross-border sample is 40 acquisitions with public targets. 
It is significant to mention that the total number of cross-border acquisitions with public 
targets has been reduced to 26 deals and that is due to a lack of information about target 
firms for several acquirers. The acquirer and the target must be public UK firms, which 
will make it possible to collect the required information about both the acquirer and the 
target. For each firm the cumulative abnormal returns have been calculated for a 5-day 
window from two days before the announcement day which is considered as day (0) to 
two days after the announcement day. The researcher depends on the market value for 
one month prior the announcement date. Depending on Bradley et al. (1987) 
methodology the median, the average, and the standard deviation have been calculated 
for each combined firm. The following two tables introduce total synergy gains for 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions. 
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Table 7. 5.Total synergy gains for domestic acquisitions with public targets 
 
 Total 
synergies 
(-2,+2) 
Total 
synergies 
(-1,+1) 
Median 3.78 4.38 
Mean -43.94 -12.88 
Standard 
Deviation 
537.13 459.79 
 
Notes: 
This table introduces the Mean, the Median and the standard deviation of total synergy gains in 
millions for domestic (54) acquisitions between 2000 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.6.Total synergy gains for cross-border acquisitions with public targets 
 
 Total 
synergies 
(-2,+2) 
Total 
synergies 
(-1,+1) 
Median 79.76 50.46 
Mean -120.37 -727.88 
Standard 
Deviation 
3987.87 6357.92 
 
Notes: 
This table introduces the Mean, the Median and the standard deviation of total synergy gains in 
millions for cross-border (26) acquisitions between 2000 and 2006. 
 
One can notice from table 7.6 that the median for the combined wealth is 3.78m and the 
mean for the combined wealth is minus 43.94m and that is for a window -2, +2. It is 
noticeable that the median for synergy gains of cross-border is 79.76 and the mean is 
minus 120.37 for the same window. Comparing these results with Hanson and Song‟s 
(1997) study, they investigated total synergy gains for 96 divestitures and they followed 
Bradley et al.‟s method. They found that total synergy gains for the divestiture are 
minus $53million which led them to conclude that divestitures do not create or produce 
any gains. Thus both studies point out according to their results that combined firms do 
not generate any synergy gains. Furthermore, comparing earlier results in table 6.5 and 
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6.6 consistent with Moeller et al.‟s (2004) study, the authors investigated gains for 
acquisitions according to the target type; they found that acquisitions with public targets 
lose more than acquisitions with private or subsidiary targets. Both results confirm that 
acquisitions with public targets do not create any synergy gains.  
To find whether these gains are real economic gains, the operating performance has 
been investigated for acquirers, and that is for the 3-year period which begins from the 
first year after the announcement year and ends at year three after the announcement 
year. The following section will explain the importance of investigating the operating 
performance for each firm. 
 
7.5 Operating performance  
Studying operating performance and its improvement as a result of a corporate takeover 
is still one of the most studied topics. Many researchers have found that there is no 
relationship between the operating performance and the abnormal returns of the 
combined firm. For example, Healy et al. (1992) examined whether there is a difference 
in operating performance when the acquirer finances their deals with cash compared 
with those who depend on stock. They found that there is no relationship between 
changes in operating performance and using different methods of payment, and 
although they also mention that these results may be affected by the small number of the 
total sample on which they depend. Cornett and Tahranian (1992) investigated some 
clear changes in operating performance, but they did not relate these improvements to 
any variables.  (See, for instance, Healy et al. 1992; Linn, Switzer, 2001; Powell, Stark, 
2005). 
 
Powell and Stark (2005) examined the sensitivity of estimates of operating performance 
improvements from UK takeovers. The authors relied on two measures of operating 
cash flow. The first one is as defined by Healy et al. (1992). The second one is called 
the „pure‟ cash flow measure and this measure regulates for the effect of the accounting 
operation increases. They relied on both measures of cash flow to allow for conclusions 
to be reached on the sensitivity of estimates of operating performance developments to 
various performance metrics. They depend on 191 takeovers by UK industrial firms 
undertaken between January 1985 and July 1993. 
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The authors investigated the operating performance according to Healy et al.‟s (1992) 
regression, which is based on two benchmarks of operating performance. The first one 
is the industry-adjusted median and the second one is the industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted. They also examined the operating performance against some 
variables such as, relative size, method of payment, the level of industrial relatedness, 
and the type of takeover. In addition, they rely on four different deflators to find out 
whether there are obvious differences in the operating performance according to each 
one. These deflators are the pre- and post-takeover cash flows relative to total market 
value, the pre- and post-takeover cash flows relative to adjusted total market value, the 
pre- and post-performance takeover cash flows relative to book value of assets, and the 
pre- and post-performance takeover cash flows relative to total assets. The authors 
found that takeovers produce some improvements in operating performance and that 
depending on the use of an accruals definition of cash flow, also there is no clear impact 
for earlier variables on operating performance. For example, the impact of the method 
of payment shows a slight impact on operating performance according to the median of 
pre- and post-takeover cash flows relative to book value of assets of 2.23%. This 
implies that although there are some improvements, these are not high or noticeable. 
  
Different methodologies have been used to measure operating performance over and 
post the corporate takeover. For example, improvements are investigated depending on 
the difference between the industry-adjusted, post-takeover performance and the 
combined, the target and the acquirer firms and pre-takeover, industry-adjusted 
performance.  
  
In this section of the paper, the researcher will investigate the improvements in 
operating performance for acquirers of UK takeovers. The main measure on which the 
researcher depends on to estimate operating performance is the industry-adjusted 
median which can be defined as „EBITDA/Total Assets as of the fiscal year prior to the 
announcement minus the median Return on Assets of the firms in the same industry 
with the bidder. It is important to add that required numbers have been collected from 
DataStream.  
 
Measuring operating performance has been considered over a three-year period, which 
extends from the first year after the effective year until year three after the effective 
year. The total sample is 81 firms, which includes public UK acquirers and target firms.  
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7.5.1. Results  
 The operating performance for each acquirer has been calculated depending on 
measuring the returns on assets. The calculation for a three-year period has been 
considered which includes year one after the effective date until year three after the 
effective date. The following table presents the results of the operating performance for 
41 acquirers within the studied years. It is significant to mention that several firms have 
been dropped because of a lack of information.  
 
Table 7. 7.The Mean, Median of the operating performance change for domestic UK acquisitions 
with public targets within a 3-year period 
 
The studied 
years 
The mean of the 
operating 
performance % 
The median of 
the operating 
performance %  
The mean 
relative to 
industry % 
The median 
relative to 
industry % 
+1 -0.033 -0.043 0.128 0.119 
+2 -0.049 -0.024 0.134 0.118 
+3 -0.018 -0.021 0.107 0.115 
1+2 -0.082 -0.077 0.262 0.237 
1+2+3 -0.101 -0.102 0.370 0.345 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the average and the median of the operating performance for 41 acquirers 
relative to the same industry sector as the bidders within a 3-year period, which includes three 
years after the effective date which is year (0).  
 
One can note from the table 7.7 that the average of the operating performance decreases 
over the studied years, and the median has the same situation. There are no clear 
improvements in the average and the median of operating performance for years +1, 
1+2 and 1+2+3. 
 
The following table introduces results of operating performance for cross-border 
acquisitions with public targets; the total number of firms is 38. It is notable that the 
researcher considers measuring operating performance for years 1+2 and years 1+2+3 
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and that is to find whether the operating performance will show some changes within 
these years. 
 
Table 7. 8. The Mean, Median of the operating performance change for cross-border UK 
acquisitions with public targets within a 3-year period 
 
The studied 
years 
The mean of the 
operating 
performance % 
The median of 
the operating 
performance % 
The mean 
relative to 
industry % 
The median 
relative to 
industry % 
+1 0.001 -0.015 0.096 0.132 
+2 0.014 -0.013 0.091 0.125 
+3 -0.013 -0.012 0.125 0.138 
1+2 0.015 -0.006 0.187 0.264 
1+2+3 0.002 0.015 0.321 0.356 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the average and the median of the operating performance for 38 acquirers 
relative to industry sector that is the same as that of the bidders within a 3- year period, which 
includes three years after the effective date which is year (0).  
 
It is notable from the earlier table that the average of operating performance increases in 
year +1 and +2 and decreases in year +3. It is notable that the average of operating 
performance increases from year 1 and years 1+2 but it does not improve for years 
1+2+3. 
 
These results share with the earlier results in several respects. Firstly, it is notable that 
there are some improvements in the mean of the operating performance over the studied 
period. For example Linn and Switzer (2001) find that the mean of the operating 
performance of combination firms increases from 21.65% in year -1, to 27.38% in year 
+1. In addition, Linn and Switzer (2001) notice that the median of the operating 
performance of the combined firms has decreased from 25.18% in year +1, to 24.01% in 
year +2. Furthermore, Ghosh (2001) finds that the mean of the combined firm decreases 
from 16.18% in year -2 to 14.78% in year +2. Also the median of the merged firm keeps 
decreasing from year to year, for example it was 14.90% in year -2 and became 13.89% 
in year +2. These results are consistent with Ghosh (2001) in one aspect, which is that 
the median decreases over the studied period which makes these results share with 
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earlier results for domestic and cross-border acquisitions. This implies that there are 
very small improvements or increases in the average of the operating performance and 
that for cross-border acquisitions which are usually happened after the announcement 
date, and there are some decreases in the median of the change of the operating 
performance and that is also after the effective date. The researcher also examines the 
self-attribution bias for earlier acquirers to find out whether they are frequent or 
infrequent. The acquirer is considered as frequent if he did at least two deals one year 
prior to the announcement date of the deal. Otherwise he is considered as an infrequent 
acquirer. The majority of the domestic sample includes frequent acquirers and the same 
for cross-border acquirers. The total number of frequent acquirers that conducted cross-
border acquisitions with a public target is 30 while the total number of acquirers that 
conducted domestic acquisitions is 32. This suggests that earlier results give a good 
reason for acquirers to avoid or reduce doing deals with public targets because operating 
performance gives a good picture about the recent and future situation of those firms. 
 
A regression has been run for the operating performance against four different variables; 
the method of payment, the industrial relationship, the relative size and the Book-to 
Market ratio. Moreover, the researcher depends on Ordinary Least Squares regression.  
  
The motive for making this regression is to find out whether the operating performance 
will be affected by these variables. In addition, it is interesting to know whether there is 
any positive or negative relationship between any of those variables and the operating 
performance. The following tables will present the results for an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression of the operating performance change as a dependent variable against 
earlier variables as independent variables and that is for 41 UK domestic acquirers and 
38 UK cross-border acquirers for three years. The four variables; the method of 
payment, the relative size, the industrial relationship, and the Book-to-Market ratio have 
been considered as independent variables and the operating performance as the 
dependent variable. The following equation will explain more about this regression 
 
 
Where: 
Y:   The operating performance  
:  The method of payment 
:  The relative size 
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:  The industrial relationship 
:  The Book-to-Market ratio 
, , ,  : are the coefficients 
: The error term  
 
Table 7. 9. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for the operating performance against four variables 
within a 3-year period for domestic acquisitions 
 
 W1 
(Year +1) 
W2 
(Year +2) 
W3 
(Year +3) 
W4  
(Years 1+2) 
W5 
(Years 
1+2+3) 
Con -0.104 
(-2.304) 
-0.053 
(-1.185) 
0.056 
(0.992) 
-0.157 
(-1.870) 
-0.100 
(-0.928) 
MOP 0.059 
(1.418) 
0.014 
(0.326) 
-0.043 
(-0.807) 
0.073 
(0.929) 
0.030 
(0.294) 
sec 0.049 
(1.058) 
-0.008 
(-0.176) 
-0.068 
(-1.181) 
0.041 
(0.490) 
-0.026 
(-0.243) 
size -0.775 
(-0.320) 
-0.580 
(-0.236) 
-0.193 
(-0.617) 
-0.135 
(-0.294) 
-0.329 
(-0.555) 
BTM -0.410 
(-0.751) 
0.138 
(0.249) 
0.359 
(0.508) 
-0.271 
(-0.261) 
0.878 
(0.065) 
Observation 41 41 41 41 41 
 
Notes 
This table shows results of OLS regression of the operating performance for 3 years for 41 UK 
acquirers who make domestic acquisitions. MOP means the method of payment and it is a 
dummy that equals 1 when acquirers used cash as a payment to finance their deals, and equals 0 
when they used non-cash as a payment. Size means the relative size of the acquirer to the target, 
and the value of the deal divided by the market value one month prior the announcement date. 
Sector means the industrial sector to which acquirer and target are belonging, and that is dummy 
equals to 1 when the acquirer and the target share same industrial sector, and the dummy equals 
0 when the acquirer and the target are from a different industrial sector. BTM means Book-to-
Market ratio which is considered as considered as the net book value divided by the market 
value one month prior to the announcement date of the deal. The numbers in brackets are the T-
ratios. The data that has been used in w4 and w5 is cross-sectional data.
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One can find from table 7.9 that there is a slight improvement in the operating 
performance when one considers additional variables. The main change which can be 
noticed is in the method of payment for the first year after the announcement year. 
Moreover, these improvements in the operating performance regarding the method of 
payment comes from the impact of using cash as a method of payment instead of 
depending on stock; that is because the number of acquirers that use cash to finance 
their deals is 31 out of 41, which implies that there is an obvious impact of cash deals 
on the performance of the firm. Furthermore, one can note that there is no change or any 
improvement in operating performance if one considers operating performance for the 
first two years together and for the three studied years as well. 
 
The following table includes results for a regression of operating performance against 
four earlier variables for the cross-border acquisitions. 
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Table 7. 10. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for the change in the operating performance against 
four variables within a 3-year period for cross-border deals 
 
 W1 
(Year +1) 
W2 
(Year +2) 
W3 
(Year +3) 
W4 
(Years 1+2) 
W5  
(Years 
1+2+3) 
Con -0.113 
(-0.929) 
0.039 
(0.346) 
-0.022 
(-0.459) 
-0.072 
(-0.359) 
-0.095 
(-0.421) 
MOP 0.093 
(0.917) 
0.120 
(1.243) 
0.061 
(1.509) 
0.213 
(1.247) 
0.275 
(1.442) 
sec 0.089 
(0.819) 
-0.098 
(-0.951) 
-0.027 
(-0.628) 
-0.008 
(-0.047) 
-0.036 
(-0.178) 
size -0.079 
(-0.494) 
-0.155 
(-1.00) 
-0.038 
(-0.598) 
-0.234 
(-0.856) 
-0.272 
(-0.893) 
BTM -0.003 
(-0.922) 
-0.003 
(-1.022) 
-0.002 
(-2.056) 
-0.006 
(-1.125) 
-0.009 
(-1.449) 
Observation 38 38 38 38 38 
 
Notes 
This table shows results of OLS regression of the operating performance for 3 years for 38UK 
acquirers who make cross-border acquisitions. MOP means the method of payment and it is a 
dummy that equals 1 when acquirers used cash as a payment to finance their deals, and equals 0 
when they used non-cash as a payment. Size means the relative size of the acquirer to the target, 
and the value of the deal divided by the market value one month prior the announcement date. 
Sector means the industrial sector to which acquirer and target are belonging, and that is dummy 
equals to 1 when the acquirer and the target share same industrial sector, and the dummy equals 
0 when the acquirer and the target are from a different industrial sector. BTM means Book-to-
Market ratio which is considered as its real value one month prior to announcement date. The 
numbers in brackets are the T-ratios. The data that has been used in w4 and w5 is cross-
sectional data.  
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It is notable that there are some changes in operating performance at year +2 and +3 and 
that for the method of payment and the Book-to-Market ratio. These changes and 
improvements in operating performance stay the same against the method of payment if 
one considers the operating performance for the whole studied years together. It is 
important to add that comparing between operating performance of domestic and cross-
border acquisitions with a public target states that cross-border acquisitions do better 
than domestic deals.  
 
It is important to add that earlier table provides significant evidence which is that 
acquirers usually benefit from an improvement in their operating performance when 
they conduct cross-border acquisitions as compared to when they make domestic deals. 
This gives a good reason for continuing to invest abroad.  
The researcher runs in the following section the OLS regression for the operating 
performance against three variables which are the method of payment, the relative size 
and the industrial relationship. The Book-to Market ratio has been excluded because this 
variable is not a decision or pre-determined variable. The following two tables present 
regression for operating performance against three variables for all studied windows.  
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Table 7. 11. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for the change in the operating performance against 
three variables within a 3-year period for domestic deals 
 
 W1  W2 W3 W4 
(Year 1+2) 
W5 
(Year 
1+2+3) 
Con -0.101 
(-2.346) 
-0.054 
(-1.228) 
0.054 
(0.966) 
-0.155 
(-1.885) 
-0.101 
(-0.952) 
MOP 0.054 
(1.361) 
0.015 
(0.381) 
-0.038 
(-0.740) 
0.070 
(0.911) 
0.031 
(0.315) 
Sec 0.045 
(1.053) 
-0.006 
(-0.148) 
-0.064 
(-1.140) 
0.038 
(0.468) 
-0.025 
(-0.951) 
Size -0.893 
(-0.379) 
-0.541 
(-0.224) 
-0.183 
(-0.593) 
-0.143 
(-0.317) 
-0.326 
(-0.241) 
Observation 41 41 41 41 41 
 
Notes 
This table shows results of OLS regression of the operating performance for 3 years for 41UK 
acquirers who make domestic acquisitions. MOP means the method of payment and it is a 
dummy that equals 1 when acquirers used cash as a payment to finance their deals, and equals 0 
when they used non-cash as a payment. Size means the relative size of the acquirer to the target, 
and the value of the deal divided by the market value one month prior the announcement date. 
Sector means the industrial sector to which acquirer and target are belonging, and that is dummy 
equals to 1 when the acquirer and the target share same industrial sector, and the dummy equals 
0 when the acquirer and the target are from a different industrial sector. The numbers in 
brackets are the T-ratios. The data that has been used in w4 and w5 is cross-sectional data 
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Table 7. 12. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for the change in the operating performance against 
three variables within a 3-year period for cross-border deals 
 
 W1 
Year +1 
W2 
Year +2 
W3 
Year +3 
W4 
(Year 1+2) 
W5 
(Year 
1+2+3) 
Con   -0.023 
(-0.195) 
0.008 
(0.080) 
-0.046 
(-0.933) 
-0.014 
(-0.072) 
-0.060 
(-0.273) 
MOP 0.076 
(0.742) 
0.106 
(1.109) 
0.052 
(1.215) 
0.183 
(1.075) 
0.235 
(1.223) 
sec -0.045 
(-0.441) 
-0.059 
(-0.621) 
0.001 
(0.025) 
-0.105 
(-0.617) 
-0.103 
(-0.540) 
size -0.001 
(-0.007) 
-0.160 
(-1.055) 
-0.036 
(0.536) 
-0.161 
(-0.601) 
-0.197 
(-0.651) 
Observation 38 38 38 38 38 
 
Notes 
This table shows results of OLS regression of the operating performance for 3 years for 38UK 
acquirers who make cross-border acquisitions. MOP means the method of payment and it is a 
dummy that equals 1 when acquirers used cash as a payment to finance their deals, and equals 0 
when they used non-cash as a payment. Size means the relative size of the acquirer to the target, 
and the value of the deal divided by the market value one month prior the announcement date. 
Sector means the industrial sector to which acquirer and target are belonging, and that is dummy 
equals to 1 when the acquirer and the target share same industrial sector, and the dummy equals 
0 when the acquirer and the target are from a different industrial sector. The numbers in 
brackets are the T-ratios. The data that has been used in w4 and w5 is cross-sectional data 
 
 
7.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the researcher studies the synergy gains for 94 UK domestic and cross-
border acquisitions with public targets that have been carried out from the beginning of 
2000 toward the end of 2006. There are several reasons for this type of acquisition. 
First, domestic acquisitions do not have any interesting results in both the previous 
chapters, which raises the issue of what is it that encourages many firms to make or 
keep making this type of investment. In addition, a further aim is to examine or know 
whether there are real economic gains that may be generated or produced from these 
investments. The main requirement in choosing these acquisitions is that the acquirer 
and the target must both be public firms. The researcher finds that these investments do 
not achieve some synergy gains around and over the announcement day. In addition, the 
operating performance has been investigated for this sample for three years around after 
the effective date of the each deal. The results show that there are slight improvements 
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and changes in the operating performance for acquirers that conducted cross-border 
acquisitions compared with those that made domestic deals, but generally earlier results 
give a reason for acquirers to avoid acquiring public firms internationally and 
domestically. Finally, the researcher regress a regression for the operating performance 
against some variables such as, the method of payment, the industrial relationship, the 
relative size, and the Book-To-Market ratio and the industrial sector. The results do not 
show any sensitivity regarding the relative size. 
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Chapter 8: The Conclusions 
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The Conclusions 
 
This dissertation introduces some evidence on the impact of acquisitions on a firm‟s 
stock and how the stock behaves after undertaking or making the deal. This research 
presents some important evidence on topics such as measuring the change in operating 
performance for domestic and cross-border acquisitions with public targets for the long-
term. It is important to mention that this research examines acquisitions between 2000 
and 2009 for UK acquirers. The major motivation which leads to include these 
investments is that by 2000 the world witnessed the end of the fifth merger wave which 
witnessed by itself very significant economic improvements. Thus the researcher wants 
to draw a real picture for these investments in UK and find how they may be influenced 
after the end of that economic period.  
 
Two major requirements were essential in this research. The first one was the Event 
study methodology, which was the essential research device that was used to find out 
and study the acquisition‟s impact on the firm‟s stock depending on investigating the 
cumulative abnormal returns for each firm. The second one was literature which helped 
to understand the main issues in each chapter. For example, understanding how the 
acquiring firm reacts after making the deal and how important the attitude of the 
directors can be in influencing the propensity of a firm to conduct acquisitions.   
 
This dissertation consists of an introductory two chapters, five essays and conclusion 
chapter. The first and the second essays investigate the acquirers‟ returns and the main 
determinants that may affect their returns. The third and fourth essays examine 
directors‟ behavior and self-attribution bias. The last essay considers synergy gains and 
change in operating performance for acquirers of public target firms.  
 
The first essay is titled “UK Acquirers‟ Returns of Domestic and Cross-Border 
Acquisitions”. Acquirers‟ returns have been studied in this essay and that depending on 
the Event study and the Market Model a for a 5-day event window. Moreover, a 
comparison has been made between acquirers of domestic acquisitions and those that 
acquire cross-border target firms. The results confirm that acquirers that acquire 
domestic and cross-border targets have insignificant returns for the whole studied 
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window, but acquirers that acquirer domestic targets have higher returns compared with 
those that have acquired cross-border targets.  
 
The second essay is titled “The Determinants of Domestic and Cross-Border 
Acquisitions”. The major variables that have been studied in this essay are the method 
of payment, the relative size, the industrial relationship, the Book-To-Market ratio and 
the type of the target firm.  
 
 The results confirm that acquirers with large relative size, cash deals, private targets 
and high Book-to-Market ratio generate significant returns compared with acquirers 
with small relative size, non-cash deals, low Book-to-Market ratio and public targets 
and that for domestic and cross-border deals. On the other hand, acquirers that acquire 
domestic targets from a different industrial sector produce higher returns compared with 
acquirers with targets from the same sector, and acquirers that acquirer cross-border 
targets generate high returns when they acquire targets from same industrial sector.  
 
The third essay is titled “Directors‟ Overconfidence and Its Impact on Acquirers‟ 
Returns”. This essay introduces evidence on self-attribution bias which has been 
considered as a basis for some managerial behaviour. These results confirm that 
frequent acquirers have lower returns compared with infrequent acquirers. 
 
The fourth essay is titled “Insider Trading and Acquirer Returns in Domestic and Cross-
Border Acquisitions” Furthermore, the essay measures the relationship between private 
investment decisions of directors and firm‟s investment regarding the acquisitions it 
makes via two main measures. The first one which is called the number of transactions 
method, this method depends on the number of transactions that directors have carried 
out, the directors being considered as optimistic when the number of buys is larger than 
the number sales by at least two transactions. The second one is called the amount 
method, which depends on measuring the difference between the number of purchases 
scaled by the amount of purchases and the number of sales that scaled by the amount of 
sales. The director will be regarded as being optimistic according to this method if the 
difference is positive, otherwise he will classified as neutral. Major results for acquirers 
of domestic and cross-border acquisitions present that optimistic managers have 
significant returns compared with neutral directors.  
.  
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Generally, these results guide the researcher to investigate more about acquirers with 
public targets and also lead me to question whether those acquisitions produce any real 
returns or gains.  The results did not show any abnormal returns for acquirers with 
public targets. 
 
The fifth essay is titled “Studying the Synergy Gains and Operating Performance for 
Acquirers with Public Targets”. In this essay, the synergy gains for acquirers that 
undertake domestic and cross-border deals and public targets have been studied. The 
results show that this kind of investment does not generate any synergy gains and that is 
for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions. Moreover, the researcher introduces 
new evidence via measuring operating performance change of those acquisitions 
depending for a 3-year period after the effective date of each acquisition. Results 
provide that are no clear or big improvements in operating performance for acquisitions 
with target firms which encourage acquirers to acquire that type of target. In addition, 
earlier results lead the research to run a regression of the operating performance change 
against some variables, and the reason for that is to find out whether there is any 
relation between the operating performance and any of the earlier variables. Mainly, the 
results confirm that these variables have no clear effect on the operating performance 
such as, the industrial relationship and the relative size, while the method of payment 
and the Book-to-Market ratio have a small impact on the operating performance and 
that is for cross-border deals. It is important to add that the novelty of this thesis is 
measuring the operating performance for domestic and cross-border acquisitions. 
 
This research may be expanded in several areas. First of all, regarding the first essay, 
this essay may be extend via calculating the acquirers‟ abnormal returns depending on 
more than one model and comparing between the returns according to those results. 
Second, the second essay could be improved more by including extra variables such as 
investigating more about acquirers‟ characteristics such as Tobin‟s Q, Debt/Asset ratio 
according to the Book value and to the Market value. Third, the third essay can be 
developed by including the personal characteristics of directors in this study such as, the 
impact of the director‟s age, and the effect of the education background for each 
director. Fourth, the last essay can be improved by studying the impact of more 
variables on the operating performance or via studying the effect of the method of 
payment in more detail, as well as by expanding the sample. In addition, further and 
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future studies should be done on examining the legal origin effects on acquirers‟ returns 
and investor protection. The importance of this idea comes according to La Porta et al. 
(2000) from differences between countries in their financial systems such as in the 
ownership of public firms, in access of firms to exterior funds, and in dividend policies. 
With respect to the above idea, it is notable that the protection of shareholders and 
creditors by the legal system is a very fundamental one to consider and understand 
corporate finance in different countries. Investor production is a very critical idea 
because in many countries expropriation of minority shareholders is widespread. When 
outside investors try to finance firms and make investment abroad, they may face a risk 
and their returns may be influenced negatively because of the controlling of 
shareholders and managers as insiders. Thus considering corporate governance as 
essential procedures will help outsiders to protect themselves against the expropriation 
of insiders. There are many faces of expropriation which should be considered such as 
selling the assets of the firm by insiders to another firm with an artificially low price. 
Several articles have proved that strong investor protection is related to efficient 
corporate governance.   
 
Cross-border acquisitions according to Bris and Cabolis (2008) are the best methods to 
examine investor protection and find out how firms change corporate governance. It is 
significant to add that future studies may also focus on studying cross-border 
acquisitions from 2000-2009 via examining investor protection and also investigating 
how legal origin may influence acquirers‟ returns.    
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